A SURVEY OF FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR BAY AREA POLICE DEPARTMENTS

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TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR BAY AREA
POLICE DEPARTMENTS

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Chapter 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study is to see how policemen can benefit from training in the area of psychological counseling. More specifically, the study will attempt to look at how departments teach new behaviors to policemen that they might consequently provide a new approach to adjudicating stressful non-criminal situations. This was done by conducting an inventory of Bay Area Police Programs in family crisis intervention. Although stressful crisis situations are non-criminal at the inception, they very often contain all the necessary ingredients to erupt into aggravated assaults or even murders. The specific problem under investigation here centers around the lack of specialized training in this area. The study points to a need to increase this training so that it would be commensurate to that actual percentage of job performance involving stressful non-criminal situations. To further elaborate on this, a policeman's job consists of approximately 80 percent of non-emergency work. This itself is a very significant concept in that only approximately 20 percent of our time is spent in emergency situations (gun fights, fist fights and foot chases). The bulk of the training, approximately 90 percent is geared to that 20 percent of working time. The discrepancy here is that the actual training and preparation for the handling of the
lion's share of the policeman's job, is prepared for only on a 10 percent factor in the training.
Chapter 2

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

The overwhelming majority of murders and aggravated assaults occur between people who know each other. In many of these situations the people involved summon police aid when they are feeling very frustrated and stressful. When the policeman arrives, he is faced with the monumental task of attempting to adjudicate or effectively interacting with an emotional problem in about twenty or thirty minutes. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the problem itself has more than likely been brewing for days, weeks and even years. In these stressful non-criminal situations, the policeman himself feels frustration since no crime has been committed, the matter does not necessarily come under his purview. In many cases people are asking for help as a last resort in the only way they know how. To heighten the frustration of all persons concerned, the usual stance that the policeman takes is that he cannot become overly involved and rightfully so since he has no power to actually do any arbitration. A policeman may however attempt to get involved, but if he has had no training in counseling he may steer the situation into a non-productive direction. These situations are very frustrating to policemen as we realize that we are often the last ray of hope the citizens look to for help before resorting to violence. We can see an assault or murder
in the making but have no real power to head it off.

The things that separate policemen from regular citizens, is first his power to arrest and second his power to use deadly force. In stressful non-criminal situations neither of these powers can be invoked, thereby reducing the police officer to the role of just another citizen. The police officer in a situation like that cannot be any more effective than a druggist or mailman. This above described situation shows that there exists a pressing need for the expertise developed by social scientist. Even though the need has existed for many years, implementation was not to be forthcoming since police departments and social scientists have traditionally had antagonistic ideological views. Social scientists have long been viewed by policemen as academic goons, people with their heads in the clouds who lacked real world life experiences. Consequently as such police departments have never had much use for social scientists. Social scientists on the other hand have long considered the police departments as being somewhat of a sacred cow. Aloof, forbidding and not lending itself to being psychologized. It was not until the last several years, that both sides became anxious to educate each about the other.

There are several different reasons why crisis intervention in police departments have become a very dominant force. It could be defined as assistance given by police departments to citizens being involved in stressful
non-criminal situations. These situations may take the outward forms of arguments between parents and their children, boyfriend/girlfriend disputes, husband/wife and customer disputes and on down the line. One of the reasons that crisis intervention training was started was that a crisis situation was not necessarily something that a policeman could get his teeth into. Although many officers felt compassion and empathy for the people that he interacted with, he also felt incompetent to really resolve or help to resolve their problems. His training in this area had been so limited, that the actual perimeter of effective crisis intervention was ill-defined so that a policeman could not get a feel for the degree of empathy necessary for effective help if he became overly involved in one of these stressful non-criminal situations. Another reason for the slow development of crisis intervention is the lack of departmental motivation for developing these skills. In the classical paradigm of stimulus response learning, that response which is immediately followed by reward is likely to be exhibited on subsequent occasions under similar conditions. There is not much reward for developing good crisis intervention skills in police departments. There is and has traditionally been much reward both overt and subtle in making felony arrests however. Therefore according to the concept developed by Dr. Pavlov, it is very easy to see why the crisis intervention skills never became a dominate force in police departments.
Crisis intervention training in most of the academies occupy a small portion of the recruits time. Confidence in handling these type situations is usually learned on the street from other officers and the old trial and error method. The average policeman on the street has been very ill-prepared to interact with the different demands of a crisis situation. One of the other small items that is of prime concern to policemen is that stressful non-criminal situations are extremely dangerous and unpredictable. The unpredictability is partly a function of the heights to which emotions have risen and partly because of the lack of good solid training of the policemen in those areas and partly due to the effect of the policeman of being a catalyst by evoking more emotionality by his appearance alone. The policeman arrives with a uniform and a gun symbolizing authority and a displacement of aggression occurs. It is easy at times for citizens involved in stressful situations to redirect their hostility toward the policeman.

Citizens at times like to call upon the policeman to solve their individual problems. And as the policeman represents authority the citizens very often find it easy to abdicate their positions of being rational thinking beings and surrender to the policeman the decision making process about what to do in that particular situation. Faced with different situations which had so many volatile components, police officers have handled these occasions very gingerly.
For example in a husband/wife dispute, what is usually attempted is to ask one party or the other to leave. It should be noted that there is actually no leverage to be utilized to insist upon this point. At this juncture in the intervention, a police officer is reduced to the position of merely suggesting and the suggestions might be accepted or rejected depending upon the whims of the combatants involved. There is nothing more frustrating to a police officer than to have a dispute of this type with both sides equally angry at each other, and know that it would only take an isolated word/incident to set it off into a major explosion. In a case like this, an astute police officer would suggest that one party leave for the night, but if both parties are adamant about not leaving there is absolutely nothing that a police officer can do besides leave the scene.

Another reason for the apparent distaste for the stressful non-criminal situations is that the outcome no matter what, is usually bad. It is generally acknowledged that arrest of one of the participants is not the best way to handle the problem. These type situations are better resolved in their own milieu rather than in a court of law. In a case of a husband beating his wife, the wife is naturally upset and usually she gets the worse end of the physical exchange and in many cases cries for the husband to be arrested. Experienced officers usually realize the temporary aspect of her particular mind set and attempt to calm her
down to try to make her see the pragmatics of the arrest of her husband. In doing this, they explain the mechanics of the arrest procedure for battery. Police officers cannot arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in their presence and in essence if the wife wishes the husband arrested then she in fact would effect a citizen's arrest on him as the police officer takes him into custody and delivers him to the judicial system. Since this is the case then a wife would conceivably have her husband arrested because she shows some objective evidence of the physical exchange, but she must press the point. I have had the opportunity to observe many situations like this, with the wife ranting and raving for the husband to be arrested. Under the same situation I have also noted that the wife was the first one to run down to the police station with money to bail the husband out of jail. I have interviewed many such wives because it is very time consuming and counterproductive for police personnel to be utilized as leverage of the wife to intimidate her husband. Invariably the response that I get from the wives are that after their emotionality subsided to the point where they could rationally process the available information they came to the conclusion that the bail money was going to have to come out of the family budget of which she is an active user. Conclusion number two is if the husband remains in jail for a day or two into the work week, then he would lose that amount of dollars in wages. The ultimate irony is that rarely
does any one of these couples seek and obtain a divorce, so the entire process merely places an undue economic burden on an already strained relationship. So in these cases the wife eventually arrives at the same conclusion that an experienced officer already knew; and that is if a battery does occur and it is not unduly severe, then it would be better to try and resolve it outside of the police realm. The resolution could possibly be discussing the problem to attempt to arrive at some intelligent solution. If the wife was very apprehensive about her safety and well being, then she could either separate or get a divorce. Usually in these type cases the wife actively seeks no divorce but merely wants to use some muscle against her husband in response to his using muscle against her. So what usually happens is that policemen get caught right in the middle of this game playing much to the detriment of the officers themselves. The family stress situations are very burdensome on the policemen since there is no cooling off period in which they can be resolved. They are very unstable situations and policemen make very few friends as a result of their intervention. One party will feel that he/she has been sided against. Another reason that these family fight situations weigh heavily upon the police departments is that there are a high frequency of call backs. Once families realize that someone can intervene in their problems, there is a tendency to call with a bit of regularity. In a police department's working day, there is only twenty-four
hours in which to respond to X number of emergency calls and if an undue amount of time is spent being social workers and marriage counselors, the ability to provide effective patrol and prompt responses to crimes is greatly curtailed.

Many police executives as well as their civilian counterparts would agree that a police department is not the best agency to interact with many situations for which they get called. This being the case, the following question might arise: Why do people call the police department for situations that policemen are ill-equipped to handle and in many cases not the proper agency concerned? As any veteran police officer will be able to tell you, most family fights and violent crimes occur between two or three hours of darkness. Within two or three hours on either side of sun down, you can encompass approximately 75 percent of stressful non-criminal situations and violent crimes.

There are reasons why stressful non-criminal situations (SNS) occur during the hours of evening or darkness. In family fight cases the spouses do not get together until the evening of the day (because of work or school schedules). After the two arrive home, it takes a while for the irritation to slowly build up to a crescendo. The significant point here is that any such social agency equipped to handle the family fight situations are usually closed during the hours of darkness. Hence there are few if any resources to turn to in the hours of darkness, thus the police department is a
very observable appendage of city government and social welfare. In addition to being readily available, the service is free. Were a price tag placed on police services in the form of a bill, the number of calls and call backs would drastically be reduced. The forces at work that are responsible for police getting a large number of social service type calls are:

1. readily available on a twenty-four hour basis;
2. able to respond to the person's house; and
3. the reason that I think is a very important consideration is that the service is free.

People feel rather comfortable about calling policemen to settle family disputes because the organization is well known, trustworthy and not about to go out of business. People tend to feel very comfortable about involving policemen in their personal matters. People have been known to tell policemen very intimate things about their private lives.

Another form of SNS is with people who are lonely and on the verge of suicide. There are cases of elderly persons living alone whose spouse is deceased and whose children are married and living miles away. This type of loneliness is unbearable at times. In the case of some of our elderly citizens, they are retired and have no meaningful occupation and end up doing a lot of chores around the house, shopping, calling a friend for light conversation. Rarely if ever do they have an outlet where they can have meaningful
communication with another person to discuss problems, feelings and anxieties. They often, since living alone, tend to be very apprehensive and frightened at minor things such as wind blowing or cars going down the street at a high rate of speed. In responding to hundreds of this type call, the officer usually realizes in about five minutes that the person is only needing someone to talk to. After the initial problem is discussed, the person will invite the officer to have a cup of coffee, pull out a photo album and discuss the world situation with the officer. This is a most difficult situation to be in since according to time and motion studies, the productivity of the policeman is greatly diminished. If, on the other hand, someone does not listen to this person, there is a possibility of a schizophrenic break with reality or the very serious consideration of suicide by this person. Although communicating with a person like this is very basic in one to one communication, it is not rewarded in police environments and as such policemen do not actively seek out these situations. If an officer is very concerned about passing his probationary period, these time consuming crisis intervention sessions do not help his record and take up large blocks of his time.

Professionals in the world of mental health, realize this problem of the unavailability of social services during the peak times of need. They have been unable to make a meaningful attempt to change the pattern of business as usual.
One of the problems is the inability to get staffing and monies for operation on a twenty-four hour basis. Another major concern is that professionals are ill-equipped to deal with violence if a situation should erupt into that. It is not clear if there is reluctance of mental health professionals to get involved because of the possibility of violence, but I am sure that more than just passing consideration has been given to this very important fact. Therefore for these above reasons, availability of mental health services during prime time is severely lacking.

There has been an increase in awareness of the very dire need for family crisis intervention, and the reasons for this vary. One of the underlying causes for the need of the crisis intervention is the basic breakdown of the family unit. A large part of our society is very mobile and diversified. In many situations a family changes from a family to being merely a group of people with the same name living at the same address. Everyone has their own lifestyle, activities, occupations much to the exclusion of the other members. Problems in living conditions such as these are inevitable. When several people are living together in close quarters with varied interests and backgrounds, patience wears thin and tempers fray. If the technique of communication has not been nurtured and developed, it cannot be utilized during times of extreme emotionality. When communication between members of a family or relatives comes to a stop, there is
a dire need to stimulate this conversation or in some manner facilitate it.

One of the important reasons for the realization of the need for crisis intervention counseling in police depart­ments is the influx of non-traditional peoples into the police environment. Starting in the 1960's and continuing until now, there has been a dramatic influx of college trained people. Many watched the violent upheavals during the Vietnam and other campus centered demonstrations and felt a burning desire to formulate alternative solutions. Social scientists should be commended for recently coming out of their learning labs to share their expertise with the community at large in the form of outreach programs.

The realization of the need for crisis intervention counseling coupled with a vehicle to serve that need all combine to form a very important reason to review the existing crisis intervention programs. These type crisis intervention (CI) permit us to take an in depth look at the infra-structure to see if there is a prescription approach to CI or if there is a need for alternative approaches. This review will also express the degree to which social scientists have become involved with police departments. One other reason for reviewing these various programs is that the training provided in these programs is very crucial because of the environments that policemen have to function within in that the quality of service very often has a profound
impact on the situation. Lastly it allows this author to draw together some of the results of some of the various local projects.

Some police departments have realized the above problems and recognized the need to try new and untraditional approaches to traditional problems. Three Bay Area departments, Richmond, San Francisco, and Oakland have attempted to establish CI training, each having different degrees of success as well as different strengths and weaknesses. I think it important to examine the different projects for some, the lack of accomplishments were as notable as some of the accomplishments.
Chapter 3

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE

The FBI's annual report on crime points out some startling facts that must be reckoned with. In the year 1974, a total of 132 local county, state and Federal law enforcement officers were killed due to felonious criminal action in the United States and Puerto Rico. Of this number, twenty-nine officers were slain responding to "disturbance calls" which included family quarrels, bar fights, boyfriend/girlfriend disputes, etc.

In 1974 there were over 20,000 murders committed in the United States. The reason and situations are quite varied for the commission of murder, and they tend to range from family arguments to felonious activities. Criminal homicide is largely a societal problem which is beyond the control of police per se. The circumstances of murder serve to emphasize this point. In 1974, murder within the family unit made up approximately 25 percent of all murder offenses. Over 50 percent of these family killings involved spouse killing spouse. The rest were parents killing children and other relative killings.

Aggravated assault is defined as an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious
bodily harm. Attempts are included since it is not necessary that an injury result when a gun knife, or other weapon is used which could and probably would result in serious personal injury if the crime were successfully completed. Most aggravated assaults occur within the family unit and among neighbors or acquaintances. The victim-offender relationship, as well as the nature of the attack this crime similar to murder.

In *Psychology and the Problems of Society*, Korten found that there was a growing awareness on the part of social scientists that people are not merely mindless automatons that respond only when stimulated. Social scientist began to voice their feelings that society's problems were people problems and could be effectively interacted with on that basis. Korten puts forth in bound form, many of the presentations that were made at the 1969 APA convention. Efforts were put forth to make psychological expertise available to the average citizen to bring their talents to bear on socially relevant problems.

Rush, Temple University, 1974, in his *A Study of Police Citizen Transactions*, found that certain police personality types were more likely to get complaints in misdemeanor and felony situations than others.

Reiter, University of Southern California, 1974, *An Alternative Model for Delivering Counseling Services to Inner City Juvenile Offenders: A Police Based Program*, notes that juvenile crime can be reduced through the provision of
counseling services to the offender in a system which is characterized by improved counseling response time.

Varni, Washington State, 1974, Images of Police Work and Mass Media Propaganda, points out that there is evidence to indicate that there is a linear relationship between self image and role expectations. He suggests that one way to alter the way in which we live up to role expectations is to influence our own self images.

The thin thread that draws all of the above literature together is that:

1. Crisis situations are volatile
2. Social scientist skills can help
3. There is a need to take these skills to the places where needed at the times needed.

The literature strongly indicates that such an approach of taking effective skills into crisis situations may well have a very profound effect on all those concerned.
Chapter 4
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

For the purposes of this study, information was collected and analyzed on crisis intervention training programs of three Bay Area Police Departments. These are the Richmond, Oakland, and San Francisco police departments. These training programs were evaluated over four variables:

1. Selection
2. Training
3. Operations
4. Evaluation

A critique was written on each department based on the four points of comparison listed above. In comparing these departments the reader can see how police departments have attempted to address themselves to a very socially significant problem. The reader will be given a clinical view of these various problems, that he might see the weaknesses as well as the strengths of each program.

PROJECT SUMMARIES

Richmond Police Department

In 1973 the Richmond police department was the first Bay Area agency to make domestic crisis intervention part of its regularly scheduled training. The Richmond police department also enjoys the distinction of being a pioneer in the
concept of training their entire patrol force in crisis intervention. The curriculum of the crisis intervention was implemented by the staff of the police department in conjunction with a firm of professionals in that field. One notable fact of the program, is that the Richmond police department put this program into motion without external funding.

Selection. After careful consideration of some of the pragmatics involved, it was decided by the staff of Richmond police that for their particular goals and interest it would be better to try and train generalists instead of specialists. A generalist officer is an officer who handles all of the cases on his beat. A specialist on the other hand would be trained for a specific job and would handle only that type call such as burglary investigators, rape investigators, etc. Some departments have taken the approach that special teams will be trained to handle crisis intervention and assigned to work during those times of the day when crisis situations have a high degree of frequency. The staff of Richmond was apparently cognizant of the mechanics of the formation of abrasive relationships by segregating officers of equal rank. The staff deliberately did not train specialists in order to avoid the concomitant problems that accompany elitism. Consideration was also given to the fact that there would be situations where the particular crisis would not allow the officer the luxury of time in order to summon a specialist.
There apparently was also the realization that there are on occasion needs for immediate intervention by someone external to the family involved in a crisis situation. It should be noted that this was a very perceptive move on the part of Richmond in the sense that it appears very unprofessional for a policeman to respond to a crisis situation and tell the citizens involved that he could not interact with that problem because that was not his particular forte. With a cold bureaucratic approach as such, great harm can be done in the area of public relations. Not only that, but the psychological advantage could be lost by one officer responding and backing out only to have the citizen wait another block of time until an elite officer arrived to help with his problem. Citizens who are emotionally distraught cannot readily understand why it takes an officer who is trained in crisis intervention instead of the one who is not. The citizen sees a uniform and tends to think of the police department as a monolithic organization and can be unduly agitated by having to await the arrival of a second officer. Lastly and most importantly, I think there should be more than consideration given to the idea that if an officer responded to a crisis situation, determined it to be just that and left the scene, there could be an escalation into a criminal situation by the time the second officer arrived to adjudicate what was originally a SNS (stressful non-criminal situation). At this particular juncture the second
officer arriving who is skilled in crisis intervention would find out that a crime has occurred, i.e. battery assault with a deadly weapon which would mandate some immediate police action and thereby negate his crisis intervention training.

Training. The training of the patrol force in Richmond police department encompassed the 80 man patrol force and they were individually taught in groups of approximately 10 to 12 men. The entire patrol force completed the training program and there was not one officer in the patrol division who was systematically denied access to the training. The particular emphasis in the training program was on teaching a behavioral approach to crisis intervention. The educators themselves particularly avoided the pure academic and or theoretician approach in lieu of teaching a more "how to" approach than a "why" approach. The particular firm that conducted the training was very adept in training police officers as they had prior exposure not only to police in general but to the police officers in the Richmond department, so there was no initial resistance or resentment. This acceptance was a crucial factor because one of the most scathing indictments of the social scientific world by police officers is that they are not in touch with the very real world constraints within which the police officer must function. The police officer has an average eight hour work day and he must conduct investigations, be a public relations man, render various services all against the backdrop of responding to
called for services. If as some social scientist propose, policemen are to spend one hour or more on one of these SNS then some areas of his job performance will suffer. The firm retained to do the training was very much in touch with the situation of receiving more calls than one can respond to and having by necessity to establish a priority system of calls. A police officer has not unlimited time and must get the most mileage out of his functions. There is also a feeling among some police officers that they are being put upon by society when they are called to help solve problems for which society is partly responsible. The feeling is that society impinges upon peoples lives in ways to combine with other factors to help foster socially maladaptive behavior. Accordingly society does not take an active role in solving the problems and it defers the actual solving of the problems to police departments who neither want nor solicit it.

Points of safety was another factor that made the Richmond program acceptable to the police officers. Police officers are very safety conscious since they know how quickly and seriously a person can be injured in a SNS. Consequently any program proposed for them had to be designed around a viable officer safety program because even after the crisis intervention training they remain police officers and are not psychologists.

Specific procedures were taught to the patrolmen in
the classes to arrive at very definite behavioral goals. Stress was placed on knowing the limitations on certain suggestions and when to choose one suggestion over another as well as how to employ the different methods. The approximate ten man team was subjected to approximately fourteen hours of classes along with a like amount of time in out of classroom reading. Day to day assignments involved utilizing the newly learned skills in order to supplement the reading. Much planning went into the preparation of the classroom material so as to maximize its effectiveness. An example of this was to distribute a syllabus so the students would not have to try to take notes while they were in the process of interacting in the classroom situation and field work.

The approach of the consultants was purely a behavioral one as there was no attempt to unscrew the tops off the heads of the different officers to realign their attitudes or prejudices. The object of the class was merely to make available to the different officers new behaviors that they could draw on during times of crisis intervention. The consultants wisely realized that a direct attack on attitudes does very little to change them. Very often the person innoculates himself quite well against change.

Another reason this program was a viable one was that input was solicited from the officers themselves in structuring the course. Prior to the beginning of the training, the troops in the patrol division were surveyed about the
training needs in the area of domestic crisis intervention. A certain universe of information was compiled about the expressed desires of the troops as well as their expressed concerns for safety and necessary precautions. This solicited input was invaluable in tailoring the course to meet the needs of the men on the street and very instrumental in preventing the program from being rejected by the police officers. These ideas were of prime concern in the Richmond project. The officers were aware that their ideas had been listened to and utilized in making up the course; this coupled with the idea that they were familiar with the consultants as the consultants had been riding for sometime with the patrol officers and were strangers neither to the patrolmen or crisis intervention made the program run smoothly.

Operations. Since the Richmond police department did not train specialty teams, there was virtually twenty-four hour availability of police officers trained in crisis intervention. In this sense there was very little difficulty in coordinating the program. The new crisis intervention technique did not pose any undue strain on the system as there was no significant increase in the amount of time spent on family crisis calls. This coupled with the fact that supervisors as well as patrolmen attended the crisis intervention training afforded the supervisor a better understanding of the mechanics of the entire program thereby insuring better communication which tended to diminish the
conflict between patrol officers and their supervisors. Since the supervisors themselves had some degree of expertise in crisis intervention they were thereby able to evaluate and critique an officer's performance in crisis intervention.

The community of Richmond arose to meet the challenge of the new crisis intervention program. A list of social services and agencies designed to help in crisis intervention was compiled and reduced to 3 X 5 loose leaf notebooks and distributed to each beat officer. This list included over thirty agencies ranging from alcoholic and drug counseling, medical and dental care, psychiatric and family counseling, legal aid, rap sessions and financial assistance.

Evaluation. The crisis intervention training at Richmond was not federally funded therefore there was no formal procedure to evaluate the overall impact of the program. Although there was some feedback by supervisory personnel as well as patrolmen, there was no formal announcement as to the overall efficacy of the program.

Richmond Domestic Crisis Intervention Unit Critique

Selection. The Richmond police department chose not to educate a select few of their patrol force, but rather to educate the entire force. One of the admitted problems in this approach is that there was some initial skepticism and suspicion in taking this shotgun approach. The training
inducted officers with varying degrees of expertise, knowledge and willingness to participate in a program of psychological counseling, and even though exposure very often diminishes anxiety and encourages dialogue, the end result of the program still only realized about 85 percent level of effectiveness.

Training. The training in the Richmond project is considered to be the singlemost important part of the program. Care was taken to develop a program that was palatable to the people to be trained, as well as soliciting input from the people to be trained. Since there was input from the people involved, which was actually implemented into the training program, the entire program seemed more viable than it ordinarily would have. The officers were more receptive to the new ideas and more willing to use them in their day to day operation. Since the educators taught a behavioral approach, it can be replicated and even adapted to other departments. The end result is that the actual degree of efficiency of the officer was a combination of his learning new behaviors, his own past police experiences, and the degree of commitment he made to becoming more efficient in the area of crisis intervention.

Training the classes and groups of ten to twelve was efficient as it afforded the class member the luxury of doing crisis intervention role playing in triads or dyads. Video tape playbacks were especially effective since much of what is done in day to day interactions is based upon individual
perceptions of things. Rarely do we have the opportunity to validate feelings/behaviors by observing ourselves as we are interacting in certain situations. Very often after the officers saw themselves on videotape, they agreed that there seemed to have been some discrepancies between what they occasionally tried to transmit and what they actually exhibited. This increased the dialogue between patrolmen and it increased the desire to try and be more explicit in both words and actions.

Although most of the members of the classes were motivated to participate in the classroom learning, there was a reluctance for whatever reason to do some of the reading. Failure to complete the required reading was a two-fold problem. Some of the officers were not that interested in the course itself and thereby did not do the reading, and some officers were interested in the class but were not interested necessarily in doing the readings. This was a significant problem since there was a limited amount of time in which to train the officers, and new information had to be predicated on already learned information. There was a significant amount of classroom time spent in trying to help the unprepared officers keep pace with the rest of the class. There was loss of valuable training time and the program was a little watered down from its original design.

Operations. It was very efficient to have trained officers on a twenty-four hour basis in all parts of the city. A very
crucial and important by-product of the training was the active participation and input of the officers in the field in modifying and readjusting departmental procedures developed in responses to crisis intervention type situations. Although there was a list of agencies compiled for community resources, there was a lag in the amount of feedback of the community resource agencies relayed back to the police department. Since the concept of confidentiality of records precluded police referral information from the particular agencies, there was no systematic way to assess community satisfaction or to see if it was even beneficial to the people referred.

**Evaluation.** The lack of a thorough and competent evaluation of the program is a serious indictment of it. A good evaluation would have supported some hypotheses or conversely not proven them thereby giving rise to valuable input for future recommendations and adaptations. Since some of the items of training were intuitively felt to be beneficial and were not statistically derived and validated via an evaluation, many of the beneficial effects still lack sound documentation. A good evaluation supporting certain concepts or pointing the directions for development of new concepts would have been very beneficial to other departments and to the Richmond police department in writing a program to get federal funds. Richmond however should be lauded for their pioneering spirit and ability to implement the program sans funding. The fact that the evaluation was not devised was more attributable to
the lack of federal funds than to a reluctance to provide some sort of evaluative data.

Oakland Police Department

The particular program in Oakland was able to secure a little more support than that of the Richmond police department. Although Oakland did not receive total funding, there was a significant amount of monies to come from the National Institute of Mental Health as that organization realized that one of the concomitant items of mental aberrations is violence. Although some funds were received from this agency, the bulk of the weight was borne on the shoulders of the Oakland departmental budget. One of the unique factors of this program is that it was studied by a group of patrolmen who then in turn presented the idea to the chief of police who was Charles Gain at that time.

Selection. A group of students was selected from the ranks of patrol officers who had volunteered for the training. The selection process utilized peer recommendations as well as group interviews. The selection process had four criteria which the members were eventually selected had to satisfy or meet. The first one was that the member must have volunteered to work with the program. Secondly the member must have demonstrated a capability of calming disturbances and maintaining control throughout the call with a minimum of friction between himself and those involved. Thirdly the member must
have demonstrated the willingness to utilize the service and problem on the approach to the family disturbance and lastly the member must have had recent street experience.

Training. The Oakland police department did not retain an outside agency to do the actual training of the officers. The Oakland department opted to use an in-house type of training. The curriculum and training was centered around a universe of information compiled by officers who had a wealth of experience and some good judgment. The actual training was centered around peer group analysis of tapes made of actual family fight situations. The group would meet and the officers would listen to each other's tapes of recent interventions and try to determine what causal element made the crisis take a turn for the positive or become worse. Much care was taken to try and determine what words, events or techniques would produce an effect on the crisis situation itself. There was a one-day orientation with officials of outside agencies to whom the policemen might subsequently be referring people to or calling upon as resource assistance.

Operations. The police officers themselves researched the number and types of crisis situations and established some important facts. They determined that the majority of the crisis intervention type calls for service came between the hours of 7 p.m. to 3 a.m., Wednesday through Sunday. The officers were also able to determine that the majority of
the calls appeared to have come from two sectors of the city and they were thereby able to concentrate their efforts there. The officers who were trained in crisis intervention worked as a two man team whose responsibility was handling crisis type calls. Since four officers were trained, two two-man teams were developed. In order to get as much mileage out of the officers as police officers as well as their newly learned crisis intervention skills, their secondary assignment was to function as cover cars for the regular beat officer when they were not actively engaged in crisis intervention. There were some logistical difficulties to later develop which eventually saw the crisis intervention officers engaged in normal patrol activities when they were not actively responding to these crisis intervention calls. The two units were assigned to the different sectors that had the high incidence of crisis intervention type calls. Direct supervision of the field crisis officers was provided by the regular district patrol supervisor. It was also the responsibility of the police supervisors to establish and periodically monitor contact with local service type agencies. In this way Oakland was unique in that they maintained their own contact with the social service agencies and not having an outside agency to be the intermediary. The Oakland plan had some flexibility built into it thereby enabling the field crisis intervention officers to follow-up on the case to see if the crisis family/person had in fact taken advantage of
Evaluation. Oakland was able to develop and utilize an evaluation system. They were aware of the limitations and the inconclusive results of some of the programs that had no evaluation. In short, Oakland's evaluation had five basic areas:

1. Descriptive data on families calling the police.
2. The outcome data on family crisis intervention unit effectiveness.
3. Comparative data on family crisis intervention unit patrol activities.
4. Survey of officer reaction to the family crisis intervention unit.
5. Survey of citizens served by the crisis intervention unit.

Although the size of the crisis intervention unit was only four officers which represented a very small percentage of the Oakland force, the results provide valuable input on the operations effectiveness and limitations of crisis intervention counseling.

Oakland Domestic Crisis Intervention Unit Critique

Selection. Oakland's selection of officers from a list of volunteers would lead one to believe that the ultimate officer
selected either had a high degree of interest in crisis intervention or some prior exposure and/or expertise. These four officers who were eventually selected might have been atypical of the entire patrol force. Any results either positive or negative could not necessarily be generalized to the entire force or other police departments since such a small sample was used. If the officers who were eventually selected were indeed atypical of the patrol force, the results of the evaluation might in actuality be measuring the impact of something other than the actual crisis intervention training which would lead us to believe we cannot accept the premise that the training was responsible for the results. One new innovative avant-garde thing about the selection process of Oakland, was the concept of utilizing peer nomination. A selection committee of select patrol officers was empaneled to make the final selection of the 14 volunteers. The patrol officers who actually work on the street have interacted with the officers who volunteered and would therefore be in a better position to evaluate how he would react under stress than an administrator who had little or no interaction with the troops on the street. In this way it was possible for the selection committee to be much more responsive to the needs of the community.

Training. The use of tape recorders to critique was quite effective. An officer was able to interact with the tape a little better than he could with a lecture or vocal repre-
sentation of certain concepts. The tape recordings were real world situations and not simulated which geared the officer to think more in terms of pragmatics instead of using the mind set of a theoretician. Additionally there existed the possibility and the likely probability that a storage facility could be established for different types of crisis situations much like a tape library. In this manner invaluable research material could be available to an officer at a moment's notice.

Oakland's dogmatic refusal to solicit any formal training for their officers can ultimately be assessed as not necessarily being that adverse. Prior to that point, many of the crisis intervention classes and curricula were not of a behaviorist bent. Many of the programs up to that point were more theoretical and not readily applicable to everyday real world situations. Oakland deliberately avoided this faulty design by bypassing prepared courses and devising one of their own and exerting energies to make it work. Even professionals in the field of crisis intervention acknowledged the merits of the Oakland program. The Oakland program could be improved upon somewhat by the addition of material from professionals in the field of crisis intervention, however the additional material would only supplement the basic Oakland program.

Operation. Right from the onset, Oakland was bothered by conflict which was the byproduct of some operational
difficulties. The problem with Oakland as with any other police department was that there was seemingly too many called for services to justify utilizing manpower in specialized fields such as crisis intervention. There was some concern expressed by some of the supervisors that there was a loss of some man hours when the crisis intervention units were not actively engaged in regular police duties. The staff of Oakland carefully considered a wide range of alternatives and eventually decided that the original design would be in a small way adapted so as to be able to utilize those man hours that were non-productive in the sense of police functions. The end result being that the crisis intervention units were doing normal patrol work when not engaged in crisis situations.

Since the majority of the crisis intervention calls came in between 7 p.m. and 3 a.m. there was an overlapping of the two major shifts, one ending at 12 midnight. Although the crisis intervention unit was ostensibly placed under the direct supervision of one of the regular area sergeants, it was eventually learned that it caused some conflict because a given supervisor would only be able to supervise the unit for some four hours. For Oakland's organizational purposes this was unworkable. Direct supervision and span of control began to deteriorate. Firstly the problem was brought up that the crisis intervention officers did not have a line up and roll call. At line up and roll call there is distributed
various bits of information and bulletin regarding dangerous people and other such pertinent things about the officers coming on duty should be aware of. There was apparently very poor coordination with patrol division itself and supervisory personnel began to complain because of the lack of direct supervision for the crisis intervention officers. In order to smooth the organizational feathers and decrease the amount of friction, the crisis intervention officers were changed to the 4 p.m. to 12 midnight shift. For the first four hours of the shift the officers would perform regular beat duties but at 8 p.m., they would don their hats as specially trained crisis intervention officers and function as such for the last four hours of the shift. This having been done, direct supervision was reestablished and the unit at least had an opportunity to work during four of the peak crisis hours.

The Oakland officers did some hard work on the referral system and communication with the social service agencies. There was great cooperation between these agencies and the feedback on referrals was an excellent source of reinforcement for the officers which was outstanding encouragement. This reinforcement greatly assisted in motivating the officers to utilize their skills in the future and to develop better skills.

Oakland's crisis intervention unit was actually a very small percentage of the entire police force (approximately
1/2 of 1 percent). As such, these four men were only able to handle about 10 percent of the total number of crisis intervention type calls in Oakland. This author cautions the reader to carefully evaluate the effects of the program prior to making extrapolations that the evidence will not necessarily support. In order to give more power to the Oakland results, they would have to have a larger number of trained officers and have them handle a larger percentage of the crisis intervention calls.

**Evaluation.** The survey of officer reaction was expanded to include officers who had not been trained in the counseling techniques. A survey of some of the patrol officers working in the same basic sectors as the experimental troops produced almost unanimous praise. Ten percent of the families randomly surveyed by the unit, indicated overwhelming satisfaction with the caliber of the service performed. Some of the statistics that are the direct byproduct of the initial impact of the program have been somewhat encouraging. Proportionately fewer arrests resulted in the sectors that had the crisis unit, than was the case in the other sectors of the city.

The sector with the crisis unit was roughly equal to the other sectors in total out of service time for the officers. The amount of time spent by the crisis intervention officers at a call was not significantly reduced, but better than 30 percent of the families referred actually made contact
with the agency to which they had been referred and 80 percent of that figure appeared to receive assistance. What these data show is that approximately 25 percent of all the people with whom the officers interacted were contacted and helped by one of the social agencies. This impressive statistic of one out of four is most worthy of note. The Oakland police department worksheet indicated that the crisis units performed more patrol work than the regular patrol officer. One of the results that was especially exciting to this author was that a visit by the crisis unit had a very definite impact on chronic callers. The evidence indicates that by two visits the crisis unit can significantly reduce the number of chronic callers.

**Effects on the system.** The experimental program had several positive effects on the system. The primary positive effect was the increased communication between the police department and the local social service agencies. This in turn led to more and better cooperation between all of the agencies involved. This was especially helpful for agencies who had poor relations with the police department with no prospectus for making them better.

Since there was some evaluation results showing a positive effect of the crisis intervention counseling on the organization as well as the citizens, the National Institute of Mental Health gave additional monies to expand and increase the program. The department thereby wrote a
contingency plan to put crisis intervention training into the recruit academy curriculum. Oakland had a long range goal of making the training available to all of its street personnel. They hoped to accomplish this by having a program of ongoing training for the experienced officers and to introduce the training into the training for the rookies.

San Francisco Police Department

As a direct result of suffering a lot of street assaults during the latter part of 1970, the staff of the San Francisco police department began to seek out new ways to help combat this problem. At the onset, the department sought specialized training from the same organization that had assisted the Richmond police department in devising its existing program. This same firm decided to implement some new components in the San Francisco plan. Some of the goals of the San Francisco approach were to:

1. Provide training to all of the patrol officers, and install the same type training in the police academy.

2. Make an effort to train policemen to do the classroom teaching so their program would be free of external trainers.

3. Try to vary the training so as to assess the effectiveness of one method of training versus another and to possibly determine if there is an approach that is optimally effective.
San Francisco wanted to be free of external teachers to avoid any resistance there might have been to outsiders on the part of the officers who were to be trained. San Francisco also wanted to avoid purchasing the training from the outside agency. In San Francisco there are approximately 1000 street patrolmen and the cost to train them would have been prohibitively expensive. By avoiding the large cost factor, the department artfully skirted the problems that accompany seeking and maintaining funding. Not only did they not have to go through the lengthy and arduous process of applying to different organizations and foundations but they also avoided having to comply with the restrictions that usually accompany funding.

In order to implement this more global and perceptive plan of training, the department had to first obtain funding and outside help on a small scale to make the necessary preparations for the monumental task of training 1000 patrol officers.

To this end, the chief of police, who was Al Nelder at that time, sought funding ($285,000 over a two year period). Top administrators in the police department were assigned to the task of applying for project funding. Many thought the small grant sought would be approved as a matter of routine, consequently there were concurrent plans made to provide a firm foundation for the larger project of training the entire patrol force. This phase seemed to have gone
along rather smoothly. As luck would have it, the two organizations to which the San Francisco police department had applied for funds denied their requests.

Since a lot of work had been done, and a lot of commitments made from various sources, a decision was made to proceed with the training sans funding. The training was done completely without funding for salaries, space, equipment, and support services. Since the program had to be administered without funds, a small scale pilot program was run on the officers at the Northern Station of the San Francisco police department.

A meeting was held with all supervisory personnel at the Northern Station to explain the training program and introduce the training staff prior to beginning any actual training. This meeting was quite successful at avoiding the development of covert hostility towards the project on the part of mid management personnel, although active support was not really achieved until the end of the training classes. Also, in preparation for the training program, the two community mental health centers nearest the Northern police District were contacted, and their cooperation was solicited and received. Some sixty other community agencies were contacted in order to establish avenues for police referrals.

Selection. The staff officers of the San Francisco police department selected seventeen officers from a list of volunteers in the patrol and other divisions of the department.
In order to get a wider dissemination of training, the staff selected fourteen men from the patrol force (including two supervising sergeants), in Northern District, two officers from police community relations and one officer who had functioned as liaison officer between the police department and the city's mental health centers.

Training. The training approach utilized by the San Francisco department was similar in many respects to that of the Richmond department with slight variations and elaborations. San Francisco presented greatly expanded views of legal and cultural ramifications that the officers should be aware of while utilizing their newly learned crisis intervention skills.

The department also varied the method of instruction by presenting reading assignments in programmed text format. Each group of eight to ten officers was given twenty-four hours in in-class training and asked to do a comparable amount of work outside of class on written and reading assignments. At each class, as in Richmond, a detailed outline of that class session was distributed along with a reading assignment for the next class session, a written assignment and a feedback form on which the officers registered their evaluation of the class session and made suggestions for changes.

Evaluation. The San Francisco project did achieve a measure
of success and the training resulted in some positive responses not only on the part of the men being trained but also on the part of the men who worked in the same sector and had occasion to interact with the trained officers. Peer influence and the generalizability of information was responsible for the spreading of the newly learned ideas. The staff attributed some of the success of the program to the careful planning that had preceded the training. One of the very definite pluses of the program was the particular social service agency retained to do the actual training. This firm had prior exposure to police problems and personnel as well as to the concept of training policemen. They were in some measure familiar with some of the inherent problems in training large blocks of students in general and policemen in particular. Since both the staff of San Francisco and the training firm were well pleased with the results, they set about to try and assess and evaluate the results. This was attempted via Langly Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute of Community Mental Health Training. Although they agreed to try to evaluate the training itself, the results were inconclusive as it depended solely upon interview data. Even though the results of the training suggested that the newly trained officers saw that the new skills did in fact reduce the incidence of violence it was not statistically validated. Operation. The newly trained officer as in Richmond were assigned to all three shifts so there would be coverage around
the clock; so the Northern sector of the city of San Francisco had twenty-four hour coverage by officers who had been trained in crisis intervention. One recognized problem was that some of the trained officers were paired with untrained officers thereby making it a little awkward to coordinate their efforts as an effective team. Another impact on the system of the crisis intervention was that there was enough favorable feedback to integrate some of this training into the regular police academy for the new recruits.

San Francisco Domestic Crisis Intervention Critique

Overview. San Francisco remains unique among Bay Area departments trying crisis intervention training in that it was not able to secure funding but put on a masterful display of planning. The San Francisco program started with a well-developed and field tested training program, departmental and community support, months of preparation, familiarity with the other crisis intervention projects in the country, and a rigorous evaluation design, yet in spite of everything there was no funding extended to them. The training was sophisticated but it did not achieve matching accomplishments. A positive note, however, is that other departments may be able to benefit from this very ingenious plan put together by the city known as the Bagdad by the Bay. Although both the training and evaluation were admirable, both by necessity need to be expanded.
Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

RESULTS

The unofficial results of the training programs indicate that the officers who received it, felt that it was helpful, however there was no evaluation to substantiate this. Of the officers who were interviewed most indicated that they felt more confidence in handling stressful non-criminal situations than they did before the training. Some programs received funding and some did not. The reasons for each is not exactly clear but the one that did receive funding could be used as a guide for future attempts at funding. In this fashion, some of the pitfalls can possibly be avoided by departments when they seek funding. Although the unofficial results suggest positive results, this as yet has not been definitely established and this disparity warrants further and greatly expanded exploration.

Many of the police departments had the normal type problems that accompany initiating new and innovative programs. One of these problems was that new ideas, very often must be taught by persons other than police officers and more often than not, these lay teachers have had little opportunity to train policemen. Another drawback was the conspicuous lack of a viable measuring device to evaluate the work
that was done. For future study other departments can use the information generated by these Bay Area departments even though no statistical assessment exists. By studying these Bay Area programs, departments in the future can learn to avoid the pitfalls and faults in design that plagued these pioneers in the field of crisis intervention. One of the important things that these early programs pointed out was the dire need to seek and maintain community support of the program. One of the most significant findings of these investigations was a need for a good evaluative tool. If there is no system of evaluation, then intelligence generated from the experiment would be of questionable validity. The positive note here is that for departments that plan to do this type of training in the future can indeed profit from the mistakes of the pioneering departments.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There are several drawbacks in the critique of these programs. One of the first items that comes to mind is that nothing is experimentally manipulated. In reviewing these programs, one is relegated to merely observation and drawing conclusions from that. When making observations, and observing two events to either co-exist or sequentially exist, there is a compulsion to imply some sort of causal relationship that the evidence may not support. To overcome such faults, training should be done on an experimental
basis. With a control and experimental group, one can isolate and manipulate certain variables so for the purpose of crisis training programs, empirically derived components could be shown to co-vary and this variance could thereby be measured. Examples of this would be the length and type of training to see which variables produce optimal results.

Another limitation was that the studies were not longitudinal. In any short term experimentation or observation, there looms the possibility of results produced by the Hawthorne* effect. In order to effectively allow for and circumvent this, some sort of evaluation and/or critique could be administered at the beginning of the training and periodically thereafter for a specified length of time. Results from longitudinal experimentation would aid the experimenter in concluding that changes in behavior would be more directly attributable to a specific treatment than to some intervening variable.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

Since the police department is readily accessible, many people seek help there at times when they are distraught. In this fashion, many situations are presented to police

*"... that almost any change, any extra attention, any experimental manipulation, or even the absence of manipulation but the knowledge that an experiment is being done, is enough to cause subjects to change." (D. Ary, L. C. Jacobs, and A. Razavieh, Experimental Research in Education, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972.)
officers that are non-criminal and range beyond the scope for which the officer has been trained. Anticipating these type service calls, future police training programs should by necessity include the teaching of certain criterion behaviors that have been identified as good and/or helpful techniques in psychological counseling. For the purpose of hypothesis testing, the hypothesis could thereby center around the exhibition of these newly learned criterion behaviors by the police officers who were exposed to the training. Along with this experimental group, a control group would be set up to balance the research design. For such an experimental end, the following hypotheses could be established.

HYPOTHESES

1. There will be no significant differences between the two groups on the Randle Scale of Counseling Techniques.
2. There will be no significant differences between the two groups in the level of self-confidence they feel.

To effectively put my recommendation into proper perspective, I have devised an appropriate experiment. The above hypotheses can be tested by running an experiment at the Berkeley police department in crisis intervention training.
POPULATION AND SAMPLE

The sample for the study is to be drawn from the ranks of patrolmen of the Berkeley police department. Berkeley's multi-ethnic and multi-racial department has a more cosmopolitan air than many other California departments. The average police officer is male, twenty-four years old having at least two years of college. The city of Berkeley itself is a college town having an overall population of 120,000, and approximately 30,000 of this number are students. Being basically a college town, Berkeley has more social and political problems than do the two neighboring cities of San Francisco and Oakland, both of which have many more crimes of violence. The study calls for twenty subjects to be used in two equal groups of ten. One being the experimental and the other the control group.

GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The desideratum of this study is to train policemen in psychological counseling skills to see if they will use them in stressful non-criminal situations. Since it will be virtually impossible to quantify how many crimes were deterred by effective counseling, the measure selected to evaluate the results should be an interview of those people whom the particular officer counseled. The desired result would be the exhibition of certain behaviors that have been isolated as being exemplary of good counseling techniques.
The second unit of measurement would be in the form of a self-report about the level of confidence that the officers feel about interacting with stressful non-criminal situations before and after training. In this fashion the officer can directly report the level to which the training has enhanced his self-confidence in handling crisis situations and to some extent the degree to which his level of confidence has or has not been enhanced. These two measures would be good indicators of the effectiveness of the crisis intervention training.

The particular twenty-four hour training course will be centered around teaching specifically the following behaviors:

1. Active listening
2. Paraphrasing
3. Perception checking
4. Information seeking
5. Offering information
6. Sharing information
7. Report on feelings
8. Offering new alternatives
9. Describing behavior
10. Clarifying questions

The reasons this will be the nucleus of the training is that these components have been isolated by various psychological counseling curricula as being indices of effective
counseling. Although the above list might appear beneficial on the surface, there are other helpful parts that lie beneath the surface. By learning and digesting these concepts and thereby utilizing them, these concepts serve to increase others autonomy as a person and as well as increase their sense of equality. Communication will be greatly facilitated by deliberately avoiding a subordinate/superordinate type of communication. As the level of autonomy and sense of equality is raised, a very significant byproduct of that process will be more trust between the two persons who are communicating. The effect of any response depends in a large part upon the degree of trust in the relationship. The less trust, the less freeing effect from any response. The more trust, the less binding effect from any response.

After the above core of training is established, it is a very simple problematical situation of writing a course outline around that. In the twenty-four hours of training, eight hours would be in the form of lecture type classroom instruction. This will be to give the student an understanding of the philosophical substance of the dynamics of psychological counseling. It helps to increase one's awareness of counseling and the mechanics thereof. This is a vitally important part of the course, since there is a natural tendency to fear and resist that which one does not understand fully. This eight-hour lecture will be an
initiation, orientation and indoctrination into the new concepts and it will give the student an opportunity to ask some specific questions. Initiating or continuing the training without this very vital phase would be counter productive.

The second phase of the training program would be in the form of dyad interaction between the students. This dyad work would consist of practical application of the new concepts to which they had been introduced in the lecture portion of the training. Since this will be many of the students first opportunity to interact utilizing their new counseling skills, a one to one setting would be one that they would tend to feel comfortable in.

In two hours of dyad work, all of the students will have an opportunity to work with more than one other student in utilizing the newly learned behaviors. Specifically the student gets to arrive at a certain level of comfort in his interactions.

As the educational process moves on, triad work would be the next logical step. Once the student gains some confidence in the dyad settings, he then progresses to a situation that involves two other students. In this fashion, the interactions become imaginative and inventive. The students thereby begin to share ideas and expertise as they learn from each other. The triad work will occupy four hours in the schedule of training which would be a prelude to the
eventual role playing.

Role playing has been scheduled for eight hours since this will be dress rehearsal in effect. After the dyad/triad work, the student will be somewhat equipped to interact with a larger number of people and situations. In role playing, students will be put in hypothetical situations and allowed to freely interact. In order to prepare for effective role playing a list of possible situations will be distributed that they might generate ideas on how to interact with them. The student will thereby get an opportunity to simulate field work. This type of critique will detect the exhibition of the newly learned crisis intervention behaviors, and it will also discern how well a student can think on his feet.

Another vital part of the training is the videotaping of the role playing. During the course of interaction throughout our daily interactions, we rarely have the opportunity to see ourselves. Since this is the case, we are not entirely sure of how we are projecting our thoughts and images. One of the distinguished spokesmen in the field of non-verbal communication states that "... most people are non-verbally illiterate." (Birdwhistle, 1970). The videotaping sessions will be able to give the student some frame of reference that he can draw upon. The student can then see what it is he is projecting and how he does it.

The last part of the training will be an evaluation.
The evaluation of the course will not be in the form of a written critique. This will not be needed as the instructor will have had ample opportunity to monitor the progress of students at various checkpoints. The evaluation will be in the form of a forum discussion. This will enable the students to discuss their personal growth as a result of the training. It will also enable the student to analyze the meaning and dynamics of the course. This brainstorming session can allow students to share their thoughts and feelings, and it gives the instructor some important feedback about course content and teaching style.

The experiment will call for two randomly selected groups, a control and experimental. The experimental group will be subjected to the treatment which will be twenty-four hours of training. This training will be in the form of lecture, dyad/triad work as well as role playing. At the conclusion of the training, both the control and experimental groups will be measured in their level of self-confidence they feel in handling stressful non-criminal situations. Subsequent to the administration of this measure, the two groups will then be permitted to freely interact with the citizens during the course and scope of their duties. The control group will be aware that they were trained specifically to interact with citizens but no specific instructions beyond that. The design calls for neither reward for use, nor punishment for non-use of the newly learned behaviors in
crisis intervention skills.

After the two groups have had an opportunity to interact with the citizenry for four weeks, the results will be evaluated. Even though the experiment will run for one month, the scoring process will begin immediately. This scoring will be in the form of reports of citizen reaction to the experimental group. This will avoid the monumental problem of trying to collect four weeks of data at the end of the experiment and it just may indicate that the officers become more competent and confident with the new skills as time passes.

Additionally the best time to interview citizens is right after the encounter when it is still fresh in their minds. Each officer will be scored on the Randle Scale of Counseling Techniques. ANOVA can be used to determine if there are any significant differences between the groups on the RSCT (citizen reaction) and the level of self-confidence measure. After such analysis, and contingent upon the significance of the results, the hypothesis can be appropriately accepted or rejected.

INSTRUMENT

The two groups will give a self report about their level of confidence they feel in interacting with stressful situations. There are several devices available to measure self-confidence or an experimenter may elect to formulate
his own. The second device to be used is the **Randle Scale of Counseling Techniques**. This is a measuring device that rates a person over twenty items. Ten items are operationally defined as good counseling techniques in that they are techniques taught in counseling curricula.

Ten items likewise are considered to be the mirror image of the desirable items or otherwise undesirable. Items will be randomly mixed and an interviewer will interview a citizen who was counseled by the officer to measure the impact that the officer had upon the citizen. Each of the twenty items will be graded over three degrees of possible intensity; NEVER, SOMETIMES, and OFTEN. These categories will be assigned a numerical rating of 0, 1 or 2 respectively. The positive or good counseling techniques will have positive numerical ratings and the other ten items will have a negative numerical rating. After scoring, the minuses will be subtracted from the pluses to obtain one final score which will be either plus or minus. These scores will be plotted on a normally distributed curve having a $\bar{X}$ of 0 and a standard deviation of 6.8. By plotting the scores of each officer, we can tell if his overall impact on the citizen was positive or negative and to what extent.

If significance can be found between the citizen reports of the two groups then extrapolations can be made about either expanding or prolonging the crisis intervention training in addition to the mere fact that the training did
produce desirable results. If significance is not found, then rather than continuing with a bad program, efforts can be made to dismantle the program and analyze it in hopes of finding the malady.

Obtaining significance is an invaluable aid when funding is being solicited. With statistically significant results, potential funders can thereby make better decisions about letting or withholding funds for backing. Many police departments would try to implement crisis intervention training but have not the monies in their budgets to underwrite the cost of the training. If the above study is performed and validated, thereby making funding not as difficult to receive as has been the case in the past, then more departments will offer the crisis intervention training. As significant results in the above design will clearly indicate, not only the policemen but the citizens themselves will greatly benefit as well.
## Randle Scale of Counseling Techniques

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<th>Positive Behaviors</th>
<th>NEVER</th>
<th>SOMETIMES</th>
<th>OFTEN</th>
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<td>1. Active listening</td>
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<td>2. Paraphrasing</td>
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<td>3. Perception checking</td>
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<td>4. Information seeking</td>
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<td>5. Offering information</td>
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<td>6. Sharing information that has influenced feelings (+)</td>
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<td>7. Report of feelings</td>
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<td>8. Offering new alternatives</td>
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<td>9. Describing behavior</td>
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<td>10. Clarifying questions</td>
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<tr>
<th>Negative Behaviors</th>
<th>NEVER</th>
<th>SOMETIMES</th>
<th>OFTEN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Changing the subject without explanation</td>
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<td>2. Explaining the other person's behavior</td>
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<td>3. Advice and persuasion</td>
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<td>4. Vigorous agreement</td>
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<td>5. Expectations</td>
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<td>6. Approval on personal grounds</td>
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<td>7. Disapproval on personal grounds (-)</td>
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<td>8. Commands, orders</td>
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<td>9. Emotional obligations</td>
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<td>10. Manifestations of disinterest</td>
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Standard Deviation = 6.8
REFERENCES


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