AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
1898-1913

A Thesis
Presented to
The Graduate Faculty
California State College, Hayward

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

by
L. Eve Armentrout
February 1972
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES 1898-1913

by

L. Eve Armentrout

Approved:  

Date:  

David H. Chan  

Feb. 25, 1972  

Bruce A. Schrader  

February 21, 1972

Committee in Charge
The author would like to acknowledge the patience of her thesis director and readers, Dr. Richard B. Rice, Dr. David B. Chan and Dr. Bruce Glasrud. Their constant encouragement has been of great benefit in the composing of this thesis.

Many libraries and librarians were more than generous with their time to further the research for this paper. The librarians at the National Archives in Washington, particularly Mr. Edwin R. Flatequal, Chief, Archives Branch and Elmer O. Parker, Assistant Director, Old Military Records Division sent the author information and documents that were invaluable for her research. The librarians in the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University were also extremely helpful.

Finally, the author owes her thanks to Dr. Jung-pang Lo, Professor of History at the University of California, Davis, and grandson of K'ang Yu-wei, for his attention and assistance in providing her information concerning his grandfather.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>THE CAMPAIGN IS LAUNCHED</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THE FIRST OF THE GRAND TOURS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY AND K'ANG YU-WEI'S FIRST VISITS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>SUN'S RISE</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 158

BIBLIOGRAPHY 164
INTRODUCTION

During the period 1898 to 1913, great changes occurred in the political, social and ideological structure of China, the Middle Kingdom. The Manchu-Ch'ing dynasty, which had ruled in China from 1644, was overthrown in 1911 and replaced by a republican government, which was accorded official recognition by the United States in 1913. The American government, its officials and leading citizens had helped bring about this revolution, primarily by giving aid to several of the most influential Chinese leaders. While it cannot be said that the American contribution was as great as the Chinese, or even as great as the Japanese, the English or French, it was larger than has been sometimes supposed. It is the purpose of this study to examine this contribution, particularly as it relates to the American involvement with Chinese reformers and revolutionaries.

By 1898 it had become apparent that China was deteriorating as a nation-state. The Imperial Government of China had lost every major engagement with foreign powers since 1842, the most humiliating of which had been defeat by Japan in 1895. Forced as a consequence to sign the so-called "Unequal Treaties," the government had lost
much of its sovereign power to the nations with whom these treaties had been concluded, especially Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and Japan. In addition, the dynasty had been suffering from the more traditional internal disorders as well: famine and rebellion.¹

In response to this evidence of weakness, particularly the loss of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, various groups sprang up throughout the country to suggest ways China might avoid being dismembered by the treaty powers. By 1905, these groups had evolved into two opposing camps. One, led by K'ang Yu-Wei, proposed a constitutional monarchy under the Ch'ing Emperor. The other, a more radical opposition, organized various revolutionary groups, the most famous of which was the T'ung-meng Hui. This party, led by Sun Yat-sen, proposed a republican revolution as a vehicle to implement the triple policy of democracy, nationalism, and "people's livelihood." Sun had led his first attempt at revolution late in 1895, the failure of which forced him to flee China. His exile, not commuted until October of 1911, made his task more difficult but did not dissuade him from continuing revolutionary activity.

¹A fuller discussion of the events leading up to 1898 can be found in John King Fairbank's The United States and China (New York: Viking Press, 1958), Chapters 7 and 8, pp. 106-141.
In recognition of his role, when the Manchus were finally overthrown in 1911, Sun was elected the first Provisional President of the Republic of China.²

From 1895 to 1905, the more important political opposition to the Manchu government came from the less radical group led by K'ang Yu-wei and his chief disciple, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao both Confucian scholars.³ Allied with them was Yung Wing, formerly Minister from China to the United States and like Sun, a Chinese with a largely Western education.⁴ Yung, however, later joined Sun Yat-sen's group.

In 1898 K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and their supporters, proposing to govern China through a system of revised Confucianism that would include Western techniques, gained access to the Kuang-Hsü Emperor. For a period of roughly one hundred days, these scholars were able to persuade the Emperor to make fundamental changes in the government of China, such as abolishing the Confucian examination system, authorizing a committee to study the possibility of drafting a constitution, and eliminating


³Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 148.

various high posts in the government, hitherto occupied by a reactionary group of Manchu nobles. But when it seemed likely that they would take steps to remove the Empress Dowager from any participation in the government, she united certain elements in the army and the conservative nobility to stage a coup d'état. As a result, K'ang, Liang and Yung Wing were forced to flee to Japan, the Kuang-Hsu Emperor was removed from administrative responsibilities, and the Empress Dowager took over the government.5

What K'ang's group proposed in 1898, and continued to work for at least until the 1911 revolution, was the gradual revolution of Chinese politics and the Chinese state. They proposed to affect this change by persuading the highest authority in the land, the Emperor, to govern the country according to their views. Their decision to work for change through the Emperor was influenced by tradition and law since he was, after all, the highest duly constituted authority. In addition, and perhaps equally significantly, he had been receptive to their ideas.6 In 1899, K'ang founded the Chinese Reform

5Fairbank, *The United States and China*, pp.148-149. K'ang, Liang, and Sun remained in exile until 1911. In 1904, the Empress Dowager pardoned all political offenders on the occasion of her 70th birthday except these three, whom she considered unpardonable.

6Ibid., p. 154. The latter reason was especially appealing to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who was more pragmatic than his teacher, K'ang Yu-wei. *New York Times*, May 13, 1903, p.9.
Association. He and his adherents are usually referred to in Chinese history as the radical reformers. The Ch'ing court viewed K'ang and Liang as subversives and posted a large reward for news of their death.

How were these various groups regarded by other Chinese, the officials and the "people"? This is, of course, a matter of some speculation. Apparently, many individuals had felt threatened by the radical changes proposed by both K'ang and Sun, although K'ang Yu-wei, as a legitimate scholar-official, was certainly looked upon with far more respect. But most Chinese were unwilling as yet to accept much in the way either of foreign ideas, or of foreigners themselves, a fact which is revealed by the repeated antagonisms and violence experienced by Western missionaries, railroad developers, and land grabbers. This attitude reached its culmination in the Boxer disturbances of 1899 and 1900, whose aim was forcefully to expel the foreigners.

Obviously, some officials shared the distress felt by K'ang and Sun, and accepted the view that basic changes would have to be made in the Chinese way of life and thinking before the country would be able to defend itself-

7 Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 148-149.
8 Ibid., p. 154.
self. Some of these officials, such as Wu T'ing-fang, a reformer of modest conviction who was Minister to the United States from the Imperial Government of China from 1896-1902 and again from 1907-1909,\(^9\) periodically gave aid to the exiles. In 1911, after the outbreak of the revolution on October 10, Wu became the personal representative of Sun Yat-sen to negotiate with the Imperial Government. He later held positions of high trust in Sun's government.

Another Minister to the United States from the Imperial Government of China, Mr. Liang Cheng, Minister from 1904-1907, seems also to have secretly given aid to the revolutionaries, and possibly helped them in their relations with the American Government.\(^10\)

Finally, Overseas Chinese

---


Mr. Liang Cheng is supposed to have gotten K'ang Yu-wei an interview with President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, among other things. Aside from the sources concerned with Homer Lea, Dr. Jung-pang Lo, grandson of K'ang Yu-wei, has also heard stories to the effect that Wu and Mr. Liang Cheng used their influence with Americans in behalf of K'ang, Liang, and possibly Sun Yat-sen. Letter, Dr. Jung-pang Lo to the author, March 30, 1971.
were relatively free to engage in political activity that ran counter to the interests of the Ch'ing dynasty, and they contributed vast quantities of money and other forms of support, both to Sun's revolutionaries and K'ang's reformers.\textsuperscript{11}

Having been expelled from China, Sun Yat-sen, K'ang Yu-wei, and their followers tried to get help from foreign governments, the aforementioned Overseas Chinese, or anyone else who could be of aid to them. One of the several nations which interested them was the United States. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen in particular thought that American institutions were a major source of this country's strength, and they hoped to introduce the same strength into the Chinese nation. In addition, Chinese in general felt that the United States had shown more restraint in its demands upon China than was often the case with the other treaty powers.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, American authorities usually permitted the exiles to come into the country when they desired entrance. Finally, the Overseas Chinese group in


\textsuperscript{12}In 1898, for example, Wu T'ing-fang successfully pressed for giving the Hanchow-Canton railway concession to an American firm, the China-America Development Company, because he felt the Americans were less rapacious than the other treaty powers. Shin, "Wu Ting-fang," p. 251.
the United States, while not large compared with that in Southeast Asia, contained many wealthy merchants who could potentially be interested in reform or revolution.

The Chinese exiles, when in this country, of course had to operate within the context of American public opinion and the United States' overall policy towards China. American public opinion, on the one hand opposed permitting Chinese to live in this country, but on the other supported the view that a modern, god-fearing, democratic United States should instruct the Chinese on how to take care of themselves. Accordingly, as early as 1882 Congress passed laws that excluded Chinese laborers from the continental United States and made it extremely difficult for Chinese not of the laboring class to enter. In addition, by 1900, Chinese were denied the right of becoming naturalized citizens of this country.\(^\text{13}\) During

\(^{13}\text{In this connection it is interesting to note that in 1905, the Commissioner-General of Immigration, who jointly with the Secretary of the Treasury shared responsibility for implementing the exclusion policy, reported that in spite of insurmountable obstacles, he had been more successful in excluding Chinese than in any other of his duties. The insurmountable obstacles included United States newspapers, missionaries, and some businessmen, as well as the Chinese themselves, all of whom were trying to get around the policy. Also mentioned was the possibility of subversive, anti-Chinese-exclusion organization. The Department of Commerce, whose report included the remarks of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, recommended that no concessions be made to the Chinese government on the question of immigration. Paul H. Clyde, ed., \textit{United States Policy toward China} (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1940), pp. 236-242.}
approximately the same period an American court was established in China to demonstrate its supposedly more enlightened principles to the Chinese, although in the first major case that came before this court, the Imperial Government felt that justice had not been observed.\textsuperscript{14} American attempts to help China preserve her territorial sovereignty are numerous and well known (e.g. the Open Door Policy) and on various occasions, the American government sought, by request, demand, and offers of financial assistance, to get China to change its tax and monetary structure so as to resemble more closely the corresponding American institutions.\textsuperscript{15}

Attempts by Chinese to introduce these institutions into their country, however, did not always meet with the approval of the United States. At the time of the Chinese revolution of 1911, for example, President William Howard Taft cautioned that China was too conservative to change


\textsuperscript{15}The Treaty of Commerce between the U.S. and China of 1903, in which the U.S. required the abolition of certain internal taxes in China generally referred to as "likin" is one example of this. Clyde, United States Policy towards China, p. 226.
suddenly, and he refused to recognize the government of the Republic of China. In part, the reasoning behind this was that Chinese, unless assisted by Americans, were incapable of developing truly modern practices and institutions.

United States policy towards China was influenced not only by Americans' nationalism and their prejudice against Chinese, but also by the desire on the part of certain United States officials and capitalists to keep a large, international market open for America's rapidly expanding industries. Interest in the commercial aspects of United States-China relations and a display of American largesse (largesse presumably dictated by its "superior" institutions) produced the Open Door policy, formulated in 1899 and 1900 by Secretary of State John Hay, with the help of various advisors. American capitalists until at least 1913 were concerned with obtaining railway and banking concessions from the Chinese government, and keeping available to American manufacturers the right to sell

---


textiles in Manchuria. The American government, aside from procuring special legal rights for businessman-citizens dealing with China, actively worked to preserve and enlarge such markets as existed, particularly during the period of Taft's presidency.19

American citizens apparently believed that Christian missionaries could supply the Chinese with ideals vital to the reconstruction of the latter's country. During the administration of President William McKinley, United States policy towards China consisted largely of making demands upon that country backed by a display of force. Until the time of the Boxer Rebellion, these demands usually centered around increasing the prerogatives of missionaries, whom McKinley thought were "the pioneers of civilization."20 President Theodore Roosevelt, who agreed with this evaluation, enlarged the concept to include Western education in general. In 1907, he obtained from Congress the partial remission of China's Boxer Indemnity;

19Paul A. Vang, Making of a Myth (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1968), deals fairly extensively with American efforts to obtain commercial dominance. His thesis, that the "China market" was a myth, causes him to dwell perhaps too long on the fact that American businessmen other than the House of Morgan and certain textile interests, were not themselves anxious to invest in China and American trade with that country was not considerable, in comparison with, for example, trade with Europe.

the remitted funds were to be used to send Chinese students to study in America, where they would receive an education that Roosevelt thought would help the Chinese nation to become modernized.  

One effect of these policies and opinions upon the Chinese exiles was that American officials' willingness or refusal to permit them to enter the continental United States varied in part with the degree of confidence with which the United States government regarded the Chinese government. In addition, by permitting them entry, the American government encouraged the exiles to expect other forms of support. Once in this country, they were able to arouse some interest in their cause, but the Americans who actually involved themselves with K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen usually gave more verbal encouragement than active assistance. Those financiers who were prepared to lend money for a revolution in China insisted that, in addition to commercial concessions, Americans should be invested with the final authority concerning the conduct of the revolution and the course the new government should subsequently follow.

During the critical years from 1898 to 1913, Chinese reformers and revolutionaries tried repeatedly to

---

21 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1907, Part I, p. lxviii, from "Annual Message of the President."
recruit support in the United States, from Americans as well as Chinese. Their appeal sometimes met with success, but perhaps more often, failed. It is the story of these successes and failures, especially as they related to Americans, with which this study is concerned.
CHAPTER I

THE CAMPAIGN IS LAUNCHED

Between 1898 and 1902, the reformers made their first attempts to enlist the aid of the American government. Hoping for diplomatic support as well as desiring to gain access to the Overseas Chinese living in the United States, K'ang Yu-wei tried several times between 1898 and 1900 to enter this country. His efforts met with failure. Americans' apparent indifference to the reformers changed to sympathy in 1900, partly in reaction to public distress concerning the Boxer Rebellion. From that time until 1902, the American press showed itself favorably disposed towards the reformers and government officials on occasion gave encouragement and assistance.

In the year 1898, almost unnoticed by the treaty powers, a major attempt at reforming the Chinese Imperial Government from within met with failure. As a result of this failure, the Emperor was relieved of state duties and K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Yung Wing fled the country. Others of the reformers were executed. ¹ The

government was taken over by the Empress Dowager, who relied heavily on the counsel of a small group of reactionary Manchu nobles and court eunuchs. K'ang, Liang and Yung Wing made their way to Japan where Sun Yat-sen was already residing, following the failure of his attempt at revolution in 1895.²

Sun was then leader of a revolutionary brotherhood called the Shing Chung Hui. In 1899, K'ang and Liang decided to form their own organization, a Protect-the-Emperor Society (Pao Huang Hui), known in the United States under the title, Chinese Imperial Reform Association. The aims of this society differed little from the aims of the reformers when they had been in power. They sought to restore the Kuang Hsu Emperor to power (and displace the Empress Dowager) in order to restructure China's educational system and bureaucracy, to establish a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy that would be more responsive to the Chinese people, and to strengthen China militarily, politically, and economically. The Empress Dowager responded by putting a price on the heads of the chief reformers, most particularly, K'ang Yu-wei, as well as outlawing, the Pao Huang Hui in China.³

²Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, pp. 188-189.
³Lo, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 183.
After a short stay in Japan K'ang decided to proceed to London by way of the United States, where he hoped to organize the Overseas Chinese and persuade President McKinley to give him diplomatic support. Because the Chinese government would be unwilling to give him the papers necessary to enter the United States, he went first to Victoria, Canada, where he persuaded the American consul there to write a letter to the State Department in Washington on his behalf, requesting that a telegram be sent to the proper authorities authorizing K'ang to enter the United States. The State Department, however, referred the matter to the Treasury Department (which at that time handled most questions of whether or not to admit Chinese) with the notation, "This Department however sees no occasion for any exceptional treatment of Mr. Kang." Not surprisingly, the Treasury Department


5Notice of referral from the Secretary of State to the Treasury Department, received April 27, 1899, and letter with enclosures from Alvery A. Adee, Second Assistant Secretary, to the Secretary of the Treasury, April 24, 1899; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
subsequently decided to deny him entrance.  

Secretary of State John Hay soon had reason to question the handling of this problem. He received a letter from the American Ambassador to Japan, which suggested that K'ang be admitted into the United States and that he had friends who occupied high positions in the Japanese government. Hay forwarded this letter to the Treasury Department for their "further information." The Treasury Department replied by reaffirming that they would not grant K'ang permission to enter.

In a final effort to get him admitted, on May 16 the State Department asked the Treasury Department if a certificate issued by the Canadian Government and visaed by

6Letter from Acting Secretary, Treasury Department, to the Secretary of State, April 27, 1899; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

7Notice of referral from the Secretary of State to the Treasury Department, April 28, 1899 (received April 29, 1899); letter from John Hay to Secretary of the Treasury, April 28, 1899; letter from Joseph H. Herod, United States Legation, Tokyo, to John Hay, Secretary of State, March 31, 1899; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971. Mr. Herod reported that K'ang asked him for letters of introduction to American officials. Herod felt that the political situation forbade his doing that, but he did offer to sign a certificate that would grant K'ang entrance to the United States on the basis that he was a resident of Japan. K'ang was to procure the proper papers from the Japanese government and return to the American Legation, but he did not do this. K'ang's Japanese supporters included Count Okuma, sometimes Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

8Letter from Acting Secretary, Treasury Department, to the Secretary of State, May 1, 1899; enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
the United States Vice Consul General at Ottawa would gain K'ang admission. The Treasury Department replied that such a certificate would not be acceptable, as they were unwilling to consider K'ang to be a resident of Canada even if the Canadian Government and the American Vice Consul General at Ottawa were to so consider him.9 Discouraged in his attempt, K'ang had meanwhile established the first formal branch of the Pao Huang Hui in Vancouver and sent various lesser reformers into the United States to found other branches of his organization there. K'ang, himself, proceeded on to London.10

Some two months later, on his return from London, K'ang tried once again to enter the United States. The Treasury Department once again denied permission.11 However, K'ang had succeeded in arousing the sympathy and support of at least one American, a young man then a student at Stanford University by the name of Homer Lea.

9 Notice of referral from the Secretary of State to the Treasury Department, May 16, 1899 (received May 19, 1899); letter from Thomas W. Cridler, Third Assistant Secretary, State Department, to Secretary of the Treasury (by direction of the Secretary of State), May 16, 1899; letter from Secretary of the Treasury Department to the Secretary of State, May 19, 1899; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.


11 Telegram from Wilson R. Gray, United States Attorney, to Secretary of the Treasury, July 31, 1899 and telegram from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to Wilson R. Gay, United States Attorney, August 1, 1899, enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
Lea organized a small group of Americans into a drill squad for the Pao Huang Hui, which included Walton J. Wood, later Justice of the District Court of Appeals, and Bill Treager, later Sheriff of Los Angeles County.12

In China, the official opposition to K'ang Yu-wei's ideas was becoming stronger. In January of 1900, the Empress Dowager thought to rid herself of the possibility of K'ang being recalled or any of his programs being enacted by simply deposing the Kuang Hsü Emperor. However, the Empress Dowager was not as powerful as she thought. K'ang Yu-wei heard of the plot on January 24 and personally protested. In addition, he caused petitions to be raised against the move in China, forty-six branches of the China Reform Association contributed money for an armed uprising against the Empress Dowager, the treaty powers gave their support, and no deposition took place.13 In response, the

12 Captain W. W. Dinegar and Major Avery E. Kolb, "The Bitter Tea of Homer Lea" (unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 4, folder 1), Chapter 10, p. 1. In a short history of the Los Angeles Sheriff Department, no mention was found of a Bill Traeger being Sheriff. No official records were kept in the Department until 1915, however. Telephone interview by the author with Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, April 2, 1971.

Empress Dowager brought new charges against K'ang and Liang on February 14. In China reprisals were taken against the families of their supporters, and the reward for the capture of K'ang and Liang was doubled. In addition, a rumor towards the end of January that K'ang Yu-wei was on board a Japanese steamer bound for Hawaii and San Francisco caused the Chinese government, through its Minister to the United States, Wu T'ing-fang, to vigorously urge the American State Department to prevent K'ang from landing on American territory. The United States State and Treasury Departments cooperated fully with the Chinese government in this instance, but K'ang was not aboard any such steamer, nor did he enter the United States at this time.


16. Letter to Secretary of the Treasury from John Hay, Secretary of State, January 29, 1900; telegram from Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, to Collector of Customs, San Francisco, January 30, 1900; letter from Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, to Secretary of State, January 30, 1900; letter from John Hay, Secretary of State, to Secretary of the Treasury, January 31, 1900; letter from Wu T'ing-fang, Minister to the United States from China, to the United States Secretary of State, January 31, 1900; telegram from "Hy" to Wu T'ing-fang, January 30, 1900; letter from Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, to Collector of Customs, San Francisco, February 1, 1900; letter from Assistant Secretary, Treasury Department, to Joshua K. Brown, Chinese Inspector, Honolulu, February 1, 1900; letter from Secretary of the Treasury Department to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1900;
The Empress Dowager's attempt to depose the Emperor occurred at about the same time that the "Boxer" movement, a sworn brotherhood in China whose members vowed to expel the foreigners, increased the intensity of their attacks upon non-Chinese residing in China. Foreign missionaries as well as Chinese Christians were killed and the legations in Peking were besieged. The treaty powers responded by sending a large, international force to occupy Peking and relieve the attack on their diplomatic representatives.17

The various important groups in Chinese politics were concerned that the treaty powers would take this as an occasion to conquer China and divide her territory among themselves. The government in Peking reacted by allying itself with the Boxers and resisting the powers with force. Viceroy of the southern provinces of China, led by Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, tried instead

---

to persuade the powers to declare that the Boxers were rebels against the throne. Guaranteeing that they would maintain order in their provinces, they were able to obtain assurances that the powers would not declare war on China and would limit their operations to the Peking area.\textsuperscript{18}

Taking advantage of the chaos engendered by the Boxer troubles, the Reform Association began to organize a military attempt to capture the Empress Dowager and curtail her power. Simultaneously, Sun Yat-sen prepared to launch another attempt at Republican revolution.\textsuperscript{19}

Before the Pao Huang Hui had finished its preparations for military action, K'ang sent Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to Hawaii to raise money for the uprising, and remove him from the influence of Sun Yat-sen, with whom Liang was trying to arrange an alliance.\textsuperscript{20} As an indication of his friendship Sun Yat-sen gave Liang a letter of introduction to take with him to Hawaii, which would gain Liang entry to the branches of Sun's revolutionary organization that existed in the islands. Liang subsequently used this

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{18}Schiffrin, \textit{Sun Yat-sen}, pp. 179-180.
  \item\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 179, 206-207.
  \item\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 163. Liang had gone so far as to agree to ally the Pao Huang Hui with Sun's revolutionary party and convince K'ang Yu-wei to retire from politics, but when K'ang discovered this and ordered Liang to Hawaii, Liang submitted and went.
\end{itemize}
letter to convince Sun's supporters to join K'ang's organization, an act something much resented by Sun. 21

Liang took a steamer from Japan to Hawaii, arriving in Honolulu on December 31, 1899. Upon his arrival, he registered with the Japanese consulate. The Chinese consul in Honolulu tried to get him deported, but because of the efforts of the Japanese consul, as well as the American official "Mo-ssu-mei" (whom Liang referred to as Hawaii's Minister for Foreign Affairs), he was allowed to remain. 22

While in Hawaii, an American named Hutchins came to see Liang. Hutchins was a close student of Chinese politics, whom Liang had met once before, in 1898 in the office of Viceroy Li Hung-chang. The Overseas Chinese in Hawaii said he could be trusted. Hutchins proposed that he and Liang go together to New York, where he knew various New York capitalists who wanted to work with K'ang and Liang to finance their mainland China military operations. But when Liang and Hutchins were to leave, Liang found that no boats would board a non-white passenger because plague had recently broken out in Hawaii. The steamship lines were owned by whites, who claimed that


22 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (梁启超), "Voyage to Hawaii (Hsia-wei-yi Yu-chi)" selection from unidentified larger work sent to the author by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, pp. 191-192.
non-whites might be the plague carriers. Consequently, Hutchins was sent on alone, with a considerable sum of money for his expenses; Liang was to join him later.23

When finally the ships were willing to board Liang,

---

23 Ting Wen-chiang (丁文江), Preliminary chronological biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Jen-gung Hsien-sheng Nyan-p'u Chang-p'ien Ch'u-kao), v. I (Taipei: World Book Co., 1958), pp. 104-130. "Hutchins" is a transliteration from English to Chinese to English. He was equipped by Liang with $20,000 for his trip.

According to Liang, the Chinese Minister to the United States, Wu T'ing-fang, had tried to help Liang get into the continental United States in 1900. Although the Ch'ing authorities were adamant against admitting Liang, and although the Foreign Office of the Chinese government said they would interpret as treason any attempt by Wu to help Liang, Wu spoke to the United States State Department on Liang's behalf, but was not able to get permission for him to come. This failure would suggest that American officials might have been involved in preventing Liang's trip. It will be remembered that Wu showed no such scruples with relation to K'ang Yu-wei, however. Wu must have been a friend of Liang's. He had asked the Emperor to give Liang a diplomatic post away from China some time prior to 1900 (probably also prior to the "one hundred days" in 1898), and was from the same geographical area in China as was Liang. Wu's failure on behalf of Liang in 1900 upset Wu; he wrote Liang that if Liang were to get to San Francisco, he should be very careful, as various assassins were awaiting him. Letter from Liang to the San Francisco Chinese Association, 1901, in Ting, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, p. 101.

It is possible, of course, that Wu told Liang one thing, and told the Ch'ing government and the United States State Department another. A letter from Joshua K. Brown, Chinese Inspector, Honolulu, to Secretary of the Treasury, February 19, 1900, enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971, does mention "the recent admission of 'Leong Kai Chew' /Liang Ch'i-ch'ao/, who was disguised as a Japanese and whose case was reported to the Department of the Treasury on the 2nd instant."
he was advised by the Japanese consul in Hawaii (Liang was traveling on a Japanese passport) that his passport had expired and was no longer valid. In addition, possibly influenced by the Chinese government's attempts to restrict Liang's movements, the Japanese consul strongly advised Liang against going to San Francisco, where Liang was to enter the continental United States, and asserted that the Japanese government would not protect him in that city. Liang wrote to K'ang that under these circumstances, it would be best to wait for the results of Hutchins' trip to New York. Liang's letters contain no further mention of Hutchins, but on April 29, 1900 he wrote K'ang that he was going to try to get a proposed American loan to Cuba of $30,000 transferred to the Reform Association.²⁴ As the Pao Huang Hui did not obtain any large amount of foreign capital in 1900, this scheme must have failed.

Liang's organizing and fund-raising among the Chinese in Hawaii was more successful than his attempts to deal with American capitalists, but here again, he ran into difficulties. He organized Hawaiian branches of the Pao Huang Hui, but solicited contributions under his own name, for fear of the Chinese consul in Hawaii. Chinese on the islands responded generously, but the Chinese consul filed

²⁴ Ting, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao*, pp. 104-130.
suit against Liang (presumably for fraud), and the money was attached by the American district court. Although Liang managed to mail Pao Huang Hui partisans some $14,000 (H.K.) prior to the law suit, he finally wrote the organizers of the military coup to proceed without the much larger sum of money that was being bound over by the courts.\textsuperscript{25}

During Liang’s stay on the islands, the Territorial Government of Hawaii granted a charter to the Pao Huang Hui.\textsuperscript{26} By September of 1900, a\textit{New York Times} article very favorably disposed towards the reformers estimated that some nine-tenths of the Chinese residing in the islands belonged to the Reform Association.\textsuperscript{27} In this respect, at least, Liang’s trip was not a total failure. The\textit{Times} article, reporting a convention to be held in Yokohama by the Pao Huang Hui, also noted that representatives would be sent from the affiliates in California. Evidently, these affiliates were permitted to exist in spite of the fact that American diplomats as well as newsmen knew the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{26} United States Department of State,\textit{Foreign Relations, 1902} (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), p. 244. The charter was granted some time during March of 1900.
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{New York Times}, October 2, 1900, p. 9.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
organization was outlawed in China.\textsuperscript{28}

Shortly before Liang left Hawaii, while K'ang and Sun continued preparing for their separate uprising, Sun received a message from Li Hung-chang, leader of the Southern viceroys. Li suggested that Sun, K'ang and himself should cooperate together in order to enable them to rapidly gain control of the country. Sun's Japanese supporters, who also had been helping K'ang Yu-wei, accompanied Sun to the Canton area. There, they were to be taken to a secret meeting with Li. In order to protect against possible treachery they decided that Sun would not meet with Li, but would send the Japanese without him. At the subsequent meeting with Li Hung-chang's aide, the Japanese were given a suitcase containing several thousand Chinese "taels" to convince K'ang of the serious nature of the negotiations. They then went to find K'ang, who was in Hongkong settling the last-minute details connected with his own imminent attack on the government. K'ang, however, not only refused to see the Japanese, but after they persisted in trying to talk to him, he had them thrown in jail. He apparently thought they wanted to assassinate him, as they carried a large sword and refused to tell

\textsuperscript{28}United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 244.
intermediaries what their mission was.\textsuperscript{29}

Six days later, Sun arrived in Hongkong from Canton, found his friends, and managed to persuade the British government to release them from jail. Sun and the Japanese, as a result of these intrigues, were expelled from Hongkong and denied re-entry for five years. Li Hung-chang proceeded to Peking, and the scheme was accounted an utter failure.\textsuperscript{30}

In the meantime in California, the Pao Huang Hui made Homer Lea an officer in their army. Lea subsequently began making arrangements for an American volunteer army under his command to go to China to fight for K'ang Yu-wei. On March 16, 1900, the Pao Huang Hui gave a dinner for Lea in Los Angeles. At this dinner, he announced that a Stanford student of civil engineering, L. E. Taggart, would lead his army's engineering corps. The signal corps was to be organized by John York, at that time an attorney and a major in the National Guard of California. A Dr. E. H. Samuels of Mayfield was to run the military hospital, and Charles White, of the United States Army, Third Artillery, had volunteered his services.


\textsuperscript{30}Ibid.
Lea also announced that White hoped to bring with him some 1200 other volunteers, men recently discharged from the Philippines operations. Lea almost surely was not able to get the full 1200 to accompany him, but K'ang's group did report having the aid of 500 American soldiers.

The number 500 may have been an exaggeration, however. On June 22, Homer Lea boarded the S.S. China in San Francisco to join K'ang's forces in China. The New York Herald reported that a public call to aid by Lea had resulted in "hundreds of letters from American and English army officers, both active and retired, asking for enlistment under his banner," but, the article did not note

---

31 Dinegar and Kolb, "Homer Lea," Chapter 10, pp. 6-7, and letter with enclosure from Andrew G. Wolf, Jr., Information Officer, California National Guard, to the author, May 27, 1971. John York served in the National Guard from April, 1898 to August, 1904 in the Signal Corps, First Brigade.

32 Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, p. 221. Two sources report that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was present on the occasion of this dinner party, Dinegar and Kolb, "Homer Lea" and Carl Glick, Double Ten, Captain O'Banion's Story of the Chinese Revolution (London and New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945). However, in view of the sometimes questionable nature of these sources, the fact that no other sources agree, and the fact that K'ang Yu-wei's chief agent to raise money and support in the United States at this time was a brother of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao named Liang Ch'i-t'ien, it seems probable that the sources in question mistook Liang Ch'i-t'ien for his more famous brother.


34 New York Herald, June 24, 1900, reprint found in Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 4, folder 2.
that any of these hundreds accompanied Lea on the S.S. China. It may well be that many of the gentlemen in question never actually arrived in China.

The article also reported that Lea took $60,000 with him to K'ang Yu-wei. This sum apparently had been collected by the American chapters of the Pao Huang Hui, a not unreasonable amount in consideration of the fact that in 1899, the association had an estimated sixty-nine chapters in Hawaii, South America and the United States. 35 However, Dr. Jung-pang Lo, K'ang Yu-wei's grandson, says that the military attempt K'ang organized during the Boxer troubles was financed solely by Ch'in Shu-yuan of Singapore, who contributed $20,000 (H.K.). In addition, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao felt one reason for the Pao Huang Hui's failure in 1900 was that the money coming from overseas never arrived. 36 Under these circumstances the New York Herald report must be discounted considerably.

When Lea arrived in China, the campaign was already in progress. The reformers' expedition centered around the Yangtse, in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Anhwei and

35Lo, "The China Reform Association, 1899-1906," p. 3. The estimate was made by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1903.

Kiangsi, while Sun's followers were in South China,\(^37\) and the armies of the powers confined themselves to operations in the vicinity of Peking. Lea was to have been given 20,000 troops, to help capture Hankow, but before this could be affected, Lea's commanding officer was betrayed, the plans were captured, and no troops were forthcoming.\(^38\) However, he seems later to have participated in two other campaigns.\(^39\)

Various sources report that he also met General Chaffee in the Peking area, where Lea is supposed to have lifted the siege of Peking from the inside, nearly captured the Empress Dowager, and tried to organize guerrilla movements in northern China.\(^40\) However, the

\(^37\)Lo, *K'iang Yu-wei*, p. 186, and Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen*, pp. 207, 220. Schiffrin also says Liang was very anxious that the Pao Huang Hui have a campaign in southern China, but K'ang Yu'wei decided against it. In addition, Homer Lea hoped K'ang and Sun's forces would cooperate.


\(^39\)Frederick Chapin, "Homer Lea" (unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 3), pp. 33-34.

\(^40\)Dinegar and Kolb, "Homer Lea," Chapter 14, pp. 6-7, and Chapter 15, pp. 4-5; Joshua B. Powers, "Homer Lea" (unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 3, folder CA); Glick, *Double Ten*, pp. 41-42.

Joshua B. Powers was Lea's nephew on Lea's wife's side, and Glick's book claims to be the account of Lea's associate, Ansel O'Banion, who assisted Lea with the Western Military Academy. Unfortunately, Powers was probably quite young when Homer Lea died, and O'Banion's
sources in question tend to exalt Lea on other occasions beyond what seems to be reasonable. In view of the lack of corroborating evidence, and since there is no written statement by Lea that he engaged in any exploits in the vicinity of Peking, they should be regarded with a good deal of suspicion.\textsuperscript{41} Another report is made both by supporters of Sun Yat-sen and supporters of Homer Lea, that these two met in China in 1900, and Lea pledged to support Sun.\textsuperscript{42} That Lea continued to adhere to the China Reform Association is explained as part of Sun's ploy to work for eventual reconciliation between the reformers and the revolutionaries.

In December of 1900, after the powers had removed the bulk of their armies from the Peking area, the Imperial Court returned to the capital. The Empress Dowager tried once again to depose the Kuang Hsü Emperor. This time, according to the \textit{New York Times}, the Emperor called upon the Reform Party to assist him in securing "the restoration account was taken down by someone from O'Banion's verbal reminiscences many years after the fact. In addition, O'Banion did not know Homer Lea in 1900.

\textsuperscript{41}Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 31 agrees with the author.

\textsuperscript{42}Glick, \textit{Double Ten}, p. 159 and Schiffrin, \textit{Sun Yat-sen}, pp. 206-207 (#97). Schiffrin reports that Sun's article "My Reminiscences" that appeared in \textit{Strand Magazine} tells of Sun's meeting Lea in China, but actually, no date is given.
tion of Emperor Kuang-Su to full power." The day after reporting these events, the New York Times noted that the powers had recently been considering excluding the Empress Dowager from participation in the Peking government. Taking note of the Pao Huang Hui's agitation on behalf of the Emperor, the author further commented that the proposed deposition of the Emperor was "an offense against China as well as the powers." In an editorial on the same day, the paper supported the move to return power to the Kuang Hsu Emperor and denying power to the Empress Dowager. The editors felt that the Emperor was progressive and not anti-foreign, the same point of view that the Reform Association had adopted. The editors also believed that better terms could be obtained under the Emperor for the settlement of the Boxer question.

The speculations turned out to be largely futile. The Boxer hostilities were over by January, 1901. Both K'ang and Sun's attempted coups had suffered defeat, the Emperor was not deposed, but the Empress Dowager continued

44 New York Times, December 30, 1900, p. 2. In July of 1900, George D. Meiklejohn, assistant to Secretary of War Elihu Root, was reported to have gone so far as to suggest that Wu T'ing-fang, then Minister from China to the United States, be made Emperor of China with the United States' support. New York Times, July 10, 1900, p. 6.
to hold power. Homer Lea made his way back to the United States, escaping China disguised as a French priest.\textsuperscript{47} From China, he went to Japan, where he had an interview with Count Okuma, an ally of both Sun Yat-sen and K'ang Yu-wei.\textsuperscript{48} After leaving Japan, he returned to California.

Judging by the amount of space devoted to the matter by the \textit{New York Times}, American interest in Chinese politics suffered a lapse after 1900. However, the Pao Huang Hui apparently was still able to command some support among American local officials. The Chinese Merchant Association of New York, an organization probably affiliated with the Reform Association, gave a dinner in February of 1902 on Chinese New Year. This dinner was attended by New York's police commissioner and two deputy commissioners, Judge Warren M. Foster of General Sessions, a United States District Attorney and several assistant District Attorneys, and officers from the New York police force. The mayor of New York, who accepted an invitation to attend, did not appear.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 32.

\textsuperscript{48} Letter from Count Okuma's secretary to Homer Lea, 1900, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 1, folder AA.

In China, in the spring of 1902, another attempt at revolution occurred in the Canton area. This revolt was led by a member of the same family that had attempted to establish the T'aoPing Kingdom in the nineteenth century. The rebels, who had connections with Sun Yat-sen's group, hoped to establish a second T'aoPing regime with Yung Wing, formerly Minister from China to the United States and later an ally of K'ang and Liang, as its head of state.\footnote{50}{Lo, "Overseas Chinese," p. 3. In addition, in a letter from Yung's agent, Charles B. Boothe, to W. W. Allen, an American capitalist, Boothe wrote "He [Yung Wing] evidently did not, through his extreme modesty . . . [say] that he was made a Prince and at the time of the Taiping Rebellion, if it had succeeded, he would have been ruler of the Empire . . . He was not then in control of the direction of the plans but was taken up by those who were managing the affair for his personal worth and a man in whom all factions could unite." Letter from Boothe to Allen, February 3, 1909, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Charles B. Boothe collection, #42.}

Shortly after the failure of this coup, Yung Wing, who had an American wife, a home in Hartford, Connecticut, 

\footnote{50}{Lo, "Overseas Chinese," p. 3. In addition, in a letter from Yung's agent, Charles B. Boothe, to W. W. Allen, an American capitalist, Boothe wrote "He [Yung Wing] evidently did not, through his extreme modesty . . . [say] that he was made a Prince and at the time of the Taiping Rebellion, if it had succeeded, he would have been ruler of the Empire . . . He was not then in control of the direction of the plans but was taken up by those who were managing the affair for his personal worth and a man in whom all factions could unite." Letter from Boothe to Allen, February 3, 1909, Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Charles B. Boothe collection, #42.}

In relation to this coup, it is interesting to note that the Chinese Reform Association was having internal difficulties in 1902. A group of members, led by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, proposed to seize Kwangtung province, in which Canton is situated, and to set up a separate government. K'ang, however, opposed any such plan. What connection there may have been between K'ang's attitude and the failure of Yung Wing's friends in Canton is not clear. It is also not clear how much this failure affected the dissident elements that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was leading, or whether or not Liang was in contact with Sun at this time. However, after Liang's trip to the continental United States in 1903, his attitude underwent a change. Without his leadership, the threat of schism subsided. Lo, "The China Reform Association, 1899-1906," pp. 7-8.
and had at one time been a naturalized American citizen decided to return to Hartford. In 1898 while Yung was in China, an American law passed subsequent to his acquiring United States citizenship which made it illegal for Chinese to become citizens of the United States was used to take his citizenship away from him. Because of his close association with first the Reform Party, then Sun’s revolutionaries, his return to America is of interest to this study. On June 6, 1902, Yung Wing’s diary says:

"'Arrive Honolulu. Called upon C. H. Hutchins—took lunch with him and classmate Alexander. Called upon Judge Estes. Got a letter from him to Judge Hiscock in case I have trouble to land.'" The entry for June 12 reads "'Arrive in San Francisco and called upon Col. W. C. Albarger, 606 Montgomery Street, and had a long talk with him of an hour and a half on China and her future.'"

These entries would seem to make fairly clear at least some of the factors surrounding his return, but in fact, they do not. The Hutchins that Yung Wing saw in 1902 may have been the same as the one Liang Ch’i-ch’ao dealt with in 1900, but this is by no means certain. Various biographical reference works show that there was a Charles Henry Hutchins, a Massachusetts manufacturer of

cloth, who was alive and active during this period.\textsuperscript{52} As cotton goods were one of the chief exports from the United States to China, this could be the correct Hutchins. Efforts to find a record of Colonel Albarger, however, met with failure, although a list of all officers of the United States Army from 1789-1903 does include a Major Morris H. Alberger, who saw duty during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{53} Similar difficulties were encountered when trying to get information on Judge Estes. Hiscock was identified as a judge on the Appelate court in New York, in 1902.\textsuperscript{54} An article by Edmund H. Worthy, Jr. on Yung Wing records that when Worthy wrote to the United States Department of Immigration, he was informed that no Yung Wing was listed on the passenger list of the ship he was supposedly on. However, Mr. Worthy also reports that the Hartford Times ran a dispatch on June 18, 1902, from San Francisco, saying that Yung had entered the country with naturalization papers.\textsuperscript{55} It seems likely, in one way or another, that he


\textsuperscript{55}Worthy, "Yung Wing in America," p. 285. In addition, in a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt, K'ang Yu-wei said that Yung Wing was detained for an
received considerable help from American officials in enabling him to return to Connecticut.

It is of interest to indicate some of Yung's more influential American friends. These included Senator Joseph Boswell of Connecticut, the Reverend Joseph Hopkins Twitchell, and Dr. Peter Parker, a missionary. In addition, Yung Wing was a graduate of Yale University; while attending that institution, he had received financial support from Robert M. Olyphant, who in 1900 was, along with John Pierpoint Morgan, one of the two largest contributors to the founding of Whitelaw Reid's China-International Institute in Peking.56

Within a month after Yung Wing's stop-over in Hawaii, the United States State Department took an interest in complaints from Chinese residents of the islands that


Finally, in the spring of 1904, President Roosevelt apparently wrote to Secretary of State John Hay asking if it were possible to permit someone, a Chinese, to become an American citizen. This probably referred to Yung Wing. Hay's answer, dated March 2, 1904, said that Congress had made this absolutely impossible. John Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Vol. 3 (New York: Gordian Press, 1969), p. 292.
their families in China were being persecuted by the Chinese Imperial Government. The reason for the persecution was that so many Chinese in Hawaii had joined the Chinese Reform Association, and the Imperial Government hoped reprisals against the families of members would weaken the organization. The trouble apparently began in 1900, when the Acting Governor of Hawaii, Henry Ernest Cooper, granted a charter to the Association under the name "Bow Wong Progressive Association." Soon after this the China Reform Association led its unsuccessful military uprising of 1900 against the Peking government, and helped prevent the Empress Dowager from deposing the Kuang Hsu Emperor. Cooper, a lawyer from Massachusetts and former Acting President of the Republic of Hawaii, reported that the "Bow Wong Party" was composed of law-abiding Chinese, who favored reform and opposed the Empress Dowager. Secretary of State John Hay responded to Cooper's report by instructing the United States Minister to Peking, Edwin H. Conger, to demand that the Imperial Government cease these activities of vicarious punishment; although he recognized that the Chinese government had publically advised the Hawaiian Chinese not to have any-

57 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1902, pp. 244-245.

thing to do with the Association. Describing Liang Ch'i-ch'ao as a "prominent Chinese reformer," Hay said "the Chinese Government had placed a price on his head." The crime of the reformers, he noted, consisted "in their alleged membership in a society engaged in the dissemination of a propaganda unfavorable to the Chinese Government and promotive of a revolutionary movement." All the same, Hay defended them in a letter to Wu T'ing-fang claiming:

By the traditional and humane policy of the United States an asylum is granted to all merely political offenders against a foreign state who have come hither from the country of their nativity. By the enlightened practice of all free states such persons, in common with nationals, are allowed to exercise freedom of speech and of the press, and to exert all proper moral influence in support of real or imaginary reforms anywhere in the world whether in the country of their nativity or of their adoption, or elsewhere.

Responding to this diplomatic pressure, the Chinese Government announced it would cease inflicting vicarious punishment, and the Chinese consul in Hawaii was replaced.

During the period 1900 to 1902, American officials began to take an interest in Chinese who dissented from the anti-foreign policies of the Boxers and Ch'ing court. That

59 United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1902, pp. 244-247.

60 Ibid., p. 248.

61 Ibid.
their interest was, indeed, related to the treatment of foreigners in China is revealed by the lack of attention with which news of the expulsion of the reformers in 1898 and forcible retirement of the Emperor was greeted. By forcing them to flee, the Ch'ing government made K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Sun Yat-sen and their followers in a very real sense dependent on foreign powers. Henceforth they needed this aid simply to enable themselves to avoid arrest and execution by the Ch'ing authorities. Because during this period of history, the treaty powers had far greater authority with respect to what the Government of China could do than is usual in the relationships between one country and another, if the exiles were to execute their political programs, they would probably have to receive at least some cooperation from foreign governments.

American officials, rather later than either the Japanese or the English, began to interest themselves in K'ang, Liang and Sun, and at times to intervene actively in their behalf. Their interest was encouraged by agents hired for this purpose. Certain American private citizens such as Homer Lea, in the meantime, had been willing earlier and more actively to involve themselves in the work of changing the Chinese government.
CHAPTER II

THE FIRST OF THE GRAND TOURS

In the year 1903, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao made a highly publicized tour of the United States during the course of which he was frequently fêted by American businessmen and local officials. In contrast, Sun Yat-sen came for the second time to this United States in 1904. Entering the country with difficulty, he was almost completely ignored by the press and the public.

The year 1903 opened auspiciously for the Pao Huang Hui. On the night of February 17, the New York branch of this society, presided over by Joseph M. Singleton, "a queue-less Chinese," gave a dinner. The New York Times reporter who attended the affair wrote that the guests were "members of the United States Supreme Court, the Judges and Justices of other courts, and a number of American and Chinese friends."¹ The Toastmaster, Judge Warren W.

¹New York Times, February 18, 1903, p. 3. It should perhaps be noted that a queue, or the lack of same, had significance to both Chinese and Americans. For the Chinese, the queue was legally required to indicate submission to the Manchu dynasty; for Americans, a queue indicated old-fashioned, anti-Western ideas.
Foster, expressed particular good will to the Chinese Reform Association members, whom he felt had become Americanized. Henry M. Goldfogle, Democratic Congressman from New York, praised the Kuang-Hsü Emperor and "implied . . . that the Dowager Empress might pass away." These remarks, not unnaturally, were applauded. Justice Lott Russell Herrick, then a judge in Illinois, complimented the Reform party and remarked that his faith in China's ability to "regenerate" stemmed from the fact that he rarely heard of a dishonest clerk or banker in his establishment in China. The reformers closed the speechmaking by denouncing the American policy of excluding Chinese. The ultimate purpose of this dinner doubtless must have been to assure the Pao Huang Hui of the good will of high-ranking American officials.

The good will of influential Americans was clearly needed in order to secure entrance into the United States for Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. In view of his relationship with the Imperial Government, Liang did not have the proper papers.


\[3\] New York Times, February 18, 1903, p. 3.

\[4\] A. N. Marquis Co., Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942, p. 555.

\[5\] New York Times, February 18, 1903, p. 3.
with which to enter the United States. However, he desired to come to this country in order to raise money, to enlarge the membership of the Chinese Reform Association, and to strengthen American support for the association.⁶

The dinner evidently had the desired effect, because Liang Ch'i-ch-ao was indeed granted entrance to the continental United States in 1903. The process of his entrance is described by Frederick Chapin; it included the personal intervention in Liang's behalf of the American consul in Vancouver, a Mr. Dudley. The Pao Huang Hui is supposed to have given a dinner in Dudley's honor, and what he observed of the association members on this occasion overcame any reservations he may have felt as to the desirability of its leaders being permitted to organize Chinese in the United States. In spite of the vigorous protests of the Chinese government, Dudley convinced Secretary of State John Hay that Liang should be admitted, and Hay in turn wrote the Department of Immigration that Liang was only "'a gentle jailbird and reformer'"⁷ rather than the criminal that the Chinese government took him to be. Chapin additionally explains that Wu T'ing-fang, a man presumably adamant against admitting Liang was replaced as


Minister to the United States at a crucial juncture, his post being assumed by someone more sympathetic with the reformers. Accordingly, Liang is supposed to have arrived in New York in April of 1903.\textsuperscript{8}

Although much of Chapin's account is probably correct, his claim that Wu T'ing-fang nearly succeeded in keeping Liang out of the country is open to question in view of the fact that in 1901, Liang claimed Wu as both a friend and an ally.\textsuperscript{9} In addition, both the \textit{New York Times} and Joseph Levenson, one of Liang Ch'\textquotesingle i-ch\textquotesingle ao's best biographers, say that Liang arrived in New York on May 12 rather than in April,\textsuperscript{10} having come by way of Japan.

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{9}Ting, \textit{Liang Ch'\textquotesingle i-ch\textquotesingle ao}, V. I, p. 101. In his letter to the San Francisco Chinese Association in 1901, Liang said Wu had tried on several occasions to help him out of personal friendship. But, Chapin writes that Wu used his position of Minister to the United States in the spring of 1903 to try to prevent Liang from entering. In fact, in a telephone conversation with the author, Miss Linda Shin, who wrote "China in Transition: the Role of Wu T'ing-fang (1842-1922)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation prepared for the University of California, Los Angeles, 1970) said that Wu left the United States in December of 1902. The \textit{New York Times} on August 20, 1902 (p. 3), said Wu would be replaced as Minister on January 1, 1903 and the \textit{Washington Bee} on June 20, 1903 (p. 3), noted that he had been replaced. He was replaced by Sir Liang Chen Tung, also referred to as Sir Chentung Liang Cheng.

Hawaii, then Canada. 11

For the first month and a half after his arrival in the United States, Liang used New York as his headquarters; from there he made short trips to Washington, Boston and Philadelphia. During this period, he received his first of four visits by members of the Socialist Party in the United States who wanted the China Reform Association to affiliate with them. Liang refused. 12 Also while in New York, Liang had a brief interview with J. P. Morgan. Although Liang in his chronicle does not say what was discussed, it is probable that he tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a loan for developing railroads in China. 13 Liang visited Harvard and Cambridge, but did not have time for Yale. While in Boston, he got good press coverage by the Boston press, and later he visited the National Armory and had interviews with Hay and Roosevelt in Washington, D.C. 14

The interview with Hay took place at Hay's home, and lasted over two hours. Liang felt that Hay was an

---


12Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, p. 70.

13Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (梁啟超), Record of a Trip to the New World (Shin Ta-lu Yu-chi), (1905), p. 284. Morgan was more closely related to the group led by Yuan Shih-k'ai, then head of the most modern sector of the Chinese army, a supporter of the throne until 1911, and a rival of the Reform Association.

14Ting, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, p. 183.
important man, deserving of his reputation, and well-informed on China. Both Hay and Roosevelt complimented Liang on his work for the Reform Association, although Roosevelt suggested that Liang do something to improve the conduct of Chinese in the United States. The President also inquired after K'ang Yu-wei, and may have suggested that the latter would be welcome in this country. Hay, on the other hand, went so far as to say he thought China would one day resume her status as a great power, and judging by Liang's impression of his statesmanship, must have been very sympathetically inclined towards the Pao Huang Hui. By and large, the interview with Hay seems to have been more successful than the one with Roosevelt.\footnote{Liang, Record of a Trip to the New World, pp. 305-306. Roosevelt's remark concerning the conduct of Chinese in the United States is not explained in Liang's book.}

In case there is any question whether the American public knew what was going on, it is necessary to mention the article in the \textit{New York Times} written the day after Liang's arrival. After generously referring to him as the "Great Reformer," the article gave a short, incorrect, but lauditory resume of Liang's life. It noted that the reformers wanted to overthrow the Dowager Empress, who implacably opposed them. Liang was reported to have said, "'The Emperor, while he is a Manchu and a man of no very conspicuous ability'" favored reform, which is why Liang
supported him. Liang also reminded the Times' reporter that "... the nations to feel first effects of beneficial reform in China will be the United States, England, and Japan." The reforms he referred to were a constitution, a parliament and modern education. ¹⁶

While Liang was still on the East coast, Homer Lea began organizing what was to be the first of a series of military training schools for young Chinese affiliated with the Reform Association. According to the account of former sergeant Ansel E. O'Banion, ¹⁷ when he left the United States Army, (Troop A, Fourth Cavalry) on June 18, 1902, his commanding officer Colonel C. C. Carr gave him a sealed letter addressed to Lt. General Homer Lea of Los Angeles, California, telling him that if he ever wanted to use the skills he had acquired during the Philippine campaign, he should take this letter to Lea, who would give him a job. It was not until June of 1903 that O'Banion delivered the letter, but when he did, Lea explained that he was Lt. General in the Chinese Imperial Reform Army. He added that he had written General Chaffee asking Chaffee to recommend someone suitable for a drillmaster for Lea's army-to-be. O'Banion was the man who had been chosen, O'Banion, fascinated, accepted the rank of Captain in Lea's

¹⁷This account forms the basis of the work Double Ten: Captain O'Banion's Story of the Chinese Revolution by Carl Glick.
army and was initiated the next night into a Chinese secret society which had affiliations with both K'ang's group and Sun Yat-sen's group. Drilling began almost immediately with cadets supplied by the Pao Huang Hui, although the military school was not formally incorporated until 1904. ¹⁸

As the troops were "massing," Liang Ch'i-ch'ao continued his trip through the United States. The first of July, 1903 found him in Pittsburgh. From here he went to Cincinnati, New Orleans, St. Louis and Chicago, with good press coverage at all times. After leaving Chicago, he crossed the country, passed through Montana where he was received by the governor of that state, then continued on to the State of Washington. From Washington, he went to

¹⁸Glick, *Double Ten*, pp. 11-27. The National Archives has no record of a request from Lea to Chaffee that Chaffee recommend someone to him, nor does it have any letter written by Chaffee to Colonel C. C. Carr on the subject of O'Banion. Nor is it clear that Chaffee knew why Homer Lea was looking for the man Chaffee recommended. It should be mentioned in passing that Homer Lea, in addition to his services for Chinese revolutionaries, wrote several rather sensational books on military strategy. These books, the most famous of which was *The Valor of Ignorance*, were for the most part highly regarded by the American military establishment as well as by the British. Letters from high-ranking officers of both countries complimenting him on his far-sightedness were accompanied by other letters encouraging Lea to help plan the defense of California, and the like. For the actual letters, see Joshua Powers collection, Hoover Institution for War and Peace, Archives. O'Banion went with Lea on expeditions to inspect the mountain passes of California.
Oregon and finally, California.  

While he was en route, a crisis developed in Shanghai related to Chinese revolutionaries there. Sometime near the end of July or beginning of August, the editors of a Chinese magazine of unmistakably revolutionary tendencies took refuge in the International Settlement at Shanghai when the Chinese authorities tried to arrest them. The Chinese government asked that the men in question be turned over to them, but officials in the International Settlement refused. According to Frederick Chapin, Liang telegraphed John Hay and Homer Lea wrote President Roosevelt asking that the United States refuse to give up the revolutionaries. Roosevelt's personal secretary is supposed to have advised Hay ten days later "to be exceedingly slow about delivering any political criminals to the Chinese government." A partial compromise was reached according to which the Settlement police did arrest the offenders on June 29, 1903. They

19 Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, pp. 73-74, and Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 54.

20 Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, pp. 268-270.

21 Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 56. Harold Schiffrin in his book Sun Yat-sen, however, says the United States, French and Russian representatives in Shanghai were willing to give the editors up to the appropriate Chinese authorities but that the British refused, probably in order to strengthen England's claim of sovereignty over her concessions in China. This seems to be a case of the American representatives disagreeing with their home government.
were not brought to trial until December of that year and were finally sentenced to less than four years in prison in a court presided over by an English judge. Sentence was pronounced in May of 1904.  

On August 6, 1903, the *New York Times* wrote an editorial on the affair. Calling them "reformers" (one of them had previously been a follower of K'ang Yu-wei) the *Times* suggested that they not be rendered to China. "They are political prisoners, ... it is optional with the civilized Governments whether they surrender them or not." The editorial then noted that these reformers favored good things; keeping them in the International Settlement would not impinge on China's sovereignty because "China is no longer a sovereign Power. The civilized nations have already gone very far in the exercise of control over her affairs." The reason for China's weakness, the *Times* contended, was the reactionism of the Empress Dowager, who forced the treaty powers to extremes that would otherwise be unnecessary.  

On September 25, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao arrived in San Francisco on the last stage of his journey in America. The *New York Times*, in noting his arrival there, remarked that although the Empress Dowager had offered $100,000.00 for

---


his arrest, Liang "has no fear of being deprived of his liberty." It was implied that the American government, as well as Pao Huang Hui members, were giving him some protection. The San Francisco Examiner also ran an article on him the same day, referring to him as "'the big Chinese Reformer.'" It said a brass band, apparently sent out by the city fathers, was ready to meet Liang at the train station where he would arrive from Oregon. A banquet, organized by the China Reform Association, would be given for him that same night, and a second on October 1.

The following day, the San Francisco Examiner noted Liang had arrived. Mentioning the price on Liang's head and erroneously stating that he spoke English, the Examiner declared that Liang was in the United States primarily to raise $50 million, of which $10 million had already been raised. However, Liang was soliciting this money from Chinese in America rather than Americans. The sum was to be used to develop railways in China and similar projects. Liang was also recruiting for the Reform party, said the Examiner, whose head was K'ang Yu-wei, a man doing "missionary work" in Southeast Asia.

---

25 San Francisco Examiner, September 25, 1903, p. 2.
26 San Francisco Examiner, September 26, 1903, p. 2.
On October 18, Liang went to Sacramento. From there, he made his way to Los Angeles, where he arrived on the twenty-second of the month. Meeting him at the train station were General Homer Lea, in full dress, the Pao Huang Hui cadets, "many prominent citizens of Los Angeles," a band, and a police escort. A parade was held in his honor, including "the local Signal Corps . . . accompanied by a band . . . followed by [members of the Los Angeles] Chambers of Commerce committee, the press, and the local Chinese," as well as Mayor Snyder.27

Lea seems to have done his best to see that Liang was well-received and given ample opportunity to meet with those Americans of Los Angeles that would best be in a position to help him. A reception was given for Liang followed by a dinner at which "a select few" members of the Chamber of Commerce and "officers of the military" were present. General Prescott, Major Lovett and Lt. Sabine of the United States Army attended, as did a Mr. G. G. Johnson and a Mr. John Alton from the Chamber of Commerce, among others. These last two must have been agreeably impressed by Liang, because in 1904, they became two of the three original incorporators and directors of the military school for the Pao Huang Hui's Chinese cadets established

27Los Angeles Times, October 23, 1903, Section II, p. 1, and Glick, Double Ten, p. 105.
in Los Angeles under the direction of Homer Lea.\(^\text{28}\) Probably referring to these cadets, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} remarked that Liang, who had a price of \$140,000 on his head, was in the United States to add to "the war sinews of the Society for the Protection of the Emperor /China Reform Association/."\(^\text{29}\)

Liang spent about ten days in Los Angeles. During this period, at least one other reception was held for him, this time, by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. Mayor Snyder escorted Liang to his seat, John Alton introduced him, and the President of the Chamber of Commerce gave a welcoming speech.\(^\text{30}\) Finally, around the first of November, Liang made his way back up the coast to Vancouver, and embarked for Japan.\(^\text{31}\)

About a month after Liang had left the United States, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} referred to him again as "the distinguished Chinese reformer" and noted that "the question of the reform of the Chinese empire . . . is liable to


\(^\text{29}\)Los Angeles Times, October 23, 1903, Section II, p. 1.

\(^\text{30}\)Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1903, Section II, p. 4.

\(^\text{31}\)Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, p. 74.
develop a revolution in China any day. . . ."32 Towards the end of December, the New York Times reported that the Reform Association planned to start a newspaper in New York in the immediate future, to serve as its official organ in that city. The article noted the aims of the association were to remodel China according to "the modern methods of the civilized countries of the West."33

Although the American press publicly lauded Liang, noting with particular favor that he seemed to be learning Western ways, Liang accomplished very little among Americans outside of Los Angeles of concrete value to the Reform Association. To have won the good will of John Hay and the recognition of Roosevelt was significant, but that did not lead the United States to demand that the Chinese government return power to the Emperor or institute a constitution. With respect to raising money, which was one of the most important goals of his trip, Liang obviously received nothing from J. P. Morgan. His meetings with members of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce also does not seem to have enriched his coffers, and even among Chinese residing in the United States, although they obviously contributed generously, it is probable that he was never able

---

32 Los Angeles Times, November 4, 1903, Section II, p. 1.

to raise more than half the desired sum.

In contrast to the recognition given Liang in 1903, Sun Yat-sen's second trip to the continental United States, which took place in the following year, was accorded very little publicity by the American press. On his first trip, in 1896, Sun had crossed the country rapidly. He was on his way to London, and in addition he was able to stimulate only slight interest in revolution among the Chinese residing in America. His second trip seems to have been more of a success, in spite of an inauspicious beginning.

Sun arrived in San Francisco from Japan via Hawaii aboard the steamship Korea on April 6, 1904. He had in his possession a false birth certificate that he obtained in March of 1904 which purported that he had been born on Oahu in 1870. Hawaiian birth would entitle him to free entry into the continental United States, and the certificate had been easy to obtain, requiring only that the Chinese inspector in Hawaii certify that it was correct, after which the appropriate official signatures were affixed. To strengthen his argument, Sun had taken a loyalty oath to the United States prior to embarking for San Francisco. Henry Ernest Cooper, who had pleaded the case of the Reform Association's Hawaiian members with Hay and the Department

---

of the Interior in 1902, was, in 1904, Minister of the Interior and Finance, on the Board of Health, and First Secretary of the Territory of Hawaii. It is possible that he helped Sun get the required papers.35

Sun's arrival was duly noted in an article in the San Francisco Examiner, which called Sun a leading "reformer," reported that he wore American clothes, and wanted to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. It then incorrectly stated that the Manchu government wanted to boil him alive in oil, and that he had been living in Hawaii for several years. Remarking that he was "mild in manner and speech," the article said Sun first tried to claim he was Japanese in order to gain entry, but his ruse was discovered. Referred to as Sun Yat Seen or Mr. Seen, a photograph of Sun was included with a drawing of a pot of boiling oil. Mention was also made that Sun feared assassination by Chinese in the United States.36

Upon his landing, however, American authorities sent Sun to the Immigration shed, where they deliberated

---


36 San Francisco Examiner, April 7, 1904, p. 5.
whether or not to permit him to enter. Not only were they convinced that he was not Japanese, as the Examiner article noted, but they did not believe he was born in Hawaii.

Harold Schiffrin explains this by saying that the Chinese interpreters for the customs inspectors were members of the Reform Association. As the Reform Association and Sun's organization were in direct competition, they did not want Sun to land and were also aware of the falsity of his claims. They informed the officials, and the latter said Sun would be deported when the S. S. Korea returned. However, Sun had in his possession letters of recommendation to two Chinese living in San Francisco. On seeing a Chinese newspaper (while still being detained by the Immigration authorities), he noted that the editor was one of the two men to whom his letters recommended him. He managed to get a message delivered to this latter, who turned out also to be the legal advisor to the Chinese consul in San Francisco. This Chinese consul, in turn, was a brother of Ho Kai, a supporter and intimate of Sun's. These men wrote an appeal to the Department of Commerce and Labor in Washington. According to Schiffrin, the Chinese consul was persuaded not to let the Chinese Minister to Washington know what was happening.37

37 Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen, pp. 327-330. The consul was also a brother-in-law of Wu T'ing-fang, former Chinese Minister to the United States. Wu's great-grandson is
Another theory as to why Sun was detained for three weeks in San Francisco is that American authorities were afraid Sun might try to assassinate the Manchu Prince P'u-lun, who passed through San Francisco late in April of 1904 on his way to the St. Louis International Exposition. As this was the first visit of a member of the ruling family to the United States, particular precautions were taken to insure that his visit would give him a favorable impression of the United States. Some credence is given to this interpretation by an article that appeared in the San Francisco Examiner on the seventh of May, 1904, which essentially stated that this was the reason for Sun's detention.  

inclined to believe that Wu used his influence to help Sun at this time. Interview between Patrick Wu and the author, April 2, 1971.  

An intimate of Sun Yat-sen's, a Mr. Feng Tze-uo (Feng Tze-yo (芬哲尤)), in one of his books explains the situation as being involved with the then-current Chinese secret society, the Hung Men (Chinese Masons). K'ang and Liang had joined this pro-Ming, anti-Ch'ing society in 1899, but Sun did not join it until shortly before his arrival in San Francisco in 1903. The Chinese consul in San Francisco, as well as being brother of Ho Kai and brother-in-law of Wu T'ing-fang, was a member of this organization. Partly for this reason, he agreed to help Sun and hired an American lawyer to write an appeal to the United States Department of Commerce and Labor. He (the Chinese consul, ) later helped Sun raise $200,000 (U.S.), and convinced the Chinese language newspaper in San Francisco to switch allegiance from K'ang and Liang, to Sun. At this time as well, Sun founded the first American branch of his earlier revolutionary organization, the Shing-chung Hui. Feng Tze-yo (芬哲尤), Discussion of the Revolutionary Organizations of Overseas Chinese (Hua-ch'ao Ko-ming Tzu-rih shr-hwa) (Taipei: Central Bookstore, 1954), pp. 24-26.

38 Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and its
Unfortunately, Sun Yat-sen's memoirs mention nothing of these affairs.

On April 28, the Department of Commerce and Labor sent a letter on the matter to the Commissioner of Immigration of San Francisco, signed by the Acting Secretary, Lawrence O. Murray. This letter was in response to communication number 629-C of April 21, and dealt with whether or not to admit Sun Yat-sen into the United States. The writer of communication 629-C explained that Sun had entered the United States in 1896 with a certificate of the Chinese government saying he was a Chinese student. The author of 628-C apparently thought Sun was really an American citizen, born in Hawaii, but that he forfeited this right by gaining admittance in 1896 on a Chinese certificate, thus making himself a subject of China.39

Murray, for the Department of Commerce and Labor, noted that no one had disputed Sun's Hawaiian birth. The Department considered that his entering the country on a Chinese student certificate in 1896 was a matter of convenience, and did not represent declaring allegiance to

---

39 Decision No. 20, Department of Commerce and Labor, April 28, 1904; enclosure in letter to the author from District Director, Bureau of Immigration, March 25, 1971.
China or giving up American citizenship, especially since Hawaiian-born Chinese only became American citizens in 1900, by act of Congress. Since Sun could not have given up in 1896 what he did not have, he should be considered an American citizen and permitted to land.40

The question then remains as to whether or not higher American officials really thought Sun had been born in Hawaii. They would certainly have known of his revolutionary activities, if not from reading the newspaper then from reading Sun's book *Kidnapped in London* published in 1896 concerning his imprisonment in the Chinese Embassy in London. Certainly, the Chinese and English governments were not uninformed of the truth. Since the certificate claiming he was born in Hawaii was not issued until 1904, his student certificate of 1896 would have named the province in which he was born. The student certificate, in view of his standing with the Chinese government after he failed in his attempt at revolution, must have been obtained through devious means. American officials probably were a party to the deception of 1896, giving them a further reason to know the circumstances of his birth.

The same day that the Department of Commerce and Labor wrote their decision, Sun was permitted to enter the United States. The *San Francisco Examiner*, this time

---

40 Ibid.
calling him Dr. Sam Yet-Sui, duly noted his release.  

According to a later article that appeared in the San Francisco Examiner the Chinese Consul General had warned Chinese in the United States not to associate with Sun, the dangerous revolutionary. The Examiner perceptively noted that although Sun claimed this was his first trip to the United States, Chinese living in San Francisco remembered that he had been there eight years ago, trying to raise money.  

On the twenty-third of May, the Examiner published a very sympathetic interview with Sun conducted by Edward H. Hamilton, including a photograph of Sun, Sun's opinion of K'ang's group, and Sun's statement that he had been born in Hawaii. Sun Yat-sen, not surprisingly, told Hamilton he thought the Reform Association had little of importance to offer. This interview appeared in the paper on the day Sun departed from San Francisco. On May 25, the paper ran a final item concerning Sun which reported that by the time Sun left San Francisco for Los Angeles the Chinese consul in San Francisco no longer feared he would assassinate Prince P'i-lun. This was because Sun had "won the confidence of the best element of Chinatown" during his

---

41 San Francisco Examiner, April 29, 1904, p. 7.  
42 San Francisco Examiner, May 7, 1904, p. 1.
San Francisco visit. 43

Probably Sun arrived in Los Angeles around May 24 or May 25, assuming he went directly there from San Francisco, as is implied by the San Francisco Examiner. Unfortunately, neither the Los Angeles Examiner nor the Los Angeles Times seemed to have covered his activities but he probably met at least once with Homer Lea. 44 On August 11, a special report came to the New York Times from New Orleans that reported Sun Yat-sen was currently in that city, after which he planned to go on to St. Louis. The article, without commenting upon the merits of his aims, said Sun was in the United States in order to "start another revolutionary movement and raise a powerful following, ready to invade southern China without delay." 45 On the following day, the Times carried a special report from Washington, D.C., which claimed that the Chinese Reform Association was making great gains in the United States; it failed, however, to compare this with Sun's efforts. 46 Although no


44 Lo Shang-lin (罗香林), European and American Friends of our Country's Father (Kuo-fu yu Ou-mei ij Yo-hao) (Taipei: Central Literary Contributions Society, 1959), p. 97 actually says Sun saw Lea in San Francisco in 1904, but is probably a confused account, as Sun was not in the United States in 1904, and Lea lived in Los Angeles.


more of Sun's activities on this trip can be traced, it is worth noticing that after the decision to admit him on April 28, there is no mention of Sun having contact with American officials or being given a warm reception by the American people.

There seems to be this difference between Sun Yat-sen's group and the Pao Huang Hui: whereas the former engaged more or less secretly in revolutionary plotting, leaders of the latter sought to further their cause through more established channels. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, for example, was an important and highly respected man, and he knew this. He could count on the protection of the United States government as well as many other governments; he could openly have interviews with the President of the United States, big capitalists, and other men of consequence. He could even openly make arrangements for the training of officers of what was, in effect, a party army. Not surprisingly, he took advantage of these opportunities, gave frequent lectures and interviews to the press, and generally made himself visible. Such was not the case with Sun Yat-sen, so that when he came to the United States, most of his activities escaped the public eye. In addition, his memoirs devote little attention to the details of his life and his biographers are not able to give a detailed picture of all that occurred to him during this period.
In effect, Sun Yat-sen was tolerated by the American government, but probably not as encouraged as the Pao Huang Hui. Speaking in more concrete terms, however, Liang can hardly be said to have accomplished a great deal more than Sun in their respective dealings with Americans. Neither was able to raise money from American sources. The Pao Huang Hui cadets during the years 1903-1904 numbered somewhere around forty, hardly a significant number. Their commanding officers, Homer Lea and Ansel O'Banion, were acting as private citizens when they engaged to train the cadets. Although Lea certainly had among his friends various high-ranking officers in the United States Army, it is doubtful that these officers contributed much more than, in certain cases, verbal encouragement. American diplomats, finally, were at least as sympathetic to the reforms promulgated during these years by the Imperial Government as they were to exiled reformers with Pao Huang Hui connections. In other words, in spite of Liang's receptions and Sun's secrecy, Americans continued to be involved very cautiously or not at all in Chinese politics. It is only fair to add that Lea's cadets eventually numbered over 1,000 and O'Banion was given a position on the Los Angeles police force, making him the officer responsible for the Chinatown area. These events, which occurred after Liang's departure, nevertheless were at least in part due to the
good will he generated among Americans in 1903. However, when measured against Liang's ultimate goal of securing American capital for the development of Chinese railways and American official backing of the Reform Association, Liang failed.
CHAPTER III

EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY AND K'ANG YU-WEI'S
FIRST VISITS

As the New York Times article declared in August of 1904, the Pao Huang Hui made great gains in the United States after the departure of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. These gains enabled Lea's military academy to be formally incorporated in November of 1904, and branches of the academy opened in over a dozen American cities. In 1905, K'ang Yu-wei came to the United States and made a triumphant tour of this country that included two interviews with President Roosevelt. The Pao Huang Hui appeared to be on the verge of acquiring full-scale diplomatic support by the American government and people.

Although there were Chinese cadets being trained by the Reform Association and Homer Lea as early as June, 1903,¹ the central training academy for the drilling of these cadets was not formally incorporated by the State of California until November 28, 1904.² Probably in anticipation of this event, on October 10, 1904, K'ang Yu-wei

¹Glick, Double Ten, p. 105.
²Letter to the author from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Secretary of State, California, March 10, 1971.
wrote Lea a letter thanking him for joining the Reform Association.³ Prior to incorporation, the cadets had been organized into a minimum of one brigade and a record was being kept of their attendance.⁴ In addition, Frederick Chapin claims that a competitive drill between various companies of the academy, held shortly prior to incorporation, was witnessed by Harrison Gray Otis and Colonel Fyfe, Colonel G. W. Schreiber and Lt. D. P. Quinlan of the United States Army.⁵

The academy, named the Western Military Academy, was intended as an officers training school. The incorporators and original directors were Robert Sherman Page, G. G. Johnson, and John Alton, all of Los Angeles, California.⁶ It has been noted that, during Liang's 1903 visit to Los Angeles, Johnson and Alton were on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and among those who attended banquets in Liang's honor.

³Letter from K'ang Yu-wei to Homer Lea, October 10, 1904, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 3, folder CF.

⁴"Parade or Morning Report," November 15, 1904. Joshua B. Powers collection, box 3, folder CF. O'Banion was listed as commanding captain of Company A, 1st Infantry, 1st brigade, Imperial Army.

⁵Frederick Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 71. Since Chapin relied on O'Banion's memory of events in this instance, the claim is open to suspicion.

O'Banion claims the incorporators did not know the true purpose of the Western Military Academy until a later date, and that they contributed their names rather than money for what they thought would be an academy to Westernize Chinese. In view of the name of the academy, however, and since they met with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao a year earlier, it seems unlikely that they would have been uninformed of the truth. O'Banion further says that money to start the school was provided by the Reform Association, a natural enough source. Officers were recruited on two levels: Americans, recommended by O'Banion, were made members of the Pao Huang Hui, given the rank of Captain in the Association army, and paid $160 a month. In addition, Chinese officers were used, the latter receiving the rank of First Lieutenant. Generals Chaffee and Story supposedly visited the Academy after it "had ceased to be a clandestine organization." In addition, according to Chapin's account, John York was its "Judge Advocate General" and Colonel George W. Schreiber, commander of the 7th Regiment, National Guard of California, drafted general orders.

Shortly after incorporation, the school applied for

---

7Glick, *Double Ten*, pp. 58-67. Chinese officers were in charge in Phoenix, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, Oxnard, Ventura and Bakersfield.

8Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 72.

9Ibid., pp. 65-66.
and received permission, through Roger S. Page, to parade
with arms at the Pasadena "Tournament of Roses." The
parade permit, issued by the Adjutant General of California,
was effective from December 30, 1904 until January 3,
1905. The flexibility may have been due to a lack of
firm scheduling of the tournament itself. This Pasadena
"Tournament of Roses" was an annual affair some three years
old, but the parade of 1904 was unsuccessful, and some
question existed as to whether or not to hold one in
1905.

The source of the arms mentioned in the permit is
hard to determine, but an undated letter written to Lea
from Bryan Singleton, head of the New York branch of the
Pao Huang Hui provides some information. Singleton wrote
that an old acquaintance of his in London could supply the
Chinese with at least 200,000 Mausers. This acquaintance
originally planned to sell his guns to the Viceroy of
Nanking, but knowing "our show," would sell them to

---

10Letter from J. B. Lanck, Adjutant General, State
of California to Mr. Roger S. Page, Secretary, Western
Military Academy, Powers collection, box 1, folder AB. The
letter says the governor of California was the one who
actually granted permission, under Section 734 Penal Code.

11Lou F. Chapin, Thirty Years in Pasadena (Pasadena:
Singleton for Lea to use.\textsuperscript{12}

The Pasadena "Tournament of Roses" for 1905 took place on January 2 of that year, and partially because of holding chariot races, seemed to have been a great success. Frederick Chapin claims that the Los Angeles district attorney at the last moment tried to prevent the Western Military Academy from parading, because of their questionable status under American neutrality laws. In spite of his objections they were permitted to march.\textsuperscript{13} The day after the parade, a \textit{Los Angeles Times} reporter, remarking that "Homer Lea's troops" had been secured by John York, said that they had been the most interesting of the marchers.\textsuperscript{14} In another article, the presence of Captain O'Banion's company of "fifty-eight Americanized Chinese" was noted.\textsuperscript{15} Their second public parade after incorporation took place in Los Angeles a few days after the tournament, when they participated in the funeral procession of a leading Chinese.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{12}Letter from Bryan Singleton to General Homer Lea, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA. The letter-head on this letter is Bachelor's Club, Piccadilly, W. The only indication as to when the letter was written is that Singleton wishes Lea a Happy New Year.

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Chapin, "Homer Lea,"} pp. 88-89.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Los Angeles Times,} January 3, 1905, Section II, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.,} Section II, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Chapin, "Homer Lea,"} pp. 88-89.
The Reform Association soon established military academies in other cities in the United States, all under the command of Homer Lea. When the system reached its greatest extent, training programs operated in twenty-one American cities.\textsuperscript{17} The charter of one of these consists of a petition presented to the Circuit Court in St. Louis, requesting permission to establish a "night school for Chinese in the City of St. Louis . . . with American teachers . . . for the improvement and bodily health of the members by classes in drilling and calisthenic exercises . . ."\textsuperscript{18} The petition was filed on February 2, 1905 by the Chinese-American Educational Association, and the members of the board of governors would be Chinese. A branch in Chicago was already functioning by this time. Its head, Major George W. Gibbs, First Battalion, Imperial Army, informed Lea on January 6, 1905 that they painted the words American Chinese Empire Reform Academy over the entrance. Gibbs, who wrote Lea principally to complain of the "scurrilous slander of the Hearst papers" also mentioned that uniforms had been ordered from Pettibone Brothers, and a Sturm galling rifle and ammunition had been

\textsuperscript{17}Glick, Double Ten, p. 66. A partial list of officers is found on pp. 65-67.

\textsuperscript{18}Petition to Charter a Chinese-American Educational Association, February 2, 1905, Hoover Institution for War Revolution, and Peace, Archives, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 1, folder AA.
purchased. One company in New York was commanded by Major George McVikar of the United States Army's "Fighting Sixty-Ninth."  

Some time after Liang Ch'i-ch'ao left the United States, K'ang Yu-wei had decided to try once again to come to this country. On October 20, 1904, K'ang's daughter, K'ang Tung-bac, sent a telegram from London to President Roosevelt announcing that her father would shortly leave London to attend the St. Louis Exhibition. Asking Roosevelt to "Pray instruct customs officer allow admission," she also requested he advise her of his action. The President shortly afterward referred the matter to the Bureau of Immigration.  

The Bureau of Immigration then informed Mr. F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, that

---

19 Letter from Major George W. Gibbs to General Homer Lea, January 6, 1905, Powers collection, box 3, folder CG.  

20 Chapin, "Homer Lea," p. 75. Among Lea's papers there are schedules of instruction for the Lawrence Light Guard from March through June, 1905. It is the military training program of Lt. Whitney, Captain Clark, and Lt. Magee. Whether these men helped Lea in any way or whether he was simply trying to model his program on theirs is nowhere made clear. Schedules of Instruction, Powers collection.  

21 Cablegram, K'ang Tung-bac to President Roosevelt, October 20, 1904, written notice of referral to Bureau of Immigration, and stamp acknowledging receipt by that Bureau on October 27, 1904; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
K'ang would soon arrive in a port under his jurisdiction. Writing Berkshire that K'ang would probably claim Japanese citizenship, the Bureau decided this claim should be ignored and K'ang should be examined "under the terms of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, the Bureau having no information in its possession as to the character of papers which K'ang may present." Berkshire replied that he had received information that K'ang would probably land in Montreal and try to enter at the Canadian border. At the same time, Berkshire asked for information concerning K'ang. In reply, the Acting Commissioner-General of Immigration noted that K'ang had previously been refused admission and that he was "a political fugitive from China, having belonged to some reform element in that Empire and thereby brought upon himself the dislike of the reigning dynasty." If Berkshire's information was correct, K'ang probably tried to enter the United States from Montreal but was

---


discouraged in his attempt by the American Immigration authorities. He eventually proceeded to Canada's west coast, where both American and Canadian authorities had previously shown more willingness to help K'ang and the Pao Huang Hui. On the morning of February 12, 1905, K'ang left Vancouver and arrived in Seattle, Washington, later the same day.\textsuperscript{25} At the border, he presented the required Section 6 certificate issued by the proper Canadian authority in Vancouver which claimed K'ang was a resident of Canada and desired to visit the United States "for the purpose of traveling for curiosity or pleasure." The United States Consul at Vancouver visaed this certificate on December 17, 1904, thereby permitting K'ang to enter this country. All that was irregular in the procedure was that K'ang was not a resident of Canada, he had presented certified copy rather than the original of his Section 6 certificate, and he was given no consular number.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, his entrance was not according to law.

From Seattle, K'ang traveled through Oregon and California, finally reaching Los Angeles on March 16. The day after his arrival, the \textit{Los Angeles Times} announced,\textsuperscript{25}\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25}Lo, \textit{K'ang Yu-wei}, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{26}Letters from F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, to Commissioner-General, April 30, 1906 and March 18, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
"Mr. Kong /sic/ arrives in town and is received with honors." Because K'ang's train was almost two days late, the mayor of Los Angeles was unable to meet him at the station, but General Homer Lea, Captain O'Banion, and the Los Angeles cadets welcomed him.\textsuperscript{27} A reception in honor of K'ang and Lea was given, to which the guests (probably members of the Western Military Academy, and possibly some of Lea's friends from the United States Army) were instructed to dress in uniform. Later, a banquet was given for K'ang that was attended by other prominent citizens of Los Angeles, such as Harrison Gray Otis, G. G. Johnson (then president of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce), Jack London, and various bankers.\textsuperscript{28}

K'ang spent about two months in the Los Angeles area, during which period the commanding general of American Army forces, Department of California, had the cadet school investigated. The results of the investigation revealed that the uniforms issued by the Western Military Academy very closely approximated those worn by officers in the United States Militia. In addition, the commanding general felt that the cadets were drilling in violation of American neutrality laws. Only the Fresno branch of the

\textsuperscript{27} Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1905, Section I, p. 1, and Section II, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{28} Invitation to a banquet, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA, and Glick, Double Ten, pp. 126-127.
academy was involved in the ensuing scandal, but the publicity forced Governor Pardee to have this branch closed down. In a private interview with John York, Pardee said that he sympathized with Lea’s program, and regretted the inconvenience his action must have caused.29

While K’ang was still in Southern California, a discussion arose as to who was commanding general of the Reform Association army. In 1900, a Mr. A. R. Falkenburg, President and Manager of the Standard Rock Oil Company in San Francisco, wrote a memorandum to President McKinley suggesting the United States intervene in behalf of the Kuang-Hsü Emperor. In return for this show of concern, he felt he deserved to be the Reform Association’s Commander-in-Chief in the United States. He hired Edmund R. English of Yankton, South Dakota, to recruit officers from among the ranks of the United States National Guard.30 Falkenburg came to Los Angeles in 1905 to assume command from Homer Lea. While in Los Angeles, he was a house guest of his relative, Colonel A. B. Hotchkiss, United States Army, (retired). Enjoying the support of the latter, he may also have been encouraged by K’ang Yu-wei, who was distressed by Lea’s determination to eventually use the cadets in an

---


active campaign in China. K'ang desired to keep the organization peaceful, intending perhaps to wait until the Empress Dowager died, then present the Emperor with Chinese officers trained in Western military methods who would be capable of taking over the Chinese army and modernizing it.\textsuperscript{31}

Lea refused to give up his position in favor of Falkenburg. In return, Falkenburg charged that Lea and O'Banion had tried to extort $5000 from him on the basis of secret plans Lea was said to have, and Lea's control of the Los Angeles press. A newspaper article reported that William R. Sager of the National Creditors' Association was to be the agent of the extortion, and that Sager demanded $1000 from Falkenburg in front of a police officer but O'Banion and Lea had denied any misbehavior. According to Lea, the article stated, Sager was acting on his own authority when demanding money from Falkenburg, and since no money had changed hands, the police refused to permit Falkenburg to file suit.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, K'ang Yu-wei publically disavowed Falkenburg, stating that General Homer Lea was the only commanding

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{32}Los Angeles Examiner, April 7, 1905, p. 2, and April 8, 1905, p. 14.
general of the Chinese Reform Association cadets in the United States. The incident marked the beginnings of a coldness between Lea and K'ang Yu-wei, however. Also at issue was K'ang's use of Reform Association funds, which Lea and O'Banion, among others, thought improper.

In spite of these differences, Homer Lea and K'ang Yu-wei left Los Angeles together towards the middle of April to tour the United States and review the various military academies they had established throughout the country. Their journey can be traced in part by various invitations they received as they proceeded to cross the country: on April 13, Homer Lea was invited to use the facilities of the San Francisco Olympic Club. On May 23, K'ang Yu-wei was welcomed to Zion City, Illinois by Reverend Dowie, who wished him "God speed in your good work for beloved China." Six days later, Lea was issued an invitation to use facilities of the San Francisco Olympic Club, issued at the request of Mr. A. Nerney, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA; and letter from Reverend John Alexander Dowie to K'ang Yu-wei, May 23, 1905, Powers collection, box 1, folder AE. The Reverend also invited K'ang and K'ang's entourage to come to his church.
invitation by Mr. George W. Best to use the facilities of the Chicago Athletic Club for two weeks. After this, there is no record of their activities until their arrival in Washington, D.C. on June 10.

During this period, an investigation was launched into the various activities of the Pao Huang Hui in the United States, with the particular view to shutting down Homer Lea's cadet schools. On the twenty-fifth of May, a William H. Eckley of St. Paul, Minnesota, wrote a letter to Governor Frank W. Higgins of New York, in which he warned the governor that Chinese members of an organization headed by K'ang Yu-wei were "armed and drilling" in the United States. Explaining that these troops were under the command of Homer Lea of Los Angeles, he ended the letter by saying: "This, Sir, I believe, is contrary to law, as these men are aliens to this country." Two days later, Governor Higgins' secretary wrote a letter to the Secretary of State of the United States in which a copy of the Eckley letter was enclosed, and on the same day, another of his

---

36 Invitation to use facilities of Chicago Athletic Club, issued at the request of Mr. George W. Best, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA.

37 Lo, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 198.

38 Letter from William H. Eckley to Governor Frank W. Higgins, May 25, 1905; enclosure in letter from Elmer O. Parker, Assistant Director, Old Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, to the author, March 12, 1971.
secretaries sent the original of the Eckley letter to the secretary of President Roosevelt, requesting that the matter be dealt with promptly. Although the text of these letters did not give Higgins' view of the matter, an article appeared in the New York Times about one month later which stated that Governor Higgins had said the Chinese troops were violating the Military Code, particularly since they had modern weapons and intended to perpetrate revolution in China.39

The White House, by direction of the President, referred the matter to the Secretary of War for consideration. On June 1, the Military Secretary of the War Department referred the matter to the Judge Advocate General for remarks.40 He, in turn, sent Eckley's letter back to the Military Secretary with the note:

If it is thought that the representations of Mr. Eckley are worthy of serious consideration, it is suggested that these papers be referred to the

39 Memorandum from the Governor of New York by Taal A. (?) Hereico, his Secretary, May 27, 1905 and letter from Frank E. Perlez, Secretary to Governor of New York, to William Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President, May 27, 1905; enclosures in letter from Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971, and New York Times, June 21, 1905, p. 4.

40 White House Referral: William Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President to the Secretary of War, and Second Endorsement: Henry P. McLain, Military Secretary of the War Department (by direction of Acting Chief of Staff) to the Judge Advocate General, received June 1, 1905; enclosures in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.
Commanding General, Department of California, for investigation. An equally satisfactory result could probably be obtained by a reference of the papers to the Chief of Police at Los Angeles, California.  

Frederick Chapin asserts that this choice was significant, since the Commanding General, Department of California was the general responsible for forcing Governor Pardee to close down the Fresno branch of the academy. On the orders of Lt. General Chaffee, War Department Chief of Staff, the matter was then sent to the Los Angeles Chief of Police, who was instructed to keep the matter confidential and return the paper with remarks.  

A few weeks later, the Los Angeles chief of police reported that cadets were drilling under the command of Homer Lea and Captain Ansel O'Banion twice a week in uniform with "unloaded guns when drilling." In addition, he noted that their charter had been granted them by the State of California, and that they drilled in public only with the permission of the United States Government. "Their

---

41 Third Endorsement: Judge Advocate General to the Military Secretary, June 3, 1905, an enclosure in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.

42 Memo from Lt. General Chaffee, Chief of Staff, to the Military Secretary, June 7, 1905 and Fifth Endorsement: Military Secretary's Office to Chief of Police, Los Angeles, June 8, 1905, enclosures in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971. An envelope addressed to the Military Secretary of the Army was enclosed for the reply, and the Military Secretary underlined the instructions to keep the matter "confidential."
object is the betterment of their condition, as they expect to occupy responsible positions in the Chinese Army at some future time."\textsuperscript{43} This same chief of police, incidently, hired O'Banion as special deputy sheriff for Los Angeles' Chinatown, and in 1905, made him a special police officer. O'Banion continued in this capacity until at least 1912.\textsuperscript{44}

On receipt of the letter from the Los Angeles chief of police, Lt. General Chaffee instructed the Military Secretary to refer the matter back to the Judge Advocate General, requesting that the latter give a report on the "illegality of conduct of the organization referred to, if any."\textsuperscript{45} The Judge Advocate General replied that no Federal question was involved with the Chinese cadets, because "The regulation of the individual right to carry arms" fell in the States power. Nothing Federal could be involved "unless an attempt is made to violate the requirements of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43}W. A. Hammel, Chief of Police, Los Angeles, California to Military Secretary's Office, June 20, 1905, an enclosure in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971. As elsewhere noted, the uniform of the Western Military Academy bore a striking resemblance to the uniform worn by members of the United States militia. Although Mr. Hammel gave a brief description of the uniform in this letter, no allusion was made to the above-mentioned resemblance.
\item \textsuperscript{44}Glick, Double Ten, pp. 73-74.
\item \textsuperscript{45}Sixth Endorsement: Military Secretary's Office, June 26, 1905, Memo from Lt. General Chaffee, Chief of Staff, to Military Secretary, June 27, 1905 and Eighth Endorsement: Henry P. McLain, Military Secretary, to Judge Advocate General, June 28, 1905, enclosures in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Neutrality Laws of the United States," which the Judge Advocate General apparently did not feel were then violated. Since a charter for the Western Military Academy had been issued by the State of California, and the Los Angeles chief of police knew of the drilling, he felt "bound to presume that the State authorities are fully informed on the subject." He advised that a copy of the Los Angeles police chief's report be sent to the State Department, and that Governor Higgins be told of this action. These last two recommendations were followed, the appropriate letters being sent on July 3. Apparently, neither Chaffee nor the Judge Advocate General wanted to oppose or inconvenience the academy unless they were forced to, and since the Governor of California and the Los Angeles authorities favored Lea's scheme, there was no need to take any action.

Ten days later, Acting Secretary of State Alvery A. Adee acknowledged the communication, and asked if there was any "specific purpose" in sending this information to the State Department. The War Department replied that there

46 Ninth Endorsement: Judge Advocate General to War Department, June 30, 1905, an enclosure in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.

47 Tenth Endorsement: Military Secretary of the War Department, July 3, 1905 and F. C. Ainsworth, Military Secretary, to Governor Frank W. Higgins, Governor of New York, July 3, 1905 and Robert Shaw Oliver, Acting Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, July 3, 1905, enclosures in Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.
was no "specific purpose," but the report was sent for "information merely." Adee also seems to have been happy to avoid taking any action. An article appeared in a Los Angeles newspaper stating that the cadets were in violation of American laws, and that the Chinese Imperial Government had complained to the American Government, saying that the existence of these academies was an "unfriendly act." In reply, United States District Attorney H. Valentine refused to take action against the cadets, publicly stating that he would do nothing unless instructed to by the United States State Department, and that department did not see fit to take any action.

On June 16, while the investigation was still in progress, K'ang Yu-wei and some of his friends attended a session of Congress, and on June 24, he met with President Roosevelt. On an unspecified day in July he obtained a second interview, at which Yung Wing was also present.

---

48 Alvery A. Adee, Acting Secretary, Department of State to Acting Secretary of War, July 14, 1905; and Memorandum from Robert Shaw Oliver, Acting Secretary of War, to Secretary of State, July 18, 1905; enclosures in letter from Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 12, 1971.

49 Glick, Double Ten, pp. 133-135. Although the author was not able to locate the articles in question, she did find that L. H. Valentine was, indeed, a District Attorney in California, Southern District, 9th Circuit, Los Angeles, California in 1905. Chief Clerk of the Department of the Interior, Official Register of the United States, 1905 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 1376.
During the course of at least one of the interviews, K'ang discussed the restrictions against Chinese immigration into the United States. K'ang and Roosevelt also talked about the Western Military Academy, an organization of which Roosevelt reputedly approved.  

K'ang Yu-wei and Homer Lea originally planned to arrive in New York City on June 12, but the first interview with Roosevelt delayed them. While K'ang was still in Washington, the New York Times reported that he would soon arrive to inspect the cadets trained by the New York branch of the military academy. A parade in his honor, planned for June 12, was expected to be conducted by "the first ... regiment of Chinamen carrying rifles /to be/ seen in New York." The Times announced five days later that in spite of K'ang's delay in Washington, the Pao Huang Hui cadets marched as scheduled. Governor Higgins' doubts as to the legality of the organization were not reported until June 21; on June 26, the Times noted that a regularly scheduled drill by the New York cadets had not taken place, perhaps because of:


rumors that Commissioner McAdoo would act on the communication of Governor Higgins to investigate, on the presumption that the organizing of drill companies was in violation of international neutrality and of the military code relating to the carrying of arms or organization of bodies other than regular State organizations. 53

In the midst of this controversy, on the twenty-seventh of June, Homer Lea and K'ang Yu-wei finally arrived in New York City. The cadets were permitted to parade in their honor, although in order to comply with a New York police order, they carried flags instead of guns. At the head of the troops marched the New York police and the Epworth Band; the Third Chinese Regiment itself was commanded by Major McVickar of the 69th Regiment, United States Army. K'ang Yu-wei, Homer Lea, K'ang's daughter and others reviewed them, and later K'ang gave an interview to the press, in which he complimented President Roosevelt, commented on the growing strength of the Reform Association, and remarked that only the Empress Dowager stood in the way of the great change that was coming to China. K'ang stayed at the Astoria Hotel, attended various receptions given in his honor, and made side-trips to such points of interest as Boston and Philadelphia. In all, he spent about a month in the area. 54


While on the east coast, K'ang probably visited some of his more highly placed American friends, such as Elihu Root, Nicholas Butler, and Charles Ranlett Flint, the latter sometimes referred to as the "Father of the Trusts." Flint was guardian of K'ang Yu-wei's daughter when she went to high school in Hartford, Connecticut, and when she later went to Barnard College. Flint apparently did not meet K'ang until K'ang's arrival in New York in 1905, but after making his acquaintance, he became one of K'ang's staunch allies. In his memoirs, Flint not only praised K'ang's political and educational ideas, but implied he would have preferred a China according to K'ang's plan than the China of 1923. Flint believed the Empress Dowager reactionary, wanted to see the Chinese Exclusion Act put into execution with greater attention to justice, and hoped that large concessions would be given to American industrialists by the Chinese government for the purpose of strengthening and modernizing China.\(^5\) On these last two points, K'ang Yu-wei had anticipated him. At least as early as 1898, K'ang had suggested permitting an increase of foreign investment in China as one means of strengthening the economy, and during his visit to Los Angeles, he had permitted it to be

---

suggested that more liberal concessions to American capitalists might attend upon their support of his program.\footnote{56}{Glück, Double Ten, p. 127.} The interest of K'ang and the Reform Association in a change in the laws relating to immigration of Chinese into the United States has already been mentioned.

Flint apparently envisioned himself as a broker between American capitalists and Chinese politicians. He introduced Prince Tsai-Tao and Lord Li, the latter the son of Viceroy Li Hung-chang, to John D. Rockefeller and Charles M. Schwab. When T'ang Shao-yi, a former student of Yung Wing's and an associate of Yuán Shih-k'ai, the head of the modern sector of the Chinese army, came to New York in 1908, Flint invited him to a dinner to meet "men of prominence in our business and financial center."\footnote{57}{Ibid., pp. 279-285, 234.} On more than one occasion, he invited Wu T'ing-fang, Minister from China to the United States, to a similar gathering, and introduced him to E. H. Harriman, among others.\footnote{58}{Ibid., p. 285.}

In his \textit{Memories of an Active Life}, Flint mentioned that Chinese officials could not receive K'ang Yu-wei because of his standing with the Imperial Government, but he implied that they admired K'ang, all the same. Although Flint professed ignorance of what K'ang was about, he wrote
that K'ang was doing this mysterious thing "in China as well as in other countries." In addition, K'ang asked Flint to "offer $240,000 for an estate on Long Island" for K'ang. The two discussed K'ang's desire to send large numbers of Chinese laborers to Mexico, as well as "the possibility of his K'ang's talking with President Díaz of Mexico."\(^5^9\) Flint, the organizer of the American Chicle Company and the American Hawaiian Steamship Company, had influence in Mexico as well as interest in China.\(^6^0\)

It may have been partly due to Flint's influence that K'ang was invited to review the (American) troops at West Point on September 2, 1905 after which he returned to New York. On September 12, he arrived in Chicago, to begin another leisurely tour of the country, during the course of which he spent some time at Yellowstone Park.

\(^{5^9}\) Ibid., pp. 277-278.

\(^{6^0}\) Marquis Who's Who, Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942, p. 407. It is also interesting to note that Flint was awarded the order of the Double Dragon from China; in March of 1905, K'ang awarded O'Banion with a medal in the name of the Kuang Hsu Emperor. Perhaps Flint's award came from the same source. Flint, Memories, p. 282, and Glick, Double Ten, p. 131.

In addition, Flint claimed to have bought the Imperial Seal of the Chinese Empire, the Seal of the Empress Dowager that had been lost during the occupation of Peking by the powers during the Boxer Rebellion. He wrote Prince Pu Lun, offering to return it, but received no answer. In April of 1905, K'ang Yu-wei was supposed to have had it in his possession, and it figured in the Homer Lea-Falkenburg argument. Flint, Memories, p. 281, and Glick, Double Ten, pp. 136-137, 147.
before going to Oregon. K'ang's relationship with Lea did not improve during this period, although the two did not actually break. They probably parted company in Oregon; Lea went back to Los Angeles, K'ang traveled down to New Orleans, and from there he went to San Antonio and, on November 29, crossed the border into Mexico. 61

After Lea returned to Los Angeles, O'Banion smuggled Sun Yat-sen into the United States on Lea's instructions in order that Lea might discuss K'ang with Sun. After this meeting, Lea decided he would definitely support Sun rather than K'ang, if a choice had to be made. In addition, on September 30, Lea gave a banquet for Sun (although Sun was not introduced to the guests) at which several hundred people were present, including the Chinese cadets, leading Chinatown merchants, and some twelve of Lea's American friends. Four of the Americans were John Alton, then at Farmer's and Merchant's Bank, John York, Marshall Stimson, and Henry Carr of the Los Angeles Times. According to O'Banion, during the course of the banquet an attempt was made on Sun's life by Chinese supporters of the Ch'ing dynasty. O'Banion and others, however, overcame the assailants, who then fled and were never identified. 62 Sun left Los Angeles almost immediately after this event, after

61Lo, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 199.
62Glick, Double Ten, pp. 160-190.
which it is not clear exactly what he did or where he went. As for K'ang Yu-wei, he spent the first few months of 1906 in Mexico City, where he reviewed Mexican troops and spoke with President Diaz. He also wrote an eloquent letter to President Roosevelt requesting that enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws be further liberalized. In response, the Immigration Department revised its regulations. Perhaps to persuade them to revise the laws further, K'ang Yu-wei applied through a Mr. Wong Fou Chuck for admission to the United States from Mexico via Eagle Pass, Texas, which was not a legal port of entry for Chinese. The matter was referred to the Bureau of Immigration, which denied his request.

K'ang next tried to enter the United States through the port of New Orleans, a city that was also not a legal port of entry for Chinese. This time, he at first claimed he should be given entry by virtue of his official position as conferred in 1898 upon him by the Kuang-Hsü Emperor. American authorities, however, chose to honor the opinions

---


64 Telegram from Wong Fou Chuck to President Roosevelt, April 5, 1906, and memorandum for the Secretary from J. W. Sargent, Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Immigration, April 6, 1906; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
of the Chinese Minister, who reported K'ang had no official position, but was a "political offender and refugee." 65

K'ang finally abandoned this attempt, and entered the United States at the authorized port of New York, arriving on April 28, 1906, on the S.S. Niagara. He was permitted to land in spite of the fact that he lacked the important Section Six Certificate and had instead a certified copy. The Chinese Inspector in Charge, Mr. F. W. Berkshire, had been previously informed of K'ang's imminent arrival by the American Consul at Tampico, who wrote "of /his/ coming in order to prevent any delay in /his/ landing in New York. . . . You doubtless can inform yourself as to /Kang's/ right to land by consulting local Chinamen of prominence who know of the former visit." 66

---


The Commissioner-General of Immigration instructed that K'ang should not be given any special consideration.\textsuperscript{67} However, on April 30, Berkshire wrote that he admitted K'ang in spite of the fact that he did not have the required papers, primarily on the basis that he had been admitted to the country in 1904. The Commissioner-General, on May 1, approved this action.\textsuperscript{68} Regrettably, there is no indication of what K'ang may have accomplished on this trip.

Prior to the end of 1904, K'ang Yu-wei left the United States and went to Europe. He returned to America the following year, arriving in New York from Liverpool on the seventeenth of March, 1907 aboard the steamer \textit{Amerika}. He was permitted to land on the same legal grounds as in April of 1906, and once again, the Commissioner-General of Immigration approved the action.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67}Letter to F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, from F. P. Sargent, Commissioner-General, Bureau of Immigration, enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

\textsuperscript{68}Letter from F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, to Commissioner-General, April 30, 1906 and letter from F. P. Sargent, Commissioner-General to F. W. Berkshire, Chinese Inspector in Charge, May 1, 1906; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

When in New York, K'ang saw his daughter and Charles Flint, and was given a reception for the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. The New York Times reported that many congratulatory telegrams were sent to K'ang on this occasion, and he gave a statement to the press saying the aim of the China Reform Association was to "bring about economic reforms in a peaceful manner."  

In order to demonstrate on a small scale how this could be done, and in order to provide sufficient financing for the Pao Huang Hui's various newspapers and schools, K'ang and certain of his associates invested the money collected from individual members of the Reform Association in several businesses, organized under the title "Commercial Corporation." By 1907, the Commercial Corporation, most of whose business ventures were located in the United States and Mexico, achieved such success that it was able to organize its own bank, called the Hua-i National Bank. K'ang formally opened this bank in March of 1907. An American bank, its main office was in New York and branches were located in about a dozen large American cities.  

By 1911, however, 

---

70 New York Times, March 18, 1907, p. 4.  
71 Lo, K'ang Yu-wei, p. 205. Various inquiries (letters from T. M. Brezinski, Director, Bank Organization Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in Washington, D.C. to the author, April 2, 1971 and April 26, 1971) indicate that there is no official record of a Hua-i, Chinese Reform Association, Protect-the-Emperor, or similarly named National Bank ever chartered. A letter to
nothing was left of either the Commercial Corporation or the Hua-i National Bank, not because of political intimidation (American officials seem to have had no objections to these businesses) but because of bad financial management.\textsuperscript{72}

After opening the bank, K'ang decided to make a second trip to Mexico. Toward the end of May, 1907 Flint wrote Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Commerce and Labor, that K'ang had been invited to an audience with President Porfirio Diaz, for which reason he would soon proceed to Mexico City. Flint noted that, once again, K'ang wanted to re-enter the United States from Mexico at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz and Eagle Pass, and requested that Straus grant him this favor.\textsuperscript{73} A second copy of Flint's letter was sent to Mr. Straus four days later through the firm Hopkins and Hopkins, Counsellors at Law, who urged that the

\textsuperscript{72} Lo, \textit{K'ang Yu-wei}, p. 207-215.

\textsuperscript{73} Letter from Charles R. Flint to Oscar H. Straus, Secretary of Commerce and Labor, May 23, 1907; enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
matter receive prompt consideration. In addition, Flint
sent an identical letter to Robert Bacon, Assistant Secre-
tary of State.

Bacon, however, sent his letter to the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor for him to deal with. The Department
of Commerce and Labor first turned the matter over to the
Bureau of Immigration, then asked the Secretary of State
if the State Department desired that regulations be waived
and the privilege granted. Secretary of State Elihu

74 Letter from Hopkins and Hopkins, Counsellors at
Law, Washington Loan and Trust Building, to Secretary of
the Department of Commerce and Labor, May 27, 1907; en-
closure in letter to the author from National Archives,

75 Letter to Robert Bacon, Assistant Secretary of
State, from Charles R. Flint, May 21, 1907; enclosure in
letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

76 Letter from Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of
State, to Secretary of Commerce and Labor, May 27, 1907;
enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives,

77 Letter from Chief Clerk, Department of Commerce
and Labor to Chief of Bureau of Immigration, May 23, 1907
and letter from Lawrence O. Murray, Acting Secretary of
Department of Commerce and Labor to Secretary of State,
June 1, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from
National Archives, June 25, 1971.

In addition to these developments, there are rea-
sons to suspect that K'ang Yu-wei made another brief trip
to the United States some time during the fall of 1908.
O'Banion claims that he came in 1910 to New York, where
Homer Lea and Sun Yat-sen went to see him, and convinced
him to stop actively opposing Sun Yat-sen. Although there
is nothing in Homer Lea's remaining papers that support
this contention, O'Banion claimed to have accompanied them
to New York in the capacity of body-guard. On the other
Root responded on June 7 that the State Department had "no wish in the matter." Three days later, Hopkins and Hopkins, and Charles Ranlett Flint were informed that their request on K'ang's behalf would not be granted. Although Elihu Root was supposed to be a friend of K'ang's and unofficial supporter of the Pao Huang Hui's cadet training program, he was not in this instance willing to make any plea in behalf of K'ang. Without this plea, the Department of Commerce and Labor simply followed law and precedent, and denied K'ang's request.

Shortly after this, K'ang went to Mexico, visited with Diaz, and returned. He arrived in New York on July 12 on board the S.S. Merida, and was admitted on the same basis as he had been in March of that year. This time, he stayed less than two months, for by September 9, 1907.

hand, in April of 1908, Lea wrote Boothe that K'ang might soon make a trip to Los Angeles, in which case Lea would introduce him to the Boothe family. A letter from Boothe to Lea written on September 11 of that year suggests that K'ang was at that time on the east coast of the United States. Glick, Double Ten, pp. 269-271; letter from Lea to Boothe, April 7, 1908, and letter from Boothe to Lea, September 11, 1908, Boothe collection, #75 and #77.

78 Letter to Secretary of Commerce and Labor from Elihu Root, Department of State, June 7, 1907; enclosure in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

79 Letter from Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor to Hopkins and Hopkins, June 10, 1907 and letter from Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor to Charles R. Flint, June 10, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
Prior to K'ang's departure from Mexico, Díaz granted K'ang the right to construct a streetcar line in Mexico City. Flint, who had been greatly displeased by his failure on behalf of K'ang, was referring to this streetcar line when he wrote Straus in September that it had been bad business for the United States to refuse K'ang's request. Claiming that K'ang should be viewed as a "good customer," that Díaz had invited K'ang through the United States Ambassador to Mexico in spite of attempts by the Chinese Imperial Government to block the interview, Flint said that the interview resulted in K'ang's receiving valuable concessions whereby "he was in a position to place orders for manufactured products from which American commerce would probably have received a benefit of $100,000 and labor... certainly... much more." Finally, Flint asked that Straus recommend that the "Exclusion Act" be called the "Admission Act" and that it be amended so as to permit Chinese to enter the United States.

80 Letter from H. R. Sisson, Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, July 12, 1907 and letter from Charles R. Flint to Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor, September 9, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
by any and every "generally traveled route." 81

Straus defended his actions on the grounds of precedent and "the relations between K'ang Yu-Wei and the Chinese Government." 82 To overcome this reluctance, Flint included in his letter an article on K'ang that appeared in the New York Times and a twenty-four page statement on K'ang's role in Chinese politics, both highly laudatory. These, Flint referred to as "certain historical statements which I have obtained to transmit to Europe." 83 In response, Straus wrote that he could not permit Chinese to enter the United States from any ports not already designated for entrance, but he agreed that the exclusion laws harmed American trade with China. He concluded that the exclusion laws should be changed to admission laws "without in any way enlarging the exclusion provisions." 84

In November of the next year, K'ang Yu-wei made a last appeal to American officials. He asked Flint to try to get President Roosevelt and the Czar of Russia to prevent the assassination of the Kuang Hsu Emperor. Flint

81Letter with enclosures from Charles R. Flint to Oscar S. Straus, Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor, September 9, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.
82Ibid.
83Ibid.
sent K'ang's cable to Washington and St. Petersburg, but in spite of this attempt, when the Empress Dowager died a week later, it was announced that the Kuang Hsu Emperor had died on the preceding day. It is usually assumed that he was poisoned.\footnote{Flint, Memories, p. 278, and Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, East Asia, the Modern Transformation, p. 627.}

The period from the end of 1904 to the beginning of 1906 marked the height of K'ang Yu-wei's and the Reform Association's influence both in the United States and in the rest of the world. Thereafter, their support in this country dwindled to such an extent that K'ang had almost as much trouble entering the United States in the spring of 1906 as he had in the winter of 1899. By 1908, the leaders of the Pao Huang Hui could no longer imagine that a personal appeal by them to the American people would in any way substantially benefit the reformers' cause. Homer Lea, together with all the cadets, had decided to accept the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, the Overseas Chinese in America became more receptive to revolutionary ideas, and higher American officials seemed to ignore K'ang.

There appear to be various reasons for this. When Japan defeated Russia in war in 1905, both Overseas Chinese and Americans took this as an indication that the radical policies of modernization pursued by Japan were...
responsible for her strength. This reasoning seemed to suggest that the Chinese reformers were too moderate and was doubtless one reason that Homer Lea decided to support Sun Yat-sen. In addition, K'ang's attempt to affect substantial modification in the immigration laws was confronted by American officials who were equally determined to keep the substance of these laws intact. Finally, after the volume of American goods exported to China fell sharply as a result of China's boycott of American goods, President Roosevelt decided to take a strong stand against the boycott. At that point, K'ang was left with no American supporters except Flint and a few American consuls. This was not enough.
CHAPTER IV

SUN'S RISE

Between 1906 and 1908, Americans seemingly lost interest in Chinese politics. Towards the fall of 1908, this interest began to revive, at least on the part of certain individuals. However, this time it was Sun Yat-sen rather than K'ang Yu-wei that attracted the most attention. There were several reasons for this, one of which was the decision in 1905 and later to take a strong stand against K'ang's demands. This left Americans time to consider other Chinese political figures, and Sun was one of those frequently thought of. Furthermore, Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 had the effect of further radicalising Overseas Chinese in both Japan and the United States causing them in increasing numbers to reject K'ang in favor of Sun. Seeing the support given to Sun by Chinese in America must certainly have inclined Americans to consider his proposals with greater attention. In addition, Sun's ideology showed more Western influence than did that of K'ang Yu-wei, for Sun hoped to turn China into a democratic republic modeled in part after the United States. Surely, Americans must have been flattered.
Finally, Homer Lea decided to abandon K'ang and support Sun. He took with him all the cadets and the support of all his personal friends. Several things caused him to change his allegiance. One was apparently a personal dislike of K'ang Yu-wei. In addition, Homer Lea desired the glory that would come of commanding an army victorious in the field. He had volunteered for a position in the United States army but had been rejected because his eyesight was poor, he was hunch-backed, and his health was inadequate. K'ang wanted to train a peace time army; Sun Yat-sen agreed to use Lea in a campaign against the Manchus. It is also quite possible that Homer Lea joined Sun because he hoped a strong China would balance the growing power of Japan. K'ang Yu-wei supported the imperial ideal, but the Imperial Court had proved itself to be weak on several occasions, not the least of which was during the Russo-Japanese war, when China was unable to prevent the belligerents from conducting the entire war on Chinese territory, and after which, Manchuria became even less an integral part of the Chinese Empire. Not a few Americans had been alarmed by the implications of the Japanese victory in this war. Homer Lea, in fact, published a book in 1909 that purported to reveal secret war plans for an attack on California. If Lea were to command a victorious revolutionary Chinese army, China would
perhaps be strengthened by her new ideology. Furthermore, with an American as commander of China's armies, and possibly with the backing of American capital, this rejuvenated China could be used to further the aims of American foreign policy and provide a balance to Japan.

With respect to the relationship between Americans and reformers or revolutionaries, the years 1906 to 1909 were a relatively uneventful period. Although the Pao Huang Hui was still quite strong during these years, with a world total of perhaps 200 branches in 1906,\textsuperscript{1} after the departure of K'ang Yu-wei in 1905, the leaders apparently did little of interest to those Americans not in the Bureau of Immigration. As noted earlier, K'ang actually returned to the United States once in 1906 and twice in 1907,\textsuperscript{2} but he appears neither to have contacted Homer Lea nor to have had another interview with President Roosevelt. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did not come to the United States at all after his visit in 1903. Homer Lea continued to train his cadets,\textsuperscript{3} Yung Wing lived quietly in Hartford, Connecticut,

\textsuperscript{1}Lo, "The China Reform Association, 1899-1906," p. 3.

\textsuperscript{2}Letter from Lawrence O. Murray, Acting Secretary of Department of Commerce and Labor to Secretary of State, June 1, 1907, and letter from H. R. Sisson, Chinese Inspector in Charge, New York, to Commissioner-General of Immigration, July 12, 1907; enclosures in letter to the author from National Archives, June 25, 1971.

\textsuperscript{3}Acknowledgment of an order and a notice that the goods were to be sent in about a week, sent by the Military
and as for Sun Yat-sen, although he spent several months in the United States and Hawaii in 1907, it is difficult to determine any details concerning his actions. 4

At least one thing of significance did occur in 1906, and that was the recruiting of Paul Myron Wellington Linebarger. When Sun was passing through Manila in September of that year, he went to see Linebarger, then United States Circuit Judge, Philippines, who was an expert in the field of international law. Linebarger had learned of Sun's activities from one of his employees. When, in 1906, Linebarger met Sun Yat-sen, he agreed to resign his judgeship and work for the revolutionaries, on the condition that this work would neither require him to break American law nor work counter to American interests. Sun agreed, Linebarger resigned his judgeship (effective as of January 1, 1907), and on the twenty-ninth of September, 1906, officially began his work for Sun Yat-sen with the title "Foreign Legal Advisor." In October, he went to China, where he spent four days. In November, he went to Mexico City where he established headquarters for all of Sun's revolutionary organizations in the Americas. His

Department of Pettibone Brothers Manufacturing Company to Lea in 1906 at least indicates that Lea was, indeed, still active. Pettibone Brothers Manufacturers Company to General Homer Lea, October 30, 1906, Joshua B. Powers collection, box 1, folder AD.

4 Feng, Revolutionary Organisations, pp. 66-67.
work for Sun included recruiting and organizing Overseas Chinese, and trying to find a wealthy American to finance the Chinese revolution. But in 1906, Linebarger claimed he was not sure enough of the sentiments of his former companions-in-arms from the Spanish-American War to bring up the subject of the Chinese revolution-to-be with them. If he felt this reticent with his acquaintances, one wonders how he expected to approach American capitalists.5

Early in 1907, at Sun's request, Linebarger also established a revolutionary center in Mexico City to coordinate communication with the revolutionaries of Southeast Asia, India, the Philippines and the Americas. This was separate from, and larger than, the center for the Americas established in November, 1906. In addition, he suggested to Sun that another center be organized in Hawaii, since all Chinese who traveled between China and the United States passed through these islands. In Hawaii,


Linebarger was born in Illinois in 1871. He had been an officer in the Spanish-American War and entered American politics shortly after that. He was first given a judgeship on the Circuit Court in the Philippines in 1901. He retained the title of Foreign Legal Advisor to Sun Yat-sen until the latter's death, in 1925. The author tried to obtain further information on Linebarger's activities from his relatives and Sun Yat-sen's relatives, but with little success.
said Linebarger, they would be safe from the Empress Dowager and could more effectively combat the influence of K'ang and Liang. The centers in Mexico City ran into problems, however. Recruiting lagged, and the government of Porfirio Díaz objected to their activities. In July of 1907 (shortly after K'ang Yu-wei was granted his second interview with President Díaz), Linebarger told his fellow revolutionaries that it was dangerous to continue the centers in that city. He, himself, was forced to leave the area. In December Linebarger was in Chicago, where on December 28 he gave a speech before the Union League Club claiming that "This is a capitalists' club, and the capitalists of America, first of all, should support Dr. Sun in his Revolution because it will mean more dividends back here in America." From 1907 until 1911, when the Chinese revolution broke out, Linebarger traveled through the United States trying to raise money, and was frequently called upon to give speeches to branches of the Union League Club. 

Sun Yat-sen also made a trip to America in 1907. Although it is certain that he was trying to strengthen his support and raise money for the revolution, as on his

---

6 Linebarger, Gospel of Chung Shan, p. 9. Also see Lou, "Linebarger," p. 60 and Linebarger, Gospel of Chung Shan, p. 70. Linebarger was a member of the Union League Club. Ibid., p. 99.

7 Ibid., pp. 99-227.
previous trips it is difficult to determine any of the
details of his activities. After his trip to the contin-
ental United States, he spent two months in Hawaii, where the Reform Association and the T'ung-meng Hui were competing for the allegiance of the Overseas Chinese. In part, the fight centered around a Chinese-language newspaper published in these islands. The Chinese consul in Hawaii, attempting to proscribe the revolutionaries tried to convince the American Immigration Department to expel the editor of the revolutionary's newspaper, Lu Shin, claiming he did not fall into the category of permissible Chinese. The United States Immigration Office accordingly brought charges against Lu, but Lu hired a lawyer who appealed to the United States Bureau of Commerce and Labor in Washington. The Bureau decided in favor of Lu. A newspaper editor was an educator, according to the Bureau, and the class of educators was one of those permitted by treaty to enter the United States.

Sun's group gained another victory in 1907. In 1904, Sun had sent a member of the T'ung-meng Hui to the continental United States to organize the Overseas Chinese, but this man was not granted entry because of the Chinese Exclusion laws. In 1907, Li Shu-nan was sent; this time,

---

8Peng, Revolutionary Organisations, pp. 66-67.
9Ibid., pp. 44-45.
the organizer gained entrance. Unfortunately, however, the Chinese in the United States were not very receptive to his ideas, and he was not able to establish an American branch of the T'ung-meng Hui. The victory, then, consisted solely in Li's overcoming American objections to his entrance into the continental United States.\(^\text{10}\)

In the fall of 1908, Homer Lea, Yung Wing, a New York financier named W. W. Allen and Charles Beach Boothe, a retired New York banker\(^\text{11}\) joined forces in order to bring Sun Yat-sen's plans for revolution to final fruition. The first indication of this cooperation is a letter from Homer Lea to Boothe, written on September 21, 1908, in which Lea informed Boothe he wanted an appointment from the United States government as Consul General of Canton. In order to secure this, Lea intended to contact Harrison Gray Otis, Governor Gillett, and the United States Senators from California, the Chambers of Commerce of southern California cities, the Viceroy's of southern China, and other influential people. He asked Boothe to plead his case with J. J. Hill and the various national organizations of cotton goods

\(^{10}\)Ibid., pp. 61-62.

\(^{11}\)Newspaper article (no name of newspaper, no date) found in Boothe collection, #103. Boothe, formerly in mercantile and banking (in 1874 he was at the American Exchange Bank of New York) had retired early because of ill health, and moved to Los Angeles.
producers. Lea proposed to raise American exports to China to pre-boycott levels if he could secure the desired post.\textsuperscript{12} Some three weeks later, Yung Wing wrote to Boothe that Yung was happy Boothe was coming to see him. On the twenty-first of October, Yung wrote his appreciation to Boothe that Boothe and Homer Lea had decided to work with "them."\textsuperscript{13}

One of those that Boothe wrote concerning Homer Lea's desire for a post and Sun Yat-sen's need of money was W. W. Allen. In late November, apparently in response to a letter from Boothe, W. W. Allen wrote that he felt Chinese anti-foreignism, and the presence of reactionaries on the Imperial court were not responsible for the decline in American trade with China that began in 1906. For this reason, Allen suggested that Chinese revolutionaries try to borrow money from bankers rather than manufacturers. In return for a loan, he explained that the bankers should be offered rich concessions. Allen also asserted that it would be impossible to remove the then-current Consul General of Canton and replace him with Homer Lea, because this consul was backed by the Senators from New York and

\textsuperscript{12}Letter from Homer Lea to Charles B. Boothe, September 21, 1908, Boothe collection, #78.

\textsuperscript{13}Letter from Yung Wing to Boothe, October 9, 1908, and letter from Yung to Boothe, October 21, 1908, Boothe collection, #1 and #2. Yung Wing lived in Hartford, Connecticut.
the United States Minister to China. In closing, Allen said he would come to Los Angeles in the near future to have a conference with Boothe. On December 28, Boothe informed Yung that he had chosen Allen to officially represent the American financiers in their dealing with the Chinese revolutionaries, and suggested Yung meet with Allen as soon as convenient.

One probable motive of Lea and Boothe in negotiating with the T'ung-meng Hui was that Lea expected to be made commander of the T'ung-meng Hui's armed forces, and that Boothe had been offered a position on its advisory board. In addition, Boothe would perhaps be made Treasurer of the Provisional Government of China (not yet established). Boothe in turn told Yung that in negotiating with Allen, the most important thing would be to inform him of how he would be compensated for his services.

---

14 Letter from W. W. Allen to Boothe, November 25, 1908, Boothe collection, #29. Allen had been Boothe's friend since his childhood and had "organized the Guggenheim Exploration Company and has been for many years associated with some of the greatest financial houses of New York and London." Letter from Boothe to Yung, December 28, 1908, Boothe collection, #6.

15 Letter from Boothe to Yung, December 28, 1908, Boothe collection, #6.

16 Letter from Yung to Boothe, December 5, 1908 and letter from Boothe to Yung, December 28, 1908, Boothe collection, #3 and #6. The author presumes Boothe was referring to some kind of financial reimbursement.
After choosing Allen, Boothe was obligated to convince him that the revolutionaries deserved to be supported, while Yung Wing devoted himself to the task of explaining to Boothe which revolutionaries were the right revolutionaries. Around the time that Yung told Boothe to "eliminate Kang Yu-wei in our reckoning" (Boothe at first protested, but finally acquiesced and passed these instructions along to Allen on January 25, 1909), Boothe wrote Allen that the reforms proposed by the Ch'ing government were not meant to be implemented, being enacted only in an attempt to deceive the liberals.

Allen agreed that the court was largely reactionary, but his greatest sympathy was with Yuan Shih-k'ai, head of the most modern section of the Chinese army, and a supporter of the dynasty. In the early months of 1909, the court removed Yuan from positions of authority, and his

17Letter from Yung to Boothe, January 4, 1909, Boothe collection, #7.

18Letter from Boothe to Yung, January 16, 1909; letter from Boothe to Allen, January 25, 1909; and letter from Boothe to Allen, January 2, 1909, Boothe collection, #9, #39 and #33. Allen, interestingly enough, had agreed as early as January 21, 1909 that K'ang, because of his handling of finances, could be ignored. Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 21, 1909, Boothe collection, #38.

Yuan Shih-k'ai was one of those who cooperated with the Empress Dowager in her coup of 1898, which resulted in the expulsion of K'ang, Liang and Yung Wing. In addition, he had used his position as head of the modern sector of the Chinese army, in Tientsin, in 1905 to suppress attempts at making the Chinese boycott of American
life was apparently in some danger. T'ang Shao-yi, a subordinate and close associate of Yuan's, was in America in late 1908 and early 1909, to thank the United States for remission of the Boxer Indemnity and negotiate a loan to China from a group led by the J. P. Morgan firm. Allen wanted Yung to contact T'ang (who was a former student of Yung's) while T'ang was in the United States in order to persuade Yuan to join forces with Sun Yat-sen. Yung, himself, hoped to draw up some kind of agreement between Sun and Yuan, but he was unable to see T'ang during the latter's trip to New York, and the matter had to be

goods effective in that area. This gained him the friendship of American capitalists and officials. He was involved in various schemes for the large-scale industrial development of Manchuria through enlisting foreign capital. One of those with whom he had extensive dealings was J. P. Morgan. In February of 1909, Boothe wrote Allen that if T'ang's negotiations with Morgan were successful, Allen would share in the resulting benefits. Letter from Boothe to Allen, February 3, 1909, Boothe collection, #42.

20 In the Joshua B. Powers collection, there is a telegram dated the twelfth day of an unidentified month, 1909 to the American Admiral Murdock, which seems to have bearing on Yuan's demotion. (box 1, folder AA, #52)


22 Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 4, 1909, Boothe collection, #34.
dropped. By June of 1909, Yüan had been reinstated in the government and any chances to cooperate with him had been lost.

Allen's views on the rightful aims of the Chinese revolutionaries, and the relevance of their cause to the United States, were not completely in accord with Sun Yat-sen's principles. On January 12, 1909, Allen wrote Boothe that "I do not like the idea of a Republic because of the Foreign attention it would attract." Nine days later, Allen told Boothe he opposed establishing a lobby in Washington (too much publicity) or setting up a republic one province at a time. If a revolution occurred he said the Imperial Government should be overcome all at once, but he again re-iterated his reservations concerning any republic, even if it were set up in the manner he had just suggested. On January 29, Allen wrote that he thought

23 Letter from Yung to Boothe, January 16, 1909, and letter from Yung to Boothe, January 25, 1909, Boothe collection, #8 and #10.

It is interesting to note that Sun Yat-sen's admirer and former professor of medicine, Dr. James Cantlie, reports in his book Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China (New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1912), p. 57, that Yüan contacted Sun at this time and offered an alliance, but Sun turned him down.

24 Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 12, 1909, Boothe collection, #37.

25 Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 21, 1909, Boothe collection, #38.
the Chinese should first be educated to republicanism, somewhat in the same fashion as the Imperial Government was then doing. He said he was still interested in the revolution, but considered Yung Wing, and Chinese generally, "mighty poor timber." Accordingly, American backers of the revolution would want the authority to direct the revolution as well as the expected concessions.26

A better idea of exactly what Allen and his American backers expected from the revolution is obtained by examining the second draft of a proposed loan agreement drawn up by Allen. This agreement provided that Sun's supporters would raise about one third of the money and the American group, called the "Outside Syndicate" would come up with another $9,000,000. In return, the "Outside Syndicate" would receive a ninety-nine year exclusive concession for railroad building in all of China, a twenty-five year exclusive concession for coinage, exclusive mining and banking concessions for an undetermined number of years, and the "Outside Syndicate" would have ultimate and complete control as to how the money would be spent. This was to say, it would control both the revolution and the new state which would come out of the revolution. The agreement also explained: "It is not believed that the

26 Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 29, 1909, Boothe collection, #40.
Oriental mind, or training, will admit of a Republican form of government."27 The reason that the "Outside Syndicate" would exercise such power was because Allen was unused "to the idea that an Oriental would ever be called upon to disburse the money of an Occidental and I confess that I am not yet on bowing acquaintance with the idea."28

While trying to organize this syndicate, Allen also interested himself in more practical affairs. In January of 1909, he requested that Boothe send him an estimate of the number of guns and bullets that would be needed. Allen and Yung had already agreed on a plan whereby Yung would send his eldest son to China as an agent of the revolutionaries for the purpose of launching the revolution within six months' time. Allen said a friend of his with "wide experience" was interested in this plan, but Allen anticipated that raising money would be difficult.29 In response, Boothe said they should wait a few months, and Yung's son apparently was never sent. However, a few weeks later,

27 "A Plan (Revision No. 1)," January 27, 1909, Boothe collection, #97.

28 Letter from Allen to Boothe, February 1, 1909, Boothe collection, #41. Allen did say the "Outside Syndicate's" interests could be bought out by the Chinese revolutionaries, but said that the syndicate itself would determine when, under what circumstances, and at what price.

29 Letter from Allen to Boothe, January 21, 1909, Boothe collection, #38.
Allen reported that he and his agent had tried to negotiate a loan from various capitalists. One of the men they spoke with said he would only lend to established governments; the other attempts also failed. At this point, Allen suggested that the revolutionaries raise the money themselves.30

Allen did not give up his search for capital, in spite of his discouragement. On February 13, he wrote Boothe that those who had backed Morgan in the China railways scheme of 1898-1906 (the American-China Development Company) would probably loan money for the revolutionaries in return for similar concessions.31 However, Allen's support of the revolutionary cause was not whole-hearted. Accordingly, Boothe asked Yung Wing to come to Los Angeles, where Allen was soon to arrive, in order that difficulties between Yung and Allen could be reconciled. Boothe also knew that the Pao Huang Hui had a source of funds in China as well as in the Commercial Corporation. Realizing that added membership and a broader financial base could be of use to Sun Yat-sen, he suggested to Yung that the revolutionaries eliminate K'ang Yu-wei from the Chinese Reform

30 Letter from Boothe to Allen, January 25, 1909, and letter from Allen to Boothe, February 6, 1909, Boothe collection, #39 and #44.

31 Letter from Allen to Boothe, February 13, 1909, Boothe collection, #39.
Association and take over the organization for themselves.\textsuperscript{32} Sun, of course, had been trying without success to do that for several years.

During May, Homer Lea tried to increase his influence by securing an appointment as Minister to China from the United States. He asked General Chaffee, Harrison Gray Otis, and General J. P. Story to back his candidacy. On May 18, Chaffee wrote that although he, Otis and Story would be happy to support Lea's application for the ambassadorship, they also thought that Lea should gain the support of the Senators from California, and arrange that a politician be the first to broach the subject of an appointment with the President. Once this had been done, Chaffee and the others would not feel awkward about indicating to the President that they strongly supported Lea's candidacy.\textsuperscript{33} On the twenty-fourth of May, Lea got a letter from Otis, in which Otis apologized that they had not been able to get Lea appointed Ambassador to China, and said that when Otis became convinced that Lea's "project," requested over the telephone, was not feasible, he informed

\textsuperscript{32}Letter from Boothe to Yung, March 6, 1909, Boothe collection, #15.

\textsuperscript{33}Letter from General Adna R. Chaffee to Mr. Lea, May 18, 1909, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF.
General Chaffee of this.\textsuperscript{34}

Shortly after receiving this letter, Lea's second book, \textit{The Valour of Ignorance}, was published. Dedicated to Elihu Root and given very favorable reviews by General Chaffee and Major Story, it presumed to reveal Japan's secret war plans for the invasion of California. Received with enthusiasm by high-ranking officers in both the American and the British military establishment, it greatly enhanced Lea's reputation.\textsuperscript{35}

Just as Lea's influence over his fellow Americans was increasing, so Sun's was over the Overseas Chinese.

In September of 1909, Sun arrived in New York from

\textsuperscript{34}The "project" mentioned in the letter however does not seem to refer to Lea's attempt to get the ambassadorship. Letter from Harrison Gray Otis to Lea, May 24, 1909, Powers collection, box 2, folder BB. As a last resort, Boothe wrote to K'ang Yu-wei, suggesting that K'ang support Lea's candidacy. Letter from Boothe to K'ang, June 14, 1909, Boothe collection, #36.

Otis also wrote that he and his agent, McLoughlin, had been working on a plan to send Chinese laborers to Mexico. As K'ang had a similar plan, it is possible a partnership existed between the two. The plan failed after several thousand dollars had been expended because, wrote Otis, of a "conspiracy" of Hongkong merchants and the Chinese Consul at Yokohama. Letter from Otis to Lea, May 24, 1908, Powers collection, box 2, folder BB.

\textsuperscript{35}Theodore Roosevelt would probably have endorsed the book if requested to, but Boothe did not think a review by him would have been as good as one by Chaffee and Story. Letter from Boothe to Allen, February 3, 1909, Boothe collection, #43.
Europe. While in New York, he was finally able to establish the first American branch of his organization, the T'ung-meng Hui. In addition, he had a conference with W. W. Allen. Although Allen was not favorably impressed by Sun, Boothe wrote Yung that Allen was encouraged concerning prospects for the Chinese revolution, and his relationship with Yung Wing. Late in December, Yung asked Boothe and Lea to come to Hartford to confer with Sun. Boothe replied by asking Yung and Sun to come to Los Angeles.

When still on the East coast, Sun got a telegram from Hongkong that said the revolution could begin immediately if he could send his supporters $20,000 H.K. In an attempt to raise this sum, he decided to cross the country, which seemed to solve the problem of who was to visit whom. A close associate of Sun's, Feng Tze-yo, reports that Sun arrived in Los Angeles on December 7, where he conferred with Lea and Boothe. According to

36Feng, Revolutionary Organisations, p. 61. Although Chapin, "Homer Lea," pp. 231-234 says O'Banion smuggled Sun in through San Francisco, this is probably incorrect. Glick's account (Double Ten, p. 268), agrees with Feng's.

37Letter from Boothe to Yung, October 2, 1909, and letter from Boothe to Yung, December 23, 1909, Boothe collection, #19 and #21.

38Feng, Revolutionary Organisations, pp. 61-63 and letter from Yung to Boothe, March 4, 1910, Boothe collection, #22. The discrepancy in dates may be because Feng
O'Banion's version, General Chaffee and Major Story were present for part of this conference, at the end of which, Sun asked Homer Lea to smuggle the sons of various Chinese viceroy's into the United States, where Lea would give them military training. In addition, Sun asked O'Banion to go to China to promote peace between pro-revolutionary brigands and progressive viceroy's, which assignment O'Banion was pleased to accept. 39

From Los Angeles Sun went to San Francisco where he was met by a contingent of young sympathizers. In January of 1910, Sun arranged for these sympathizers to organize the first San Francisco branch of the T'ung-meng Hui under the leadership of Li Shu-nan. This branch became the T'ung-meng Hui's central branch for the Americas, succeeding Linebarger's defunct Mexico City center. 40 Also, Sun finally convinced the influential Chinese secret was reckoning according to the lunar calendar, although this is not clear.

39 The sons of the viceroy's were brought in via Mazatlán, some sixty in all. After receiving training, they supposedly enlisted as privates in the Imperial Army. Glick, Double Ten, pp. 250-258.

40 Feng, Revolutionary Organisations, pp. 63-65, and Huang Jeng-wu (黃柄悟), Overseas Chinese and the Chinese Revolution (Huá-ch'ao yú Júng-kuò Ko-míng) (Taipei: Graduate School of National Defense, 1963), p. 48. Much of Huang's book seems to be copied verbatim from other printed sources, such as Feng's Revolutionary Organisations.
society there, the Hung-men (which formerly was pro-K'ang) to join his revolutionary T'ung-meng Hui. This alliance with the Hung-men Society was of great assistance to him, for it contributed financially and helped reorganize Sun's forces.\footnote{41}{Feng, Revolutionary Organisations, p. 66.} In spite of these gains, he was only able to raise half the required sum for a revolution. However, the revolutionaries decided to proceed with their coup, which took place on April 27 in Canton and is referred to by Sun as his tenth failure. The uprising, ironically, failed as much for lack of organization as for lack of funds.\footnote{42}{Among other things, two contingents of revolutionary troops fired on each other, not having been informed that they were actually on the same side. In addition, many troops did not arrive at their appointed stations at the proper time, and lack of funds created problems with the supply of ammunition. The Imperial troops, as a result, gained an important victory. Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, East Asia, the Modern Transformation, p. 639.} By May of 1910, Sun had left the United States.\footnote{43}{Sun left San Francisco for Hawaii on March 22, and left Hawaii for Japan around May 24. Letter from Sun to Boothe, March 21, 1910 and letter from Sun to Boothe, May 24, 1910, Boothe collection, #59 and #62.}

Sun Yat-sen tried to raise money for the April coup through American bankers as well as Chinese nationalists. On March 4, Yung wrote Boothe that the revolutionaries wanted bank credit of $1,500,000 and an emergency fund of $2,000,000. Ten days later, Sun appointed Boothe the sole
124

foreign financial agent of the Federal Association of China (T'ung-meng Hui).\(^4^4\) On the same day, Allen wrote Boothe that he found Sun Yat-sen too utopian in his thinking. Not only did Allen doubt that Sun was actually the leader of the revolutionaries, but he also found the revolutionary party so undisciplined that Allen felt he could not ask a capitalist:

> to risk his money in this project. . . . The importance of the project to this country is increasing every day, also, we must admit, are its difficulties increasing. In its present condition it cannot be undertaken, but if it could be put in the right shape it would become the opportunity of a lifetime.\(^4^5\)

There is no evidence that Boothe informed Sun Yat-sen or Yung Wing of Allen's opinion. They may well have thought the prospects for a loan were quite good, and on March 28, Yung sent Boothe a proposal on how the revolutionaries would repay the financiers. Lenders would be given a percentage of the revenues of each conquered province. The revolutionary government would presumably control the Maritime Customs, the Ramie monopoly, the spruce wood pulp monopoly, the petroleum monopoly, and the telepost monopoly from which the bulk of the revenues would be

\(^{4^4}\)Letter from Yung to Boothe, March 4, 1910 and letter from Sun to Boothe, March 14, 1910, Boothe Collection, \#22 and \#53.

\(^{4^5}\)Letter from Allen to Boothe, March 14, 1910, Boothe collection, \#52.
Yung stated that the loan desired by the revolutionaries would be for $10 million, to be paid in five installments of $2 million each, on a ten year note at the rate of 15 per cent interest. He further wrote that of the most important posts in the future Republic of China, the Department of War would be headed by General Homer Lea, an Annapolis graduate would be selected as head of the navy, and the treasury would be run by Yung Wing's eldest son, Bartlett G. Yung.

At this point in the negotiations, a close follower of Sun's by the name of Wang Ching-wei, hoping to dramatize the cause of the revolutionaries, attempted to assassinate the Prince Regent of China on a bridge near Peking. Although he failed, Allen wrote Boothe that any suspected connection between Sun's followers and the attempted assassination (or any other terrorist acts) would ruin

46 Letter from Yung to Boothe, March 28, 1910, Boothe collection #23. Needless to say, Yung's presumption was rather optimistic. In fact, the Maritime Customs was already pledged to pay the Boxer Indemnity and was run, according to treaty requirements, by a British subject. When the revolution broke out in October of 1911, the Maritime Customs refused to turn its revenues over to the revolutionaries, even after the Provisional Republic was inaugurated. Similar problems existed with respect to the petroleum and telepost industries, which were dominated by foreign capital and foreign governments. The rubber industry did not yet exist in China; Yung hoped to develop it himself, and had earlier asked Allen for a loan for this purpose, but the loan was not forthcoming.
possibilities of their raising money in the United States.\textsuperscript{47} Whether for this or another reason, there were no further attempts on the life of members of the Ch'ing court. However, there was also no more discussion of Americans lending money to Chinese revolutionaries until after the April coup had already been attempted and failed.

In the middle of May, following the signal failure of Sun's tenth attempted coup, Boothe wrote Sun the encouraging news that he and Allen had recently reached a very satisfactory agreement.\textsuperscript{48} Boothe, unfortunately, did not say what the agreement was, or with whom it had been contracted. Anticipating success, Boothe wrote Sun on June 25 that the negotiations were going very well.\textsuperscript{49}

During this period, Sun continued traveling from one continent to another, trying to raise enthusiasm and money for a revolution in China. Near the middle of July, he told Boothe he hoped to go to Manila, asked Boothe to send him a letter of introduction to Boothe's friends there,

\textsuperscript{47}Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, \textit{East Asia, the Modern Transformation}, p. 639, and letter from Allen to Boothe, April 4, 1910, Boothe collection, #54.

\textsuperscript{48}Letter from Boothe to Sun Yat-sen, May 12, 1910, Boothe collection, #61. In this letter, Boothe's reaction to the April coup was to ask Sun to get the revolutionaries to "withhold action until advised by you that the time is ripe."

\textsuperscript{49}Letter from Boothe to Sun, June 25, 1910, Boothe collection, #65.
and asked Boothe to arrange for him to meet a former
general in the Philippines, if this seemed desirable. 50
There is no indication of who Boothe's friends were, or of
what may have been the result of Sun's trip.

Shortly after receiving this letter from Sun,
Boothe was informed by Allen that Allen was sending a man
named Schmidt to do some negotiating, but this does not
seem to have been fruitful. After Boothe sent Allen an
affidavit signed by various of the revolutionaries in China
to prove that Sun Yat-sen was beyond a doubt the leader of
the Chinese revolutionaries, Allen wrote that he was to go
to see an agent of the engineering contractor, James
Gilbert White. Allen, however, also wrote that he "still"
thought "John" was the man they should convince to make the
loan. 51

50 Letter from Sun to Boothe, July 15, 1910, Boothe
collection, #66. It would seem obvious that Boothe's
friends in the Philippines were not the same as Line­
barger's friends in the Philippines.

51 Letter from Allen to Boothe, July 12, 1910, letter
from Boothe to Allen, July 19, 1910, and letter from Allen
to Boothe, July 23, 1910, Boothe collection, #55, #56, and
#57. "John" may have been John Pierpoint Morgan, since
Morgan backers were previously mentioned by Allen and since
Morgan had tried repeatedly to invest money in China, in
return for concessions. It is also possible that "John"
was the capitalist Allen had said would only lend money to
established governments. See above, Chapter 5, p. 11.

James Gilbert White, engineering contractor, headed
He also controlled Canadian White Co., Manila Electric Rail
car and Light Co., Philippine Railways Co., Waring White
In August, Sun wrote Homer Lea that he was recalling the commissioned officers so that they might train the Kwangtung army. With the help of these officers, Sun believed that the revolutionaries "could recover our position in the Canton army very soon and with a much greater strength than before." The officers were all to be back in China within a year, with the exception of a few that Sun wanted in Penang, who were the agents O'Banion had previously shipped out of the country. Lea notified Boothe of these proceedings, and arranged to have the required cadets taken from Watsonville to Mazatlán by boat, then sent from Mazatlán to China. A Dutchman named John Osterhaus was in charge of this smuggling.

Sun wrote to Boothe on the fourth of September, requesting an advance of $50,000. Although Boothe made no direct answer to this request, he did send Sun a letter towards the end of the month explaining that negotiations had been delayed because one of the key figures

---


52 Letter from Sun to Lea, August 11, 1910, Powers collection, box 3, folder CB.

53 Click, Double Ten, pp. 223-233, and letter from "X" to "My Dear Sir," September 25, 1910, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF.
representing the capitalists was in Europe. On September 26, however, Boothe wrote Sun to tell him the "Outside (American) Syndicate" would meet early in October.54

As fall approached, so did the season for electing congressmen and senators. Lea tried to get a man named McLachlan elected to Congress through his friend, Major George H. Sheeson, presumably because he anticipated McLachlan would be able to help Sun. However, Sheeson was notified too late to be of any use, and McLachlan lost in the primaries.55 Linebarger also ran for office that year, hoping to be elected to the House of Representatives from the Fourth Wisconsin District (which included Milwaukee). He won in the primaries, after announcing that he would not "use the office of congressman for Revolutionary work in China" and that "I shall very passingly mention that economic conditions in America may be greatly hampered by making new loans to Imperial China."56 He was finally

54 Letter from Boothe to Sun, September 4, 1910 and letter from Boothe to Sun, September 26, 1910, Boothe collection, #67 and #69.

55 Letter from George A. Sheeson to Homer Lea, October 18, 1910, Powers collection, box 1, folder AF. Sheeson (the author is not sure she read the last name correctly, as the signature was not very legible) was Assistant to Chief of Bureau in the War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Washington. McLachlan had presumably run in the Republican primary, and Sheeson incidentally thanked Lea for his help with the Republican State Convention.

defeated by the Socialist candidate, Victor Berger in the
general election. Linebarger, realizing even before the
election that he would be defeated, had actually withdrawn
his name before the voting began. He attributed his defeat
to his having formed an association whose purpose was to
find ways for large landholders in Milwaukee to avoid paying
high property taxes. This move won him the admiration of
the rich, but did not recommend him to the lesser-than-
rich. It is ironic that Linebarger, working for a revolu-
tion whose socialistic overtones were revealed in Sun's
"Three Peoples' Principles," lost an election to American
socialists because of his too close friendship with those
he hoped would finance Sun's revolution.57 In spite of
this setback, Linebarger attended sessions of Congress from
time to time, to work for the abolition of the "Unequal
Treaties."58

Even Linebarger's exhortion that Americans not lend
money to the Imperial Government was to no avail. Near the
end of October, an American group composed of Morgan and
Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and the First National and
National City Banks of New York signed a preliminary agree-
ment with the Imperial Chinese Government for a loan of

57Ibid., p. 227. As noted earlier, the "Three
Peoples' Principles" are nationalism, democracy and People's
Livelihood.

$50,000 at 5 per cent interest, to enable China to reorganize its finances and pursue certain "Industrial Enterprises" in Manchuria. 59 At the request of this American group, the loan was later internationalized and coordinated with the Hukuang railway loan, to form the Consortium loan. 60

As the year drew to a close, Lea continued using his contacts with the United States Army to further the cause of Sun Yat-sen. Certainly, he aroused some interest. In November, Major Croxton, of the 20th Infantry, Luzon, wrote Lea that he had been trying to work on a "scenario" for Lea, hoping "to inject a little army stuff and Philippines in it" so Lea could "finish up the job and get it to New York." He advised Lea to read the first part of an article of his to be published in the Saturday Evening Post, hearing on his negotiations, and concluded that if Lea could send him a "scenario" then come in person to Luzon, "we could do some real business in short order and


60 The Morgan interests negotiated this loan, and it must have adversely affected Allen's project, because on November 8, Sun wrote to ask what had happened to the American bankers who were supposed to, but had not, met in October. Letter from Sun to Boothe, November 8, 1910, Boothe collection, #71.
get the thing on the boards in the fall of 1911." So far, all Croxton had been able to work out was "merely a scene on the transport deck with one congressman and some army people in it. . . . My story does not seem to work out into dramatic form. . . ." The dramatic scenario in question seems to be a thinly disguised reference to obtaining active United States backing for Sun Yat-sen.61

In early December, Lea received a letter from G. H. Burton of Los Angeles, in which Burton, claiming he hoped to accomplish "our 'ends,'" said he had spoken with Lissner, the admiral, and Adna Chaffee. He suggested that Lea call him on the telephone.62

About a month before Burton's letter Sun wrote Lea telling him to continue looking for a loan independently of Boothe. In the same letter, apparently in response to an inquiry by Lea of what to do with those cadets who had not yet finished their military training and so were not commissioned officers to be smuggled into China, Sun told Lea by all means not to turn them over to the Imperial

61 Letter from Major R. C. Croxton to Homer Lea, November 3, 1910, Powers collection, box 1, folder AE. The author was unable to find the article in question, which was supposed to have been published around December 15, 1910.

62 Letter from G. H. Burton to General Lea, December 2, 1910, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF. The author is not sure of the spelling of "Lissner."
Government. Lea's loan negotiations, whatever they may have been, must have failed because on December 17, Sun asked Boothe to grant him a personal loan. However, this was not forthcoming. 63

Discouraged by the fact that American capitalists had yet to actually give him any money and Boothe's refusal to give him a personal loan, Sun wrote Boothe a bitter letter on March 6, 1911, requesting that Boothe return the signatures Sun had sent as loan security, and telling Boothe he was raising the money in China as Americans had failed him. Finally, Boothe sent a letter to Sun in April, in which he blamed much of the difficulties with respect to the loan on the fact that it was hard to communicate with Sun, because he kept traveling from one place to another. To circumvent this, Boothe asked Sun to appoint an agent, but he also wrote Sun that he was sending a

63 Letter from Sun to Lea, November 7, 1910, Powers collection, box 3, folder CB, and letter from Sun to Boothe, December 16, 1910, Boothe collection, #72. Boothe wrote Charles B. Hill in January of 1911 that he regretted not being able to give Sun a personal loan when Sun had asked him. In the same letter, Boothe castigated the Morgan interests for their recent loan to the Imperial Government, claiming if Americans could gain the favor of revolutionary and nationalistic elements in China, "A legitimate field exists for business beyond the dreams of avarice." In conclusion, Boothe authorized Mr. Hill to negotiate with Sun Yat-sen when the latter was next in New York, but this meeting does not seem to have taken place. Letter from Boothe to Charles B. Hill, January 12, 1911, Boothe collection, #84.
Mr. Charles B. Hill to the Philippines to negotiate with Sun, and that any possibility of a loan depended on the outcome of this interview. Whether or not the proposed interview actually took place, the evidence is overwhelming that no American capitalist ever contributed money for the Chinese revolution of 1911.64

Shortly before the outbreak of the revolution, Sun Yat-sen returned to the continental United States via Montreal, Canada, around April 24, 1911.65 Homer Lea, however, went to Europe in the summer of 1911, principally because he was going blind, and a doctor in Germany had been recommended to him. He also visited his friends in the English military, and reviewed military maneuvers of the German troops. Probably he discussed Sun's affairs with some of those he met.66

During the spring and summer of 1911, despite his

64Letter from Sun to Boothe, March 6, 1911, Boothe collection, #73, and letter from Boothe to Sun, April 13, 1911, Boothe collection, #74, and Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd.), pp. 223-224.


66Chapin's "Homer Lea," Dinegar and Kolb's "The Bitter Tea of Homer Lea" and Powers' manuscript (all in the Powers collection) discuss this period. Letters written to and by Lea during his stay in Europe are found in the Powers collection, box 2.
previous failures, the political situation in China underwent a change favorable to Sun. Local businessmen in various provinces of China had raised the capital to buy out the Morgan interests in 1908, when Morgan was forced to sell his railway concession back to the Imperial Government. By 1911, much of this railroad (projected to go from Szechuan to Canton to Hankow) had been completed. However, in May, the Imperial Government nationalized the railroad and started negotiations with various of the treaty powers for an international loan to complete the development. This loan became the International Consortium loan, with the Morgan firm holding the bulk of the shares of the American group. The nationalizing of the railroad as well as the conditions to which China was bound by the Consortium agreement succeeded in arousing intense opposition to the Imperial Government. These disaffected elements then aligned themselves, for the most part, with the revolutionaries.  

In October, revolutionary groups loosely associated with Sun's T'ung-meng Hui planned an uprising in Wuchang, in the province of Hubei. Their plot was discovered by the Manchu authorities, but some of their number, soldiers in

---

the Wuchung garrison, revolted on October 10 in spite of the probable failure of their coup. The garrison fell to these revolutionaries, and soon, the T'ung-meng Hui was able to direct much of the rest of China to join in proclaiming the Provisional Republic. At this time, Sun Yat-sen was still in the United States. Hearing of the successful uprising, he proceeded to Europe via Washington, where he tried to raise money for the new government and attempted to convince the powers both to stop payments on the Consortium loan, and to recognize the Republic. He never returned to the United States.

The years 1908 to 1911 marked the high point of American interest in Sun Yat-sen. Sun was a serious revolutionary, in contrast to K'ang Yu-wei, who sought to preserve the dynasty, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who played with the idea of revolution but never actually committed himself to this extreme. Those Americans whose support was most needed by Sun, American capitalists and high-ranking officials, could not be accurately described as holders of a revolutionary philosophy, or believers in violent change. Accordingly, Sun was in the position of having to court these men through the device of offering them considerable concessions in China. However, the Imperial Government, as

68 Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, East Asia, the Modern Transformation, pp. 639-640.
an established government, and Yüan Shih-k'ai, as its strong man, would have seemed the most reliable investments to any but the most idealistic or adventurous capitalist, and there does not seem to have been very many idealistic or adventurous capitalists in the United States. Sun's principal success obtained in America was his "conversion" of Homer Lea. In the case of Linebarger, his efforts on behalf of Sun apparently were not very effective, at least as far as his work with American capitalists was concerned and Boothe failed him as well. With respect to the United States, then, Sun's rise was almost simultaneous with Sun's decline, as is borne out by the facts surrounding the United States' recognition of the Republic of China.
CHAPTER V

DECLINE OF THE REPUBLIC

After the revolution broke out in October, 1911, the T'ung-meng Hui managed quickly to gain control of the revolutionary forces and to secure the election of Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President. However, the Emperor still had not abdicated, the revolutionaries were poorly organized and unsure of the support of the most powerful elements in the Chinese political scene, and they lacked money. Sun thought a solution to the financial problem would go a long way towards solving the other two. Accordingly, he went to London, via Washington. In both these cities, he and Homer Lea tried to secure capital for their partisans, as well as to prevent the Manchus from obtaining any more installments due on the Consortium loan.

Their mission to London was only partly successful, because the treaty powers were not willing to support Sun Yat-sen. From there, they proceeded to Shanghai, where Sun became Provisional President and made Lea his Chief-of-Staff. Holding his office only three months, Sun retired in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai after the latter obtained an edict of abdication from the Emperor, and after Sun and
Lea conducted an unsuccessful military expedition up the Grand Canal. Lea suffered a stroke during this campaign and was sent back to California, where he died within a year. Sun broke relations with President Yuan early in 1913, due to Yuan's predisposition to assassinate members of the political opposition. Under these circumstances President Woodrow Wilson, encouraged by American missionaries and businessmen, recognized the Republic of China, even while withdrawing American participation from the Consortium loan.

Between learning of the outbreak of the revolution and his arrival in London, Sun went to Washington, where he "conferred with officials." At the same time, he telegraphed Lea that the situation was highly favorable except for the lack of money, and gave Lea full power to negotiate a loan. Lea arrived in London prior to Sun, from which vantage point he seems to have written or spoken to all the influential people of England and the United States who he thought he knew well enough to ask for aid.

1John B. Powell, My Twenty-five Years in China (New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 31.

2Telegram from Sun to Lea, October 31, 1911, Powers collection, box 3, folder CC-2.
For example, in a letter from Homer Lea to a Senator, possibly Senator Elihu Root, Lea explains his disappointment that the Senator was unable to secure a loan for them prior to October 10. Because the outbreak of revolution had improved Lea and Sun's position, Lea hoped the Senator would convince President Taft and Philander Knox to write a secret letter encouraging the granting of a loan. Lea announced he would provide Taft and Knox whatever additional information was necessary through the intermediary of the United States Ambassador to London.3

One reason for thinking this letter was written to Elihu Root is because Lea had previously received a letter from Root in which Root apologizes that he had not been able to secure a loan for the revolutionaries, but wishes he "had something cheerful to say on the subject."4 Root disappointed Lea again in December of 1911 when he wrote:

My Dear General Lea;

I am much gratified by the kind suggestion in your letter of November 21st that I should act for the time being in an advisory capacity in America for the authorities of the revolution in China. You know how I feel regarding the assertion by the Chinese of their right of self-government, but the fact that I am a

---

3 Letter from Homer Lea to United States Senator "X," no date, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF.

4 Letter from Elihu Root to Lea, September 19, 1911, Powers collection, box 1, folder AD.
member of the Senate and of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and therefore one of the constitutional advisors of the President in regard to foreign affairs, would make it impossible for me to act as advisor for any other government or governmental body.

With best personal wishes and kind regards, I am always, Faithfully yours,

Elihu Root.5

Lea does not seem to have written Root any further suggestions.

Somewhat before this, Sun and Lea contacted Sir Edward Grey, who was in charge of England's foreign affairs, to tell him that United States Senators Root and Knox supported their project for an alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and Sun Yat-sen's forces.6 As proof that England would cooperate in this scheme, Lea's friend Sir A. Trevor Dawson also petitioned that the order forbidding Sun to go to Hongkong be rescinded.7 In addition, Lea and Sun were hoping for a British-American loan, which if obtained, would mean that Sun would buy all his munitions and armaments from England. Lea and Sun said Knox and Root were willing to lend the revolutionaries some one thousand

5Letter from Root to Lea, December 19, 1911, Powers collection, box 1, folder AD.

6Manifesto of Sun Yat-sen and General Homer Lea, November 13, 1911, Powers collection, box 2, folder BE.

7Memorandum from A. Trevor Dawson to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, London, November 15, 1911, Powers collection, box 2, folder BE.
pounds if Grey decided that England would join the alliance. However, neither the alliance, the loan, nor rescinding of the order were ever obtained.

While in London, Lea arranged an interview between Sun and his friend, Lord Roberts. Another of Lea's friends offered to bring up the question of China in the House of Lords. In addition, Sun and Lea convinced the treaty power nations to stop payments on the first of the Consortium loans, and guarantee that no bonds or payments would be issued on the second. The British government also promised to negotiate with Sun after his government had been firmly established.

Individual Americans as well tried to aid the revolutionaries. In a letter of November 20, 1911, the American James Deitrick, who was connected with the Bank of Zimmernann and Forshay in New York, wrote Lea concerning the possibilities of enlisting the Mongolians in a

---


9 Letter from Mrs. Lea to Agnes, November 19, 1911, Powers collection, box 1, folder AD and letter from Stanhope to Lea, November 9, 1911, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA-18.

revolution. Deitrick, who in 1899-1901 had been in Mongolia surveying for a railroad, had once been offered the position of head of government by the Mongolians if he would help them rebel against the Emperor in Peking. Deitrick thought sending the right man to Urga, where the Pacha Lama lived, along with adequate planning and a little money would enable these forces to provide additional military support for Sun Yat-sen. He suggested an agreement with Russia to get the plotters in and out of Mongolia, and said matters could be arranged for a march on Peking in about ninety days. He suggested that the "right man" to send into the area was John T. McCall, who with one thousand dollars for transportation costs would be able to make preliminary inquiries. There is no evidence that Sun and Lea considered these suggestions seriously.

After the revolution broke out, Wu T'ing-fang, formerly Minister from the Imperial government to the United

---


In 1914, Sun employed James Deitrick as his agent for the commercial and industrial development of China. When Sun planned his 1914 "Second Revolution" against Yuan Shih-k'ai, he tried to borrow money through Deitrick and failing this, from Deitrick. This seems to have put an end to their relationship. Sun Yat-sen, Ten Letters of Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942).
States (1898-1902 and 1907-1909), appealed through William Randolph Hearst, Andrew Carnegie, and others that the United States recognize the Republic of China. Wu, who joined the revolutionaries prior to 1911, was a personal friend of Carnegie's. In December of 1911, he cabled Carnegie to ask for a loan for the revolutionaries, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was "unofficially interested in the establishment of a constitutional government in China." As for Hearst, his New York American ran an article on November 16, 1911 entitled "Wu Ting-fang, for the Republic of China,Appeals Through William Randolph Hearst for Recognition by the Civilized World." In December, Hearst ran an editorial in the same paper proposing that Congress extend America's sympathy with the revolutionaries, in which he particularly mentioned the beneficial effect upon China of Wu T'ing-fang and the

---

12Letter from T. P. Sun to the author, May 12, 1971. Incidentally, Wu was the Foreign Minister for the Provisional Government prior to Sun's Presidency, and Minister of Justice afterwards. (See Appendix.)

Andrew Carnegie's Carnegie Steel Mills was a member, from 1899, of an organization called the American Asiatic Association, whose purpose was to see that "important commercial interests of United States companies in China be duly and promptly... safe guarded." Other members included the American-China Development Company (until it was dissolved in 1906) and cotton goods manufacturers. Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 34, 43.
example of Western progress. In December 9, 1911, a man who referred to himself as "Austin P. Brown, Real Estate, Railroad and Corporate Financier" also wrote to Congress urging the passage of a bill then pending whose purpose was to congratulate China on her republican form of government. The bill, sponsored by William Sulzer, Congressman from New York, was adopted on April 17, 1912. Although Sun Yat-sen was no longer in a position of power by that time, much of the debate on the bill occurred in January and February of that year, and would probably have referred to the revolutionaries rather than Yüan Shih-k'ai. Passage of this resolution, in some respects the fruit of Wu's efforts, came too late and was not enough to help Sun govern and reorganize China. When he arrived in Shanghai, he had none of that element he thought so important for the achievement of his aims: money. Even more immediate a problem was that the Emperor still had not abdicated. On taking up his position as Provisional President, he sent Wu T'ing-fang to negotiate the abdication

---

14 United States House of Representatives, House Reports (Public), 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, v. 2, #6130, report no. 368, p. 3. The above newspaper articles were entered as evidence in the debate.

with the Ch'ing court's most powerful supporter, Yuan Shih-k'ai. On January 9, Sun sent a telegram to President Taft, asking him to mediate between the republicans and the Imperial Government. There is no evidence that Taft responded favorably.

Homer Lea came with Sun to China. Linebarger also joined Sun briefly at this time, in order to help him establish his ideal of one-party rule. Lea's task was to train the army loyal to Sun in as short a period as possible, and then conduct a military campaign against the forces of the opposition. Since he had been to China several times between 1900 and 1912, he had at least some familiarity with the area in which the campaign would occur. Sun and Lea probably intended to march on Peking, where Yuan and the court resided. All funds raised to arm these troops apparently came from contributions by Chinese, such as six Curtis airplanes donated by Overseas Chinese residing in the United States. Unfortunately, this first Chinese Air Force, sent to Sun Yat-sen, arrived after military activity had terminated. The pilots were Overseas Chinese, and most of the officers in Lea's army were also Chinese. However, Lea must have preferred people who spoke his

---

16 Telegram from Dr. Sun to the President of the United States, January 9, 1912, Powers collection, box 1, folder AC.

17 Lu Tsang, "Linebarger and his Gospel," p. 60.
native language, because he was taking applications for 
Englishmen and Americans to train and lead his troops, and 
the American officers of the Pao Huang Hui army were to be 
brought to China as soon as that could be financed.18

Little information is available on the actual pro-
gress of the campaign, which began late in February of 
1912.19 It is not even certain that the republican troops 
ever engaged the enemy. Some time before March 31, after 
the troops had started advancing along the Grand Canal, 
Lea suffered a stroke which left him in a coma for a few 
days resulting in paralysis. On the advice of his doctor, 
and since he was obviously of little use as a general con-
sidering the state of his health, Lea returned to California. 
Sun apparently abandoned the attack when Lea left. As late 
as July 27, 1912, Lea wrote Sun that he hoped his health 
would shortly improve, permitting him to return to China 
and to Sun's service. His hopes were short-lived, however,

18Lo, "The Overseas Chinese and Chinese Politics, 
1899-1911," p. 8, letter from F. N. Maude to Lea, November 
19, 1911, Powers collection, box 2, folder BB, and letter 
from Major George W. Gibbs to Lea, September 4, 1912, 
Powers collection, box 2, folder BF.

19On February 22, General and Mrs. Homer Lea were 
invited by the Officers and Members of the American Company, 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps, to attend Washington's Birthday 
Ball. Assuming they attended, the campaign must have begun 
after that. Invitation to Washington's Birthday Ball, 
February 22, 1912, Powers collection, box 1, folder AA.
because he died before the year was out.  

What is most confusing about this military maneuver is that Sun Yat-sen resigned in favor of Yüan on February 14, two days after the Ch'ing Emperor had abdicated in favor of a Republic with Y'uan as President. Of the three conditions that Sun imposed on Yüan at this time, only the one requiring Yüan to move the capital from Peking to Nanking was such that Yüan's compliance or lack of same would be immediately visible. Yüan did not move the capital; perhaps after his declaration to this effect, Sun believed an army led by Lea would be able to restore the situation. By reason of Lea's illness if for no other, Sun's hopes were destined to be disappointed. This might explain why Sun did not formally give up his powers of office until April 1, by which time most of the elements formerly supporting him such as the Shanghai bourgeoisie had abandoned him.

---

20 Letter from Homer Lea to P. J., no date, records some of this military expedition. Powers collection, box 1, folder AD. There are many letters in the Powers collection relative to the severity of his stroke and Chapin, Powers and the Dinégar-Kolb manuscripts all refer to these same events. Also, see letter from Lea to Sun, July 27, 1912, Powers collection, box 3, folder CD.


22 Ibid., p. 88.
After Yuan became President, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao participated in his government as head of a political party of opposition. Wu T'ing-fang resigned from the government, and K'ang Yu-wei, loyal to the Imperial ideal, also refused to cooperate with Yuan. In September of 1912, Sun accepted an appointment in Yuan's government as developer of railways; Sun did not oppose Yuan until March of 1913, when Yuan's agents assassinated the newly-elected Premier of China in order to consolidate Yuan's power. Yuan, no republican, later tried to make himself Emperor.

In developing railways, Sun used some of Homer Lea's friends as his agents. The former instructors of Chinese cadets in the United States, meanwhile, threatened to sue Homer Lea because they had not been taken to China to share in the "glory," as they had been promised, but Lea's death put an end to these threats. Officers in the United States National Guard applied through Lea for jobs in the military service for the Chinese Republic, and just before dying, Lea started to make plans to send large

23 Ting, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, v. l, p. 379.
24 Bergère, La bourgeoisie chinoise, pp. 101, 106.
25 Letter from Sun to Lea, October 13, 1912 and resolution by Homer Lea, no date, Powers collection, box 3, folder CB and box 1, folder AA-33, and letter from Major George W. Gibbs to Lea, September 4, 1912, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF.
numbers of American officers to China.\textsuperscript{26}

In the United States, during the period April, 1912 to May, 1913, American officials wrestled with the idea of when to recognize the Republic of China. These debates, intimately linked to the fortunes of the Consortium loan, were complicated by Chinese attempts to secure a private loan from American (and other) capitalists. But this time, it was not Sun Yat-sen who was negotiating in the name of China. Standard Oil and a New York firm, H. B. Hollins Company tried unsuccessfully to come to an agreement with the new republic.\textsuperscript{27}

When Woodrow Wilson became President in March of 1913, and repudiated the American involvement in the Consortium loan, this did not cause the loan to collapse. Instead, this action seems to have accelerated negotiations between Yuan and the Consortium powers, which minus the United States, signed an agreement with Yuan on April 27, 1913. The\textit{New York Times} reported that because Yuan accepted the loan after the Chinese Parliament had rejected it, a civil war might occur. The\textit{Times} further noted that

\textsuperscript{26}Letter from Harry B. Kirtland to Major General Homer Lea, May 29, 1912 and letter from Lea to Sun, July 27, 1912, Powers collection, box 2, folder BF and box 3, folder CB.

Sun and other republican leaders were in Shanghai trying to purchase "millions of dollars" of arms from foreign firms.\textsuperscript{28} It was under these circumstances that Wilson chose to recognize the Chinese Republic in a ceremony in which E. T. Williams, representing the United States, presented the Chinese government with the formal recognition papers.\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{New York Times} as well as American missionary circles, to whom Yuan had recently appealed for a day of prayer that China's problems would soon be solved, approved of this move.\textsuperscript{30} China had been welcomed back into the family of nations.

In conclusion, American government aid to the Chinese exiles was never great enough to change their political situation and, in the case of Sun Yat-sen, hardly went beyond the mere tolerance of his presence in this country. Certain individuals, of course, such as Homer Lea and Paul M. W. Linebarger, had important connections with United States government officials and at the same time worked with dedication for the cause (or causes) of the Chinese. However, their work seems in the end to have been largely ineffectual. K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao were received with more


\textsuperscript{30}\textit{Ibid.}
official honors in this country than was Prince Pu-Lon, who attended the St. Louis Trade Fair in 1904, but their visits do not seem to have affected American foreign policy. The Reformers' declining influence in China after 1905, and their support and possible instigation of the anti-American boycott in 1906 marked the end of American sympathy for K'ang Yu-wei. Big capitalists considered very seriously the possibility of lending money to Sun Yat-sen's forces, but the republicans' refusal to permit American firms to dictate the way their money was to be employed, which in effect would have meant that Americans would direct the Chinese revolution, made these capitalists reluctant to commit money to Sun. In addition, the capitalists lacked confidence in his ability to succeed. Accordingly, when money was lent, it went first to the Imperial Government, and then, except for President Wilson's interference, to Yuan Shih-k'ai. Both were willing to accept the dictates of high finance. In fact, the American group loaned money to the Peking government (as opposed to Sun Yat-sen's group) in 1917.

K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Sun Yat-sen all failed to achieve their political ideals. Their failure can largely be explained by their own lack of political acumen. K'ang Yu-wei remained essentially
a Confucian scholar in a no-longer Confucian world. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who finally eschewed revolution because he thought China was not yet prepared for democratic government, joined Yüan Shih-k'ai's regime just long enough to be once again disillusioned and help lead the revolt against him in 1916. After that debacle and Yüan's death, Liang remained in the Peking area trying to turn warlord governments into a representative parliamentary system. Sun Yat-sen, who recognized that China could not immediately achieve his ideals of nationalism, democracy, and "peoples' livelihood" (socialism), nevertheless suffered from the related weaknesses of lacking a base of support in the Chinese political scene and being unable to achieve efficiency in government. As an idealist, he had some success, attested to by his continued political life. As a revolutionary, he was very important, although not the direct author of the October revolution nor the victor in the struggle against Yüan Shih-k'ai. As a president, he left something to be desired.

Finally, the United States did not support the exiles. But it is to be wondered whether their cause would have succeeded even with this support. K'ang Yu-wei hoped on the one hand that the treaty powers would remove the reactionary members of the Ch'ing court from the government and reinstate the Emperor with K'ang as his tutor. On the
other hand, he hoped that the powers would not make the course of his military expedition of 1900 more difficult, by denying his followers free passage through their territory. Even had K'ang and Liang succeeded in re-establishing themselves in 1900, Sun may well have continued to agitate for revolution, because K'ang's essential conservatism disavowed democracy, republicanism, and theories of social equality. In addition, K'ang's and the Emperor's failure in 1898 was in part due to their inability to implement their decrees. Had the Empress Dowager led no coup, this ignorance of the devices of practical politics would probably have compounded the national weakness from which China was already known to suffer, which weakness contributed greatly toward the willingness of the gentry and the bourgeoisie to cooperate with the T'ung-meng Hui in 1911.

Sun, on the other hand, complained very justly that his lack of funds seriously endangered an already delicate cause. With money, he would not have had to pressure the Shanghai capitalists into contributing to his government, and their support of him might therefore not have wavered. Money would also have made his military campaign more successful because of being able to launch a larger and better-equipped army into the field. Even this, however, might not have been enough to give him the support and
sympathy necessary to restructure the Chinese state according to his principles, especially in view of the fact that he had not yet even convinced all the members of the T'ung-meng Hui of exactly what were the principles for which they were fighting.

In spite of their shortcomings, K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Sun Yat-sen had significant impact and fostered major changes. K'ang Yu-wei was the first important political figure in China to champion people's rights, constitutional and parliamentary government for China, and the large-scale commercialization and industrialization of the country. Internal commerce was well-developed in China by the beginning of the nineteenth century, but K'ang wanted China to compete in world markets. Industrialization had been suggested by leading Chinese at least as early as the 1860's, but was seen largely in relation to questions of national defense. K'ang wanted to raise the standard of living of the ordinary citizen as well as defend the nation. In addition, he advocated radical reform in the realm of education.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's chief significance lay in his championing and spreading K'ang's ideas through the various newspapers he edited. Through the medium of these same newspapers, he was responsible for introducing many Western ideas to China, as well. Finally, from 1911 until his
death, he actively attempted to lead a political party of "the loyal opposition" to balance the other forces in the government. In other words, he was a true parliamentarian, although his efforts were not always rewarded with success.

Sun Yat-sen's importance lies in the fact that from 1896 until his death in 1925 (excluding a few brief months after Yuan Shih-k'ai became First President of the Republic of China), he consistently advocated revolution. China produced other revolutionary leaders during the same period, but their dedication did not last as long as Sun's. Consequently, he became the chief figure to which revolutionary elements would attach themselves. In addition, his ultimate goals were very broad in nature and included a social as well as a political revolution. Although his ideals were sometimes borrowed (Sun, unlike K'ang, was more a man of action than a philosopher) and although he proved ultimately to be incapable of fully achieving these ideals, they harmonized well enough with the realities of the Chinese political scene to have continued life and to influence the more progressive and revolutionary groups in Chinese politics.

During the period 1898-1913, a great deal was changing in China, in the way of life and the way of thinking, and these changes owed much to the thought and actions of K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Sun Yat-sen. The
United States could have made important, positive contributions toward this change, but it did not. With too little faith in China's ability, too much interest in immediate dividends, and too little understanding of the forces behind the Chinese revolution, Americans were not able to perceive what were those issues with which the United States could most justly and profitably make common cause.
APPENDIX
Wu Ting-fang, sometimes Minister from China to the United States, was best known in this country for his role during the Boxer Rebellion and for his opposition to the American laws limiting Chinese immigration into this country. Since Wu did join the Chinese revolutionaries prior to 1911, and since he was Minister to the United States from 1898-1903 and from 1907-1909, it is to be wondered what he may have done on behalf of the revolutionaries that would have involved Americans. It is hard to know exactly when he joined Sun's group; probably after 1906, in which year he officially retired from service in the Ch'ing government because of his frustration with the court's unwillingness to reform. (Linda Pomera Shin, "China in Transition: the Role of Wu Ting-fang (1842-1922)," (PhD dissertation presented to the University of California at Los Angeles, 1970), p. 343-345.) However, it is interesting to note that when the father of Sun Yat-sen's ally, Ho Kai, was jailed in 1895 in order to punish Ho Kai for helping Sun escape China, it was Wu Ting-fang who, in 1901, got him out of jail. Wu, of course, was a brother-in-law of Ho Kai. (Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), p. 43.)
In 1909, Wu, then in the United States, agitated for the abolition of the queue, a movement supported by and perhaps suggested to him by Sun's T'ung-meng Hui. It is perhaps for this reason that the Ch'ing government recalled Wu in August, 1909. Back in China, Wu continued his agitation and started societies for cutting the queue. (Shin, "Wu Ting-fang," p. 370-371.) In 1910, the Smithsonian Institute printed an article by Wu in which Wu claimed "the whole nation China, high and low, has been awakened and aroused," demanding a reformed government for China. (Wu Ting-fang, "The Significance of the Awakening of China" in Supplement, Annals of the American Academy of Political Science (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1910), p. 28).

Americans who were personal friends of Wu Ting-fang included Charles Ranlett Flint, Andrew Carnegie, a gentleman whose name transliterates as Lang-wei-lo (Longfellow?) (letter from Linda Shin to the author, May 18, 1971), William Randolph Hearst and Austin P. Brown. Mr. Brown, real estate, railroad and corporate financier, claimed in 1911 that Wu was the real leader of the revolutionary forces; a statement which although incorrect, suggests he knew that Wu had been working for the revolutionary party before that date, and perhaps even knew some of the details of that work. (United States House of Representatives,
Wu incidentally, had been interested in the possibilities of American capitalists helping to develop China's industrial potential. In 1898 he arranged for the American-China Development Company, of which J. P. Morgan was a major stockholder, to be granted the concession to build a railway from Hankow to Canton. (Shin, "Wu Ting-fang," p. 199-200.) In 1900 and again in 1903, he published articles in the United States explaining American's chance to enrich themselves in China through investments in that country. (Wu Ting-fang, "Mutual Helpfulness between China and the United States" in Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution for the year ending June 30, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 565-574, and Wu Ting-fang, "Chinese and Western Civilization" in Harper's Monthly Magazine (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publications, January, 1903), p. 192.) But he hoped these developments would benefit China and when the American-China Development Company in 1905 seemed to be acting against the best interests of China, Wu pressed for the cancellation of the concession, and the company had to sell its interests back to the Imperial Government. Furthermore, he supported China's boycott of American goods in 1905 and 1906. It was
perhaps for this reason that when he was reappointed Minister to the United States in 1908 (over his own objections), the American government seriously considered refusing to accept him as Minister. Henry Cabot Lodge and John D. Foster called him a "blackmailer" and a scoundrel, but apparently nothing of substance came of these charges, and he arrived in Washington in February of 1908. (Shin, "Wu Ting-fang," p. 369-370. Dr. Shin believes these charges to have been a ruse to disguise the fact that Americans were displeased to have a Minister who lacked influence at the Ch'ing court and could not get railway concessions in Manchuria. She further reports that the file in the National Archives containing proof of Cabot Lodge and Foster's charges was missing when she went there to look for it. Wu's reason for objecting to the appointment was because he had earlier retired from government service.)

In line with this, another suggestion of the kind of action Wu could have taken for the revolutionaries prior to 1911 is found in a report published in January of 1912 written by Elbert Hubbard, presumably a close friend of Wu's. Mr. Hubbard, who called Wu "a radical" reported in 1912 that when Charles M. Schwab had recently gone to China, he got orders for about $10 million in steel for railroads, steamship-building, and building construction.
"largely through the indirect influence of Wu Ting-fang, who never deals with his party direct, but always at second hand." (Elbert Hubbard, "Trend of the Times" in The World To-day (World Review Co., January 1912), p. 1682-1683.) Presumably, Wu could have worked in the same indirect fashion for Sun at other times and in other respects. One difficulty in tracking down the truth or lack of truth of these hypotheses is that Wu's personal library was seized by the Japanese at Shanghai in 1937 and much has yet to be recovered. In addition, his daughter, currently residing in Hongkong, seems unavailable for comment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Manuscripts and Interviews

Boothe, Lawrence. Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Stanford University.


Ceccetti, Bruce. Interview with the author, April 2, 1971.


Legislative, Judicial and Diplomatic Records Division, National Archives and Records Service. Letter with enclosures from Legislative, Judicial and Diplomatic Records Division to the author, received June 25, 1971.


Los Angeles Headquarters, County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. Telephone interview with the author, April 2, 1971.
Ma, Shueh-yuan. Letter from Ma Shueh-yuan to Ma Jeong-huei, November 28, 1970.

Parker, Elmer O., Assistant Director, Old Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service. Letter with enclosures from Elmer O. Parker to the author, March 2, 1971.

Powers, Joshua B. collection. Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace, Archives, Stanford University.


Wu, Patrick and Mrs. K. Y. Wu. Interview with the author, April 2, 1971.


Wu, Patrick. "Bibliography Compiled Concerning the History, Carrier (Career) and Life of Wu Ting-fang (1842-1922)" unpublished paper, University of California at Los Angeles, 1969.
II. Published Official Documents


United States Secretary of War. *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900,* part 1-9; Washington: Government Printing Office; 1900.

United States Secretary of War. *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901;* Government Printing Office; 1901.


III. Books


Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (梁启超). Record of a Trip to the New World (Shen Ta-lu Yu-chi). (Publishing data not available; book available at Harvard-Yenching Institute) 1905.


**IV. Articles**


Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. (梁啟超). "Record of a Trip to Hawaii (Hsia-wei-yi Yu-chi)." Found in unidentified larger work sent to the author by Harvard-Yenching Library, p. 185-196.


V. Newspapers and Periodicals

The Friend (Board of the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, Publishers), 1902-1904.

Los Angeles Examiner. 1903-1905.

Los Angeles Times. 1903-1907.


Pacific Commercial Advertiser. 1900-1903.
San Francisco Examiner. 1903-1907.
Washington Bee. 1905.

VI. Unpublished Theses, Dissertations and Papers


VII. Indices and Bibliographies

Chief Clerk of the Department of the Interior. Official Register of the United States... 1905.


